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It is one o f the few unquestioned axioms in sociology that the two 
founding fathers o f the discipline as we know it are Emile 
Durkheim and Max Weber. This fact has remained practically 
unaltered since Parsons had published his seminal work in 1937, 
in spite o f the time that has passed since and the amount of 
debates to which it gave rise. The only major change was that by 
now Marx has become generally accepted as the third major 
founding figure, forming thus a holy trinity, as confirmed by the 
representative works of Giddens (1976) and Habermas (1984).
In this dominant concensus, the minor fact that Durkheim and 
Weber respectively ignored each other's work, though the}' were 
contemporaries and knew about each other, has escaped attention 
until 1966 when Edward Tiryakian called attention to the point 
(Tiryakian 1966). Since then, a minor discussion has been taken 
place (Steiner 1992), but it did not succeed to elevate the issue 
beyond the conventional academic debate on "influences". Quite 
recently it was still referred to as "the strange Weber-Durkheim 
nonrelation" (Nipperdey 1993, p. 78).
The aim of this paper is to shift this issue at the center o f interest 
by claiming that seen from the right angle it addresses the status 
and identity o f sociology as a discipline. It intends to do so by 
providing a novel conceptual framework and by introducing 
_tu tain facts that so far have been overlooked. Concerning the 
latter, it has been often asserted that the mutual lack o f 
recognition was due to the different national and disciplinary 
backgrounds o f Durkheim and Weber. There is nothing surprising 
in the fact, so it is argued, that at the beginning o f the 20th 
century, and just before WWI, a French sociologist and a German 
economic historian ignored each other. However, the picture 
would become different if it were the case that the most 
important formative experiences o f the two thinkers were quite 
close, indeed almost identical. Concerning the former, the paper 





























































































The paper intends to reconsider the foundations o f sociology, an 
issue that has received some attention lately (Baehr and O'Brien, 
1994). It aims therefore high. However, it order to make its 
points, it has to go very low, into the level o f small detail. There 
are three reasons for this. First, so much has been written on the 
Pasonian synthesis that it is not possible to say something new 
with the help o f the elegant manipulation o f a few basic ideas. 
Second, however, something new must be written as the problems 
so far have not been solved. The main reason is that the solution 
is to be found not at the level o f ideas, but in their conditions of 
possibility. This requires a close reading o f neglected or minor 
texts and a patient pursuit o f often almost imperceptible 
biographical and contextual details. Third, the paper will present 
and apply a new methodology, based especially on the writings of 
Weber, Voegelin, Foucault and Victor Turner. The aim is to root 
ideas in experiences that problematise what has been taken for 
granted and stamp the track o f thought, constituting a "positive 
unconscious" that defines the possibilities and the limits o f 
thought and that cannot be overcome without a difficult and long 
reflexive work o f thought upon itself.
Therefore, in case the reader feels lost in detail or is uncertain 
about the reasons to pursue them, it may be appropriate to start 
the paper at its conclusions.
2. On founding experiences
Today, in the age o f post-modernism and anti-foundationalism, it 
seems to be particularly untimely and inappropriate to talk about 
"foundations". However, on closer inspection, the discourse o f anti- 
foundationalism turns out to have rather specific targets. It either 
attacks the idea of a singular act o f intellectual foundation or the 
claim that the foundations are just out there as things existing in 
reality, only to be discovered and represented in a system. This 
paper, however, neither refers to founding theoretical acts, nor 
does it claim that there are objective bases for a science o f society 




























































































attention upon certain founding experiences. The way the concept 
"experience" is used in the paper requires some explanation.
First o f all, as the historical record shows, all major break-points 
in the history o f Western thought are associated with the works of 
single individuals. Take away Socrates and Plato, Jesus and Paul, 
Augustine and Luther, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Descartes - only 
nine persons during the span o f over two thousand years -, and 
the whole history o f Western thought becomes unintelligible, 
indeed impossible to conceive. Second, the works o f all these 
thinkers were very close to their lives, their own personal 
experiences. They were "empirically rooted", were elaborations 
and reflections upon the events and experiences they have 
themselves encountered. Of this, there is a telling proof. While the 
contemporary, and much critised, concept o f a "foundation" 
involves a closed and complete intellectual system, a theoretical 
treatise, the most important founding moments o f thought were 
often associated with individuals who failed to write down a 
single word, and almost without exception were contained in 
types o f documents that are today considered as o f limited 
scholarly value, like biographies and autobiographies, dialogues 
and letters, commentaries and meditations, stories about acts 
committed and prescriptive manuals. (1)
Third, it is not enough to state that these works were closely 
based upon personal experiences. The experiences that proved to 
be strong enough to become the driving force for the formation of 
significant streams and traditions o f thought had to be o f a special 
kind. They had to possess two important characteristics. The first 
was external. All persons mentioned lived in periods o f major 
socio-political upheavals that could be defined as wholesale 
dissolutions o f order. Socrates and Plato lived through the crisis 
and collapse o f the polis (Athens), Jesus and Paul were born 
shortly after the same thing had happened to the Republic (Rome), 
while Machiavelli witnessed the collapse o f  republican 
government in Italy (Florence). These three periods are cases o f a 
highly scarce type, as these were the final moments o f the only 




























































































the modern period. Augustine was a contemporary to the collapse 
o f the Roman Empire, Luther came in the final stage o f the waning 
o f the Middle Ages (the collapse o f the Church), while Descartes 
and Hobbes lived at the end of a long period of religious and civil 
wars, during the thirty years' war (the collapse o f the Holy 
Empire) and the glorious revolution. One could argue that none of 
them were preoccupied with theory building for its own sake. 
They were rather thinking about the way to put an end to chaos 
and reflecting on the reasons for the collapse. It was exactly this 
experiential concerns that gave their works such a solid 
foundation and a resounding effect.
Second, in most cases, the origins o f theses works can be assigned 
to a single moment, a decisive experience. Plato's experience o f 
the death o f Socrates, the conversion o f Paul and Augustine, the 
illumination o f Descartes in the stove-heated room are too well- 
known to require a detailed description. It is important, however, 
to clarify one point. Such experiences are often associated 
exclusively with mystical or supernatural phenomena, and this is 
used to discredit by definition any reference to the experiential 
basis o f thought. This is only one o f the strategies employed to 
normalise such experiences and deny their validity, the other 
being the exaggerated emphasis put on matters o f doctrine and 
dogma. In this manner, the founding moments o f human thought 
are taken away from the human beings who experienced them or 
who could do so again, and are assigned to distant inaccessible 
supernatural forces and normalised and systematised creeds. In 
fact, the techniques o f normalisation are the same for modern 
rational thought as well, one only needs to replace the emphasis 
on transcendence with "universality" and the emphasis on dogma 
with the predilection for "system", "general theory" and "method”. 
In both cases, the possibility o f experience and understanding is 
sacrificed for the sake o f a repetitive, ceremonial knowledge, 
justified by the claim o f "responsibility". (2)
Such arguments, however, are never able to explain the 
extraordinary impact these experiences have gained. It is a matter 




























































































moment that enabled Saulus to expand a small heretical Jewish 
sect into the most powerful religion o f the world, or Augustine to 
write an autobiography - an innovation that had to wait almost 
1000 years to find a follower. (3) The history o f thought, read in 
the proper manner, bears a striking witness to the human power 
to experience life, amidst the most adverse conditions, as opposed 
"structural" or "materialistic" determinism.
All these examples, one could say, belong to the remote past. 
However, it is not difficult to find more recent, even contemporary 
cases. Far from being uncharacteristic o f our age, there is rather a 
pronounced accentuation, an unprecedented emphasis on 
biographical and autobiographical references in thought since the 
end o f the 19th century. The references will again be restricted to 
the best known and most important cases.
Starting with literature, the two most important sources o f 
inspiration for the modern novel, both being at once highly 
autobiographical and close to reflexive thought — the Ulysses of 
James Joyce and Remembrance o f Things Past o f Marcel Proust 
have been traced to a very specific source: the events o f a single 
day in one case, a distinct smell and the childhood experiences it 
evoked in the other (O'Connor, 1993). But singular moments also 
proved to be decisive for some o f the most important historical 
projects o f the century. This applies to the more encompassing 
globals works o f Toynbee and Spengler, just as two uniquely 
innovative and influential single historical theses o f the century, 
Huizinga's idea about the twilight o f the Middle Ages and 
Pirenne's insight concerning the link between Mahomet and 
Charlemagne. (4)
Moving further, the same could be stated about philosophy. 
Nietzsche's most important work and idea, the Zarathustra and 
the concept o f the eternal return could be traced back to a 
singular experience he had in Sils Maria, "6000 feet beyond man 
and time." (1966, p. 295). Edmund Husserl, in his Cartesian 
Meditations , renewed a genre, "meditations", that is very close to 




























































































philosophy since the time o f Descartes. The most important works 
o f William James are rooted in a spiritual crisis he had in 1869 
and an experience o f 1898 (James, 1952, p. v-vi). Eric Voegelin 
realised that it is not possible to write about the history o f ideas, 
it is necessary to reconstruct the experiential basis o f thought, 
while reading a work o f Schelling (Voegelin 1989, p. 68). Michel 
Foucault's whole work has been based on the experience o f 
reading Nietzsche's Untimely Meditations in 1953 (Pinguet 1986), 
while The. Order o f Things was rooted in a single laugh he had 
while reading an essay o f Borges (Foucault 1973, p. xv).
Finally, the same considerations apply to some o f the most 
important and innovative works in the social sciences as well. All 
o f Pareto's late, sociological work was inspired by a singular 
experience that happened in 1897, transforming the liberal 
economist into a sociologist o f the illogical (Finer 1966, p. 11). 
Personal experiences also played a major role in the genesis o f the 
works o f Robert Michels (1989) or Norbert Elias (1991). Victor 
Turner developed his approach about liminality and communitas 
while reading van Gennep, being in a "liminal" situation himself 
(Edith Turner 1985).
Given these facts, one could expect that Durkheim and Weber may 
also have had some crucial formative experiences that defined 
and gave direction to their thought. However, before embarking 
on such a search, it is necessary specify the exact target. First o f 
all, it was already pointed out that for contemporary social 
scientists, the decisive experiences were often encountered while 
reading. Especial attention should be therefore placed on those 
authors who could have exerted a particular effect on Durkheim 
or Weber. Second, significant experiences altering the course o f 
(Western) thought only happened during periods o f deep crisis; in 
the words o f Arnold Toynbee, in "times o f trouble"; in the 
language preferred by the paper, dissolutions o f order. This 
condition is met in our case as both the first, pioneer, and the 
second, classical stage in the birth o f sociology coincided with such 




























































































However, the modern period and sociology, the "par excellence" 
modern science, do possess an additional characteristic: the ability 
and need to reflect explicitly on the contemporary age. In all the 
previous periods o f crisis, the fact o f crisis only provoked an 
intensified reflection on the human condition as such. However, 
since the period o f Enlightenment, there has been a heightened 
awareness o f the feeling o f living in a particular, unique period of 
time. According to the independent but mutually reinforcing 
analyses by Michel Foucault and Norbert Elias, modern philosophy 
and sociology represented two parallel responses to the same 
dilemma.
Foucault argues his point in a commentary on Kant, while Elias in 
a discussion o f Comte. The similarity o f the exposition and the 
points is indeed striking. According to Foucault, Kant stands at the 
origin o f the two main threads in modern philosophy: the concern 
with the truth value o f statements, an analytic philosophy o f 
truth: and also a concern with the particular moment in which the 
philosopher was writing, a "reflection on "today" as difference in 
history and as motive for a particular philosophical task", a critical 
ontology o f the present (1988, p. 95; 1984, p. 38).
Mutatis mutandis , Elias says much the same things about Comte 
(1970). He argues that Comte should be credited with the 
founding o f sociology not only because he coined the word (a feat 
not to be belittled), but also as he defined the dual tasks sociology 
has not ceased to pursue since. On the one hand, this was an 
empirical analysis o f the social condition, using, in so far as 
possible, the methods and techniques o f the natural sciences; on 
the other, sociology also represented a break in the history o f 
thought because it was an explicit attempt to understand the 
contemporary age (modernity) as a special moment, a difference 
in history. Thus, one could expect some kind o f increased and 
thematised awareness concerning their age in the case o f both 
Durkheim and Weber.
Third, the question is not simply about influences and teachers. At 




























































































focus on the most significant experiences, and to substantiate the 
evidence with some additional proof, related especially to matters 
o f personal or professional identity. In other words, in order to be 
strong enough to become the founding experience o f sociology, the 
key formative experiences o f Durkheim and Weber must be 
related to the basic problems o f the age in which they were living, 
while at the same time touching the heart o f their personal and 
professional identities.
The fact that major breakthroughs in thought are related to 
certain founding experiences has been demonstrated by the 
evidence listed above. A theoretical underpinning relies upon the 
works o f Voegelin (1978), Foucault (1984) and Turner (1985), but 
takes as its starting point the writings o f Weber. The way in which 
non conscious processes influence thought and action has been 
much in the center o f Weber's work. However, as opposed to 
Freud, and similarly to Schütz (1962), Bateson (1972) or Goffman 
(1974), he did not search for such factors outside thought, in 
instincts, impulses, or drives, but in certain hidden and taken for 
granted mental habits. This is the underlying idea behind his 
famous switchmen metaphor (Weber 1948a, p. 280). Under 
normal conditions, much o f the mental framework o f our action is 
unproblematic, taken for granted, routine. It provides a fixed 
track, the limits inside which actual behaviour and competition 
between individuals is governed by objective phenomena like 
interests. However, in certain moments, the framework breaks 
down, everything becomes up in the air, to be rethought and 
redefined. In such periods, the previous guideines for action like 
stable interests and values no longer provide a stable reference 
point. They will only operate once the new framework has been 
found and settled.
The previous account describes the process in a nutshell, but does 
not specify how the change could effectively takes place. Weber's 
work provided guidelines for each o f these points. (5) First, the 
passing away o f the taken for granted framework is not to be 
taken lightly. It is not simply a matter o f "progress", but is lived 




























































































for the understanding o f the actual path o f history therefore 
requires a sensitivity to this process on the part o f the researcher, 
implying a similar experiential basis. (6 ) Second, though the 
process o f decomposition implies a major socio-political upheaval, 
its analysis also requires a difficult work upon one's own 
preconceptions. If Hegel's famous dictum about the owl o f 
Minerva has a deep meaning, this is the realisation that scholars 
often keep using the same categories o f thought that no longer 
apply to the changed conditions. The struggle against the way 
certain categories o f obsolete thought exert an influence has been 
at the forefront o f the most important innovators o f the 20th 
century like Weber, Keynes and Foucault - and it is not accidental 
that they mostly ended up being misunderstood and classified 
into the very framework they wanted to escape. (7)
Third, however, the work of reflexive thought still cannot provide 
answers, a way out. Just as the first step, the collapse o f the old 
framework had an experiential basis, so it must be with the 
establishment o f the new. Weber discusses the mental part o f this 
operation under the concept o f "stamping". (8) This concept, 
central for the understanding of Weber, has so far hardly received 
any attention, though it was prominently present in a crucial 
segment o f his work, the 'Introduction' published in 1915 to the 
series o f writings entitled "The Economic Ethics o f World 
Religions", the first publication based on his substantive research 
accomplished after 1910 in which he reflected upon the basic 
stakes o f that endeavour (Tenbruck 1980).
Immediately after the introductory sentences, on the second page 
o f the paper, he defines his aim as an "attempt to peel o ff the 
directive elements in the life-conduct of those social strata which 
have most strongly influenced the practical ethic o f their 
respective religions" (Weber 1948a, p. 268), and immediately 
adds a methodological comment: "[tjhese elements have stamped 
the most characteristic fetures upon practical ethics". Later, still in 
the introductory part o f this Introduction, he emphasises that, 
despite the importance o f social, economic, and political influences, 




























































































sources, and, first o f all, from the content o f its annunciation and 
its promise" (p. 270). Even though a change in the socially decisive 
strata for a particular religion has a key importance, "the type of 
religion, once stamped, has usually exerted a rather far-reaching 
influence upon the life-conduct o f very heterogenous strata." 
Finally, at the end o f the first part o f the paper which is an 
extended and subtle critique o f Nietzsche's Genealogy o f Morals , 
Weber qualifies his undertaking by stating that he makes no 
attempt at a systematic study o f the way various psychic-religious 
states gave psychological stamp to different religions, will only 
gives a few indications (p. 279) and adds thatithe difference 
between theoretical or practical rationalism o f the life-conduct of 
the relevant strata will bear different stamps (pp. 279-80). It is 
directly in the next paragraph that the famous switchmen- 
metaphor is used.
Though Weber developed his concept o f stamping for his sociology 
o f religions, the application can be extended for the analysis o f the 
way single individual experiences stamp non-religious systems o f 
thought. In this way, the paper now possesses the conceptual tools 
to analyse the experiences underlying the foundations o f modern 
sociology.
3. The major formative experiences o f Durkheim
The biographical evidence about Emile Durkheim (15 April, 1858 - 
15 November,1917) is particularly meagre. One o f the reasons for 
this scarcity is Durkheim's extreme reluctance in disclosing 
biographical details. The secondary accounts are very repetitive, 
as they rely upon the same sources: a couple o f personal 
recollections, especially a major article by Davy (1919) and an 
Introduction by Mauss (1928), and a few scattered remarks in 
letters and reviews is all we have.
Among the scarce sources, concerning major formative 
experiences, there are only two available pieces o f information. In 




























































































the same episode that he clearly considered to be decisive for his 
work. The story by now is well known. In a 8 November 1907 
letter, written as a protest to a point o f criticism raised in an 
article about the German origins o f his work, he stated that it was 
in 1895 that "for the first time, I found a means o f tackling 
sociologically the study o f religion. It was a revelation to me. That 
lecture course marks a watershed in my thinking, so much so that 
all my previous research had to be started all over again so as to 
be harmonised with these new views", adding that the real source 
o f that experience was "the works o f Robertson Smith and his 
school." (Durkheim 1982, p.259-60). Six years later, in a review- 
article o f the book version o f the same argument, he repeated the 
point (Durkheim 1975 [1913], pp. 405-7; Engl. trsl. Lukes, 237-8).
Concerning the positive content o f Durkheim's disclosure, there 
are a series o f excellent analyses available. Lukes (1973, pp. 238- 
44) provided a detailed commentary about what Durkheim could 
have meant by this statement. Pickering (1984) has demonstrated 
with much care the exact impact the experience had on 
Durkheim's views on religion. Jones has published a series o f 
articles (1981, 1986, 1991) dealing with the exact links between 
the views o f Durkheim and Mauss on the one hand, and Robertson 
Smith, Lrazer and other British anthropologists on the other, 
finally, in two bold and ingenous articles, Edward Tyriakian came 
up with two different models o f explananation (1979, 1981). In 
one, he compared and contrasted Durkheim's 1912 book with the 
book of revelation by John; in the other, he hypothesised that the 
impact o f the reading o f Robertson Smith was related to 
Durkheim's Jewish identity. (11).
The interpretation proposed here will be complementary and not 
competetive with the previous efforts, as it will center on a 
negative aspect o f the disclosure. Though there is no reason to 
doubt the truth o f the information Durkheim left us, there are 
some puzzling elements about it. First o f all, he was already 37 
years old at the time w-hen he encountered the book o f Robertson 
Smith. Two o f his four major books have already published before, 




























































































new substantive interest (Pickering 1984). The effect was 
restricted to his last work, focusing around the sociology o f 
religion. It did not alter his basic sociological outlook in a 
fundamental manner.
Of this, there is a telling fact. Durkheim first published the Rules 
in 1894-5. At that time, he emphasised that its results were 
provisional, in need o f further revisions. The second edition 
appeared in 1902. The reading experience that has happened to 
Durkheim just after the completion of the first edition would have 
provided ample opportunity for making corrections, if they were 
deemed necessary. However, apart from a new Preface that 
mostly dealt with critics, the new edition has remained unaltered 
(Lukes 1982, p. 7).
The question is whether it would be possible to find traces o f 
other, earlier formative experience(s) for Durkheim, and whether 
this could be connected in some way to this major disclosure. For 
this, we have to return to the biographical details. However, 
before doing so, it may be worthwhile returning to a bit more 
thorough analysis o f Durkheim's description o f his encounter o f 
Robertson Smith and the circumstances under which this piece of 
evidence came to light, all the more so as there are additional 
puzzles surrounding it.
Durkheim's characterisation o f Robertson Smith is hardly more 
than a few lines. Yet, it contains two imprécisions that, given the 
context, are bound to be meaningful. First, he talks about 
Robertson Smith and "his school". The problem is that such a 
school simply did not exist. Robertson Smith was a crucial link in 
the chain o f thought between Scottish Enlightenment and the 
present, but he did not create a "school". His most important 
student and protégé was the famous anthropologist James Frazer. 
Frazer had a high esteem o f Smith, wrote a respectful obituary, 
but has soon abandoned most o f the ideas specific to Robertson 
Smith, and all but returned to the tradition o f Tylor. The only 
school proper on whom Robertson Smith had a significant impact 




























































































only formed after 1907, and Durkheim was already a main 
influence on them.
Second, Durkheim claims that "the science o f religions is 
essentially English and American: not at all German” (Lukes 1973, 
p. 238). This, however, is plainly false. The school o f Biblical 
criticism to which Robertson Smith belonged was established by 
Wellhausen and was part o f a long German tradition that, through 
Ritschl, Ewald and Baur, went back to Schleiermacher, ultimately 
to Luther. Even to consider Robertson Smith as a par excellence 
British thinker is highly misleading. As the recent monograph on 
Robertson Smith has put it, his main significance lies in the fact 
that he introduced and popularised certain continental, especially 
German and Dutch ideas in Britain (Beidelman 1974).
In the single piece o f information disclosing the major formative 
experience o f his life-work, contrasting the allegations o f the 
German roots o f his thinking, Durkheim invents an English and 
American school around a Scottish thinker whose main 
achievement was the transmission o f German ideas and methods 
to the island. The whole account therefore clearly cannot be 
accepted at face value. It is necessary to search for the formative 
influences o f Durkheim, possibly related to Germany and his own 
identity.
Due to the scarcity o f available information and based on the 
indications provided by Durkheim himself, commentators usually 
skip over the bare biographical facts in a few pages and then 
elaborate in some more detail on the formative intellectual 
influences o f Durkheim. The evidence is equivocal, the same 
names being repeated and for the same reasons. It is well known 
that the major classics o f sociology, especially Comte, but also 
Saint-Simon exerted an influence of his thought, and that later he 
came under the spell o f Spencer and Espinas. He has also read 
Kant and used for the purpose, as a "handbook” the works o f 
Renouvier. Among his teachers, only two, Fustel de Coulanges and 




























































































There is only one contentious name, Ernest Renan. Lukes, 
following Durkheim, only mentions Renan in order to dismiss any 
possible links between the two (1973, pp. 67-8). However, Peyre 
suggests that "[i]n spite o f his frank distaste for Renan's writings, 
Durkheim was influenced by them more than any historian of 
ideas has yet shown" (Peyre 1960, p.28). It is true that there is a 
definite evidence that Durkheim was particularly irritated by 
Renan's style. In this sense, Renan's thinking is much closer to 
Bergson's than to Durkheim's, and the distance and mutual dislike 
o f Bergson (who was Tarde's successor at the Collège de France ) 
and Durkheim are well-known (Lukes 1973, p. 52). Still, once 
attention is shifted from Renan's style to the content o f his 
thought - and content mattered always more to Durkheim - , the 
more closely one looks at it, the more Renan gains significance for 
some o f the central interests o f Durkheim. In practically all the 
main aspects o f Renan's activity, the closeness to Durkheim's main 
aims and interests are striking. First, Renan was one o f the most 
influential propagators o f science - even called the "priest o f 
science" (Lukes 1973, p. 67). Second, his interest in science was 
increased, indeed raised almost to the level o f a missionary zeal, 
by the French defeat in the 1870-71 war. He has become 
convinced that the German victory was a sign o f a superiority, 
rooted in educational and scientific achievements. (12) However, 
his praise for Germany was not unreserved. Though 
acknowledging his unreserved admiration for German culture 
until the war, he became disillusioned by the excessive patriotism 
the country manifested during the war, and especially by the 
behavior o f its soldiers who were not different from the 
"mercenaries o f all times, vicious, drunkards, thieves, demoralised, 
plundering like in the times o f Waldstein", and predicting that the 
violence committed in Elsace will be the guarantee o f endless wars 
to come (1871, pp. v-vi). Third, Renan was deeply interested in 
Jewish history and identity. His inaugural address at the Collège 
de France delivered on 21 February 1862 was entitled "On the 
part o f Semitic people in the history o f civilisation". Due to Catholic 
opposition to this talk, he was demoted from his chair in 1864 and 




























































































nominated administrator o f the Collège de France , he delivered a 
talk entitled "Judaism as race and as religion".
It is more than a reasonable guess that such questions must have 
appealed to Durkheim, a devotee o f scholarship and the French 
republican ideals, and the heir of several generation o f rabbis. But 
there are further pieces o f evidence that make the connection 
even stricter. First, the 1870-71 war, the decisive experience for 
Renan's (and also Durkheim's) scientific interests was also the 
moment when Durkheim has first encountered signs o f 
antsemitism. (13) Second, Renan's 1883 talk has been given in 
front o f an association called 'The Saint-Simon circle'. I have not 
yet found evidence whether Durkheim was a member o f this 
group or attended the talk. However, given the fact that it was 
exactly in 1882-83 that he was "converted" to Saint-Simonism 
(Mauss 1928), it would be difficult to argue that he did not know 
about the event or was not interested, even intrigued. Finally, it 
was on 11 March 1882, shortly before Durkheim's agrégation , 
that Renan delivered his best known talk 'What Is a Nation' that, 
according to Peyre (1960, p. 29), he probably attended. In sum, in 
spite o f the differences in style, there is a striking convergence 
between the main interests o f Renan and Durkheim - the 
questions o f science, the nation, and Jewish identity, in the context 
o f the shattering events and experiences o f 1870-71.
Finally, there is a telling, and only relatively recently accessible 
evidence about the importance Renan had for Durkheim. It is 
related to the crucial formative years for Durkheim's project. On 6 
August 1883, at the end his first years at the liceum, and very 
shortly after the two major talks o f Renan, Durkheim delivered a 
speech to celebrate the price winners o f his school. This is the first 
public document we have about Durkheims views, published 
posthumously only in 1967. It preceded by two years his first 
written publication. In the speech, he makes reference only to one 
contemporary thinker, already on the first page o f the transcript, 




























































































In order to discover the significance of Durkheim's encounter with 
Renan and of the German connection, it is necessary to leave the 
tracing o f influences and return to biographical details, following 
the chronological order.
Concerning family background and childhood experiences, only a 
few facts are worth mentioning. Durkheim was born on 15 April 
1858. On his father's side, his ancestors were rabbis, back to the 
18th century. He was brought up in a tightly knit family, under 
austere conditions. In his whole educational career, he was an 
extremely serious and devoted student. In the local school, under 
the influence o f a Catholic school-mistress, he went through a 
short period o f mysticism, but quickly overcame this and has 
become distanced from religion after. The most significant event 
o f his whole childhood was no doubt the 1870-71 war.
The Franco-Prussian war o f 1870-71 and the ensuing Commune 
was a fundamental experience to all those major thinkers who 
lived through it, whether they were mature by that time (Marx, 
Taine, Renan), young adults (Nietzsche, Le Bon, Sorel, Kropotkin) 
or - even especially - if they were children (Weber, Durkheim). 
However, in Durkheim's case, there was an additional factor. 
During the German occupation o f his home town, he witnessed, 
and may even have been subject to, anti-semitism (Lukes 1973, p. 
41).
Political events and personal motives and experiences remained 
interconnected for the whole generation. After 1871, France 
became overwhelmed by the defeat and was searching for the 
reasons o f the German superiority. Many older and younger 
members o f the leading elite went to Germany in order to 
discover the reasons. Durkheim, even here, fitted therefore into a 
trend when, in 1885-86, he spent the second part o f his 
"sabbathical" year in Germany, visiting Berlin, Marburg and 
Leipzig (Lukes 1973, p. 85). Though the purpose o f the trip may 
have been strictly practical, given Durkheim's range o f interest 
and capabilities and his age, it is not too risky to conjecture that 




























































































Durkheim. In order to assess this claim, it is necessary to 
reconstruct the exact conditions of the trip. Apart from the 
external conditions, the visit also came about in a very special 
time in the dynamics o f Durkheim's own development.
Apart from the question o f nation, the second problem for which 
Durkheim wanted to use science was the other main issue of the 
day, the "social question" (Procacci 1978, 1993) According to 
Mauss, it was this question that, even during his school years, 
preoccupied Durkheim most. The topic he first formulated for his 
thesis was the link between individualism and socialism and, as 
Mauss pointed out, he has never lost from sight his original 
starting point (Mauss 1928).
However, already by 1883, the question was reformulated. It was 
posed now as the link between the individual and society. Due to 
his more recent readings, the works o f Espinas and especially 
Spencer, his theoretical interests gained an upper hand, and he 
came under the impact o f organicism. Though the assertion of 
Alpert (1939, p. 33) according to which it took him a decade to 
liberate himself from under the impact o f a biological orientation 
may be an exaggeration, it contained more than an element o f 
truth. It was under this impact that he came to formulate, in 
1884, his first plan for Division o f Labor.
This formulation o f the thesis question, however, not only 
distanced him from his more practical interests, but was also an 
extremely general, impossible scholastic project. At that level o f 
generality, the problem o f the "link between the individual and 
society" is a scholastic abstraction, a non-problem. It simply 
cannot be treated with any hope o f completion.
The project, indeed, proved to be unmanageable. At least, 
according to all evidence, point to the fact that before 1886, 
Durkheim has not made any progress on his thesis. All he 
managed to complete in three years were three book reviews 
published in 1885. They show that in 1884-85, the most 




























































































1884 book Bau und Leben des soziales Korpers . One of the 
reviews discussed the book, while the other two repeatedly 
mentioned both Schaffle in general and the book in particular, 
Spencer and Espinas only receiving a few short allusions. Such a 
lack of achievement was certainly not satisfying for a person with 
his ability and ambitions. For the academic year 1885-86, he 
applied for and obtained a leave o f absence. After a few months, 
on the basis o f a conversation with Liard with whom he shared a 
deep commitment concerning the need to renovate the French 
educational system, with an emphasis on "realism" (LaCapra 1985, 
p. 310; Wallwork 1972, p. 12), at the age o f 28, he decided to go to 
Germany for the remaining period.
A simple account o f the facts immediately renders visible the 
impact o f the short visit. Right upon his return, Durkheim started 
serious work. Before the end o f the year, he finished the first 
draft o f Division o f Labor . He also produced a series o f articles, 
mostly based on his German experiences. In these, he began to 
sketch the outlines o f what eventually became his approach to 
sociology. According to Mauss, Durkheim was already clear in his 
mind in 1886 that there was need for the establishment o f a new 
science, sociology. (14) The surge in his creativity did not pass 
unnoticed. By 1887, Durkheim is no longer just a "very serious” 
and "rigorous", though less "penetrating" and somewhat "abstract" 
young high school professor (Lukes 1973, pp. 64-5). He reveals his 
abilities and is nominated for a university post in Bordeaux.
For Durkheim, 1886 clearly represented a break, an acceleration. 
Yet, both Mauss and Lukes loyally take at face value his late 
claims downplaying the German impact. Thus, according to Mauss, 
Durkheim came to the new conclusions in 1886 "by a progressive 
analysis o f his thought and the facts" (1928), while Lukes asserts 
that the influences he encountered during the visit "only clarified 
and reinforced existing tendencies in his thought" (1973, p. 92). It 
is important to clarify the matter before going into the short 




























































































This point adds to the argument already made in the introductory 
section about the manner in which the serious study o f singular 
experiences has been rendered impossible by certain prior 
assumptions concerning their nature and impact. This time, it is 
the assertion that such an experience must be an all-for-nothing, 
global change, after which nothing would remain o f whatever 
existed before. Of course, such experiences rarely if ever happen. 
No matter which thinker is taken as an example, it will always be 
possible to show that the new idea existed in a "rudimentary" 
form even before. However, such an approach would never be 
able to account for the fact why it is only certain thinkers who 
accomplish major breakthroughs in thought. There were countless 
young scholars in the late 19th century who read Spencer and 
Comte, or who were thinking about the relation between the 
individual and society. None o f them did what Durkheim has 
accomplished. If we do not subscribe to the doctrine o f 
predestination - in which case the analysis would be truly 
superfluous -, it is necessary to highlight the exact moment which, 
suddenly crystallising the previous lose trends, made Durkheim, 
the potential young scholar into the Durkheim we know. The facts 
show that this did not simply happen "gradually", that there was a 
crucial moment o f concentration around 1886; and that this 
coincided with his trip to Germany. The trip, therefore, was not 
merely a useful visit to help Durkheim's scientific formation, but 
was a real experience, providing a sudden push. It did not simply 
add to his existing stock o f knowledge, but changed the way he 
saw things and the world, altered his frame o f mind - produced a 
different person, more focused, and armed with a singular 
determination. In Weberian terminology, the visit stamped him, 
set him on a track that has only been altered somewhat in 1895. 
(16)
After establishing the fact o f a major experience, it is necessary to 
present the exact substance o f this experience. Here, the main 
problem is again the shortage o f sources. Apart from the texts 
published by Durkheim and a few additional bits and pieces, even 
the basic facts o f his trip are at the moment beyond reach. One 




























































































Durkheim published two major texts about his visit in Germany. 
One is a detailed study o f the German university system (1975, 
vol.3, pp. 437-86). Though it is very much a scholarly work, 
containing a lot o f information and critical evaluation, the overall 
tone is decisively enthusiastic. There are many things Durkheim 
found remarkable about the German university system - the still 
existing corporate spirit, the seriousness o f the students (p.466), 
the devotion to the nitty-gritty o f work as opposed to the oratorial 
allures characteristic o f France, etc. Though it would be erroneous 
only to contrast the attitudes o f Durkheim and Weber, one cannot 
help noticing that Durkheim found many o f exactly those aspects 
o f the German University system worthy o f copying which Weber, 
following Nietzsche, found most nauseating, like its "spirit o f 
gravity" and its combination o f authoritarian and corporatist 
elements. Weber, on the basis o f his travel experience in the 
United States, wanted to correct exactly those elements o f the 
German system Durkheim deemed worthwhile copying (Weber 
1973, pp. 23-31), while in other cases, he was critical about the 
academic life o f his own country in exactly the same manner as 
Durkheim was o f his own (like being opposed to the abusive 
political rhetorics o f some professors, and the willingness to build 
intellectual systems as opposed to doing the daily business o f 
research).
The second text, a detailed study of main currents in German 
thought, is the more significant piece, and calls for a more detailed 
account (1975, vol.l, pp. 267-343). The introductory first page o f 
the text already defines Durkheim's main purpose in the article, 
alluding to the substance o f his German experience. This is the 
realisation that the science o f morals is not only a theoretical 
possibility, but in fact it has already been established. He assigns 
this breakthrough to the work o f Wilhelm Wundt that has just 
been published in 1886. The same introductory page also 
unequivocally gives the background against which this 
breakthrough represented a difference, both in Germany and 
France: the spiritualists and Kantians on the on hand, and the 




























































































context, these two traditions can safely be assigned to the names 
o f Renouvier and Espinas - exactly those earlier major influences 
on Durkheim that have been both overcome and preserved, in the 
sense o f aufheben , by the German experience.
The article proper consists o f three major parts and a conclusion. 
The first part is about a theme that will become central again for 
Parsons: the relation between economics and sociology. First, 
Durkheim discusses those writers among whom the movement for 
the science o f ethics has started: the German political economists, 
especially the so-called "socialists o f the chair". He starts with an 
implicit self-critique, stating that although in France many talked 
about the group, few have actual read them - a possible allusion 
to the comment he had made about the school in a 1885 review 
(Durkheim 1970, p. 183). The article then introduces what 
"radically distinguishes" (1975, vol.l, p.269) the German from the 
English schools in economics. Much o f the page that follows 
(pp.269-70) is taken up by two long quotes from Schonberg's 
Handbook o f  Political Economy . After indicating that there is 
some problem concerning the precision o f these formulas, 
Durkheim moves on to a detailed discussion o f the ideas o f 
Schmoller and Wagner (pp. 271-82). His conclusion is that though 
they, as opposed to the English economists, are on the proper road, 
they fail to draw the right conclusions o f their own ideas, and 
rather place excessive confidence in legislative action.
One may add here that the affinities between Durkheim and the 
socialists o f the chair, especially Schmoller, indeed proved to be 
close in several areas. First, the latter school serves as an 
important channel o f transmission between the early-modern 
police, an all-purposeful though not all-powerful apparatus o f the 
absolutist state, and the Bolshevik party apparatus. The link 
between the Polizeiwissenschaft, the "science o f police" and the 
German historical school is an established fact (Tribe 1988, 1995). 
The impact o f the German school on Bolshevik economic thought 
has also been pointed out by Tribe (1988, p. 4). The closeness 
between the activity and tasks o f the absolutist police and the 




























































































study (Horvath and Szakolczai, 1992, esp. Ch.8). Finally, the 
Durkheimian idea o f reconstructing "social solidarity" on the basis 
o f the occupational groups, the guiding thread of Division o f Labor 
, reveals a striking affinity with the way the communist parties 
were organised. These were precisely built upon workplace cells, 
and were able to exert such an undisputed power on this basis, 
while all other modern political parties have a territorial 
organisation. The effective power base o f Communism collapsed 
like a mountain o f cards, rendering the changes irreversible, the 
moment political parties were forbidden to organise themselves at 
the workshop level. Moreover, this affinity between Durkheimian 
thought and the effective power basis o f Bolshevism has been 
recognised by Marcel Mauss, Durkheim's own appointed heir, in a 
1925 analysis o f Bolshevism that still reads as strikingly original 
and incisive, and has recently been translated into English in 
(Gane, 1992). It is rather perplexing, therefore, that it had been 
left out o f the otherwise excellent French edition, with the 
allegation that it was a purely journalistic piece o f circumstance, 
not worthwhile reprinting in a scientific collection.
The second indirect affinity between Durkheim and Schmoller 
concerned their academic politics. Both o f them spent much effort 
in establishing connections within state and university 
bureaucracies and building up a whole network o f disciples and 
personal connections in order to further their own, missionary 
ambitions, and also to get rid o f opponents. Durkheim's positive 
methods are discussed in Clark (1973), the story o f the promotion 
o f Durkheim's protégé, Bouglé being a particularly pertinent 
example (pp. 69-71 and 177-8), while on the negative side one 
can mention the erasing o f Tarde and van Gennep from academic 
life (Needham 1967, p. xi). Schmoller has similarly become the 
first "university pope" since Hegel's time by getting his students 
into influential position through his personal contacts in the 
Prussian ministry o f education (Honigsheim 1968, pp. 5-6). This 
has been a constant source o f conflict between Weber and 





























































































Returning to the text, the consequences the historical school failed 
to draw, however, have been taken, however, by Schaffle (p. 282). 
Schaffle made a distinction between morals and law, emphasised 
the empirical bases o f both, and was clear about the dangers of 
legislative influence. The problem with him, according to 
Durkheim, is that he assigns "reflection an excessive role in the 
formation o f human societies and in the genesis o f moral ideas" (p. 
284). In this way, concludes Durkheim on a critical note, Schaffle 
considers society as a product o f art and the family as the sole 
natural institution. In concluding the first section, Durkheim 
asserts that the process o f the disintegration o f philosophy is 
already on its way. One part o f the process has been accomplished 
by the progressive independence o f psychology, with the help of 
the biological sciences. The other part will be the independence 
struggle o f morals from philosophy, where it will, analogically, 
rely upon the help o f the social sciences (pp. 285-6).
Economics, however, is only one o f the social sciences that should 
contribute to the establishment o f the science o f morals. The other 
helping hand should be given by law. Therefore, the second part 
o f the essay discusses German legal theories, focusing, after a 
briek mention o f Jellinek, almost exclusively on the recent work of 
Ihering. Though Durkheim judges his underlying psychology 
extremely simplistic, as it attributes an excessive role to 
calculation and interests, Ihering "has the merit o f sensing and 
clearly indicating the manner in which morals can become a 
positive science" (p. 297).
The third and most important part o f the essay (in the original, 
the second o f the three articles) is devoted to the founder of the 
science o f morals, Wundt. His work presents itself as the 
"synthesis o f all these isolated views, these specialised studies" 
that Durkheim discussed so far (p. 298). Wundt starts by the claim 
that the science o f morals can't be reduced only to psychological 
observation. There is also need for a social psychology 
(Volkerpsychologie ), a "history o f languages, religious, habits 
(moeurs ), o f the civilisation in general". In sum, there is need for 




























































































According to Durkheim, Wundt proceeds by analysing the 
different elements o f such a genesis, and resumes the discussion 
by pointing out the two common elements o f all moral 
conceptions, and the two general laws o f moral evolution. These 
are the "law of three stages", and the "law o f the heterogeneity' of 
ends" (p. 312). After a discussion of the formation o f morals, the 
discussion shifts the fundamental principles on which it rests. 
These are given by two centers o f gravity: individualism and 
universalism (p. 314). Concerning the moral ends, Wundt argues 
for the impossibility o f individualism: " [i ]f  the individual does not 
play a primary role in morals, this is because it is too small a 
thing: what difference can his sufferings or joys make to the 
world?" (p. 318). As opposed to this, societies are the true subjects 
o f morals. They have a distant past and future. Even among social 
groups, their interest is not equal, and varies with their volume. 
This line o f argument is closed by a peculiar statement, a "thought 
to which we could not accommodate ourselves in any case: this is 
that after thousands and thousands o f years, the whole mankind 
may disappear, without leaving a trace in the world" (p. 319). 
This, o f course, is the idea o f the eternal recurrence.
The discussion then moves into the question o f moral means, and 
presents an elaborate taxonomy o f social and individual norms, 
having at their center the "moral ideal". The basic idea of Wundt is 
that morality is a social function (p. 329). At this point, Durkheim 
finds this idea as well excessive, and argues that individual 
motivations also have some importance. The section concludes by 
a call for more determination in the realisation o f our moral 
ideals: " if we see it now less clearly, ... the mistake is ours, does 
not reside in the nature o f things" (p. 331).
The third essay is much shorter, and contains Durkheim's 
concluding remarks. It focuses on the common elements in the 
works o f the authors discussed, contrasting them with Mill, 
Spencer, and Kant. Durkheim claims that such a comparison is 
necessary to "render visible the novelty o f the German school" (p. 




























































































method. The ethics o f both Kant and the utilitarianis is defective. 
"Only the German moralists see in the moral phenomena facts that 
are at the same time empirical and sui generis . Morals is not an 
applied or derived science, but is autonomous" (ibid.). Moreover, 
at the end o f this crucial summary paragraph, he judges it 
expedient to distinguish moral facts from social facts. The two 
should not be confused: "[mjorals is not a consequence and like a 
corollary o f sociology, but a social science apart from and among 
the others" (ibid.). (16B) At the end, he states as a major critical 
point against the German school that it has devoted so far too 
much attention to general principles and much less to empirical 
details, and shortly discusses the work o f Albert-Hermann Post 
who was the only moralist in Germany to study details for its own 
sake (p.339).
It is now possible to present and assess the exact content o f 
Durkheim's German experience. Under the impact o f his new 
encounters, Durkheim was able to fit all o f his major ideas 
together into a coherent project, driven by a single goal, the 
establishment o f a science o f morals. Such a novel discipline, 
under the guidance o f the basic principle o f social solidarity, 
would eliminate both the "social problem" at its roots, and the 
ever widening gap between the individual and the state, forming 
the nation into a single, organic body, thus integrating Durkheim's 
theoretical, moral, and practical aspirations and ambitions.
If this be the case, one must give an account o f the resistance o f 
Durkheim 1907 and 1913 against the significance o f a German 
influence on his work. There are at least three reasons that could 
explain this fact, two being known and trivial, the third - and 
arguably the most important - not analysed so far. First, the 
debate with Deploige occured in the last years before WWI, and 
after the Dreyfus affair. Durkheim, who was a French patriot o f 
Jewish descent, had all the reasons not wanting to stress this 
German connection at that time. (17) Second, the originality o f 
one's ideas is always a sensitive issue in academic life. However, 




























































































particularly pertinent. Thus, in the last decade o f the 19th 
century, there is was long a protracted debate between Sighele, Le 
Bon and Tarde concerning priority in the discovery o f the basic 
principles o f crowd psychology, while in the first years of the 20th 
century there was a similarly intense rivalry between Mosca and 
Pareto concerning elite theory. Both debates were not about 
marginal issues and persons, but the most influential ideas of the 
age and lay at the center o f academic and even public attention. It 
is therefore no wonder that Durkheim was particularly sensitive 
to the matter.
But there is a third reason, also connected to the question of 
originality and the German connection, but involving something 
more. In his early work Durkheim has asserted that the 
groundworks o f this project about the science o f morals, on the 
analogy o f the establishment o f psychology, have already been 
laid down by Wundt. There can be no confusion between this new 
science and sociology, as sociology was only discussed as one o f 
the auxiliary sciences helping the establishment o f a science o f 
morals. However, this creates considerable perplexity, as it is 
exactly Wundt who is in general credited with the establishment 
o f the autonomous science o f psychology (Manicas 1987), and 
Durkheim specifically refers to the episode about the 
establishment o f the laboratory' (Durkheim 1975, vol.3, p. 474) 
that is considered as one o f his major achievements in psychology. 
Furthermore, throughout his career, Durkheim considered the 
strict separation o f sociology and psychology as one o f the 
cornerstones o f his system. This was one o f the central issues in 
his debate with Tarde.
The fundamental reason due to which Durkheim wanted to hide, 
evidently even from himself, the German origins o f his ideas was 
given by the ambivalent relationship he had toward Wundt. On 
the one hand, in 1886-87, Durkheim just followed Wundt as a 
disciple in the autonomous science o f morals. On the other hand, a 
few years later, he imitated Wundt in the establishment o f the 
autonomous science o f sociology. This, in itself, would create some 




























































































fact, as he definitely changes his attitudes with respect to 
sociology shortly after 1887. On the other hand, even in the 1887 
essay, Durkheim omitted any reference to the fact that Wundt has 
been associated with the establishment o f psychology. He could 
only present his story, the analogy between the establishment o f 
psychology and the science o f morals, by omitting the fact that the 
founder of both disciplines is one and the same person.
The half-year long stay in Germany proved to be a fundamental 
experience for Durkheim. The writing and the eventual impact of 
Division o f Labor bears testimony to this fact. However, if six 
months are enough to encounter face-to-face a different cultural 
environment, they are not enough to understand it in depth, to 
recognise the all-important nuances. One becomes attentive to the 
most striking phenomena, the basic differences, and not to 
different levels o f analysis and understanding. It is unlikely that 
such an impact would question one's own taken for granted ideas, 
even less to go beyond the surface o f the newly received wisdom. 
The impact helps to give a better focus to what one has already 
known, but does not produce new question marks.
This is exactly what has happened to Durkheim. He has picked up 
in Germany those pieces o f work that have most fitted with his 
own previous preconceptions, and even later failed to get 
interested in the most innovative works o f contemporary German 
thought. After a short relation, he broke with Simmel, his exact 
contemporary, and the thought o f Weber who was six years his 
junior has completely escaped him.
Durkheim's relation to German thought in the late 19th century is 
very similar to the contemporary Anglo-American attitude to 
French thought. Fitting everyone into the rubric o f post­
structuralism or post-modernism, it is overlooked that the work of 
Michel Foucault does not inhabit the same universe as that o f 
Baudrillard, Lyotard, Derrida, even Deleuze. Though having much 
in common in terms o f background, even basic orientation, the 




























































































given by the general "mood" o f the times, while the rest o f the 
post-moderns kept expressing, repeating, elaborating it. Exactly 
because they were always trying always to be original, they never 
escaped the limits o f their age, while the project o f Foucault, like 
that o f Weber or o f Keynes, another victim o f a huge 
misunderstanding, obtained a touch of lasting contemporaneity.
We are now in position to return to the event disclosed by 
Durkheim, the "revelation" o f 1895. Only two points can be shortly 
discussed, concerning what this event did and what it did not alter 
in Durkheim's thought.
First, Durkheim was correct in placing the emphasis on his second 
major experience, the reading o f Robertson Smith, even if not so in 
denying the first, his travel in Germany. The first was a rather 
superficial encounter that has enabled him to combine his major 
concerns in an approach that merely expressed the spirit o f the 
times. This is visible in the two books he produced under the 
encounter. The Division o f  Labor and the Rules , published in 
1893 and 1894-5, belong to the late 19th century. They are 
tedious to read, advance little beyond Spencer. If one would read 
them todaywithout knowing that they were written by the "great 
founding father", nobody would pay them any attention.
Things are a bit different with Suicide , the first book published 
after the second experience, in 1897. The book, o f course, was not 
the product o f this experience. Durkheim has already given a 
course on suicide in 1889-90, five years before. The difference, 
therefore, is partly due to the subject matter. It was an empirical 
book, as opposed to the evolutionist philosophy o f history that 
Division o f  Labor to a large extent still was. But the final version 
was put together after the experience, and it makes a difference 
in the intellectual weight o f the book.
The real effect was Durkheim's last work, the Elementary Forms , 
on which he worked for over a decade. According to Jones (1981) 
and Pickering (1984), the change o f orientation is fundamental. 




























































































contemporary social change, Durkheim moves to the study o f 
religion in other, "primitive" cultures, developing a series o f 
concepts like ritual and collective effervescence, o f which not only 
there is no trace in the early writings, but that even counterdict 
their framework.
The late work, as contemporary critics were ready to point out, 
had serious limits. Still, it carried a potential for understanding 
extending way beyond the early work. The realisation o f that 
potential, however — and this is the second point — was severely 
jeopardised by the fact that Durkheim was unable or unwilling to 
reflect and elaborate upon that difference. He refused to rethink 
and alter his own taken for granted, the framework o f his thought; 
to "work on himself'. This is best seen in the way he republished 
his methodological work without any alteration. As the new 
insights were fitted into the old framework, the difference they 
could have made was largely lost.
in this way, even in his last works, Durkheim was not able to 
make any use o f Weber. The sociological methodology o f 
Durkheim and Weber had practically no common points. In order 
to enable one to perceive any similarity, Weber first o f all had to 
be normalised, forced back into the background commonplaces 
from which he tried to escape. Though this work is usually 
credited to Talcott Parsons, it has been largely prepared and 
completed before by some of the most effective and least noticed 
"detractors" o f Weber, Alfred and Marianne Weber.
4, The major formative experiences o f Weber
The trace on which the search for the basic formative experiences 
o f Max Weber (21 April, 1864 - 14 June, 1920) can start is even 
thinner. Weber, just like Durkheim, was extremely reluctant to 
talk about himself. The excessive use o f public confessions was 
one o f the first and most severe charges he brought up against 
Roscher in his first methodological writing written after his 




























































































like for Durkheim, the only piece o f such a direct evidence was 
provoked by a debate. In February 1920, Weber has first 
discussed the ideas o f Spengler in his seminar, and then, on the 
suggestion o f his students, a debate with Spengler was organised 
in the Munich city hall. After the debate, when going home, Weber 
told the members o f his company that "the honesty o f a present- 
day scholar ... can be measured by his attitude to Nietzsche and 
Marx. Whoever does not admit that considerable parts o f his own 
work could not have been carried out in the absence o f the work 
of these two, only fools himself and others. The world in which we 
spiritually and intellectually live today is a world substantially 
shaped by Marx and Nietzsche." (18).
This piece o f evidence has only come to light in 1964. Since then, 
the validity o f its truth claim has often been contested. This is not 
surprising, as such a claim must have sounded almost 
unintelligible in 1964. At that time, Weber’s sociology was 
considered to be the direct opposite o f Marx's, while Nietzsche did 
not even enter the universe o f Weber scholars. (19) A statement 
that put these two names at the center o f Weber's positive 
concerns simply could not have been true. However, apart from 
the content o f the statement that will be discussed soon in detail, 
certain elements related to the conditions o f its uttering and 
publication lend extra weight to its validity.
First, the exact date o f the original disclosure requires some 
attention. Weber did not like to talk and think about himself. 
Throughout his career, there were two types o f events that forced 
him to do so. The first happened when, in the context o f a public 
debate or a revision for a written publication, he had to reread his 
earlier writings. Examples are the "anticritical" debates with 
Fischer and Rachfahl, whose importance has been recently 
discovered by Wilhelm Hennis (1988), or the rereading o f his 
essays on the 'Economic Ethic o f World Religions' during the war. 
Such reflections did not remain idle discussions, but were 
transformed into effective meditative exercises, immediately 
followed by significant developments in Weber's thought. (20) 




























































































events: engagement, marriage or the death o f a relative, a friend 
or a close colleague.
In the case o f the famous disclosure about Marx and Nietzsche, 
both conditions were present, and in perfect detail. Weber was 
coming out o f a second public debate, (21) and this took place 
shortly after the 13 February death of Otto Gross, a person who 
crossed Weber's life in several crucial moments, and who not only 
thought, but lived according to what he - probably rather wrongly 
- held as the basic principles o f Marx and Weber, being a 
Freudian-Nietzschean anarchist, a partisan o f the "counterculture" 
movement in Ascona, and a supporter and participant o f the 
short-lived Communist uprisings o f 1919 in Germany (Green, 
1986).
Second, the person who published the disclosure and the date of 
this publication also matters in this respect. The story was 
rendered public by Eduard Baumgarten, a German sociologist who 
was a relative o f Max Weber, and in a book published as part o f 
the celebration o f the 100th anniversary o f Weber's birthday. 
Baumgarten was not a person driven by sensationalism. He had in 
his possession about 300 letters written to or by Max Weber, 
providing information about intimate details o f Weber's life. Yet, 
even though he was concerned with the publication o f these 
letters, they are still not published. Far from advertising the 
disclosure, the statement is rather stuck away in the book as part 
o f a long footnote. Moreover, the publication date o f 1964 
evidently mattered a lot to Baumgarten. He was so immersed in 
his attempt to finish the book in time that he was unable to 
prepare a paper for the memorial Weber conference (Stammer 
1971, pp.122-3). This haste left a visible mark on the book which 
is extremely poorly organised. (22)
Taken all these together, it seems very likely that Weber was in 
the position o f making a similar statement, and highly unlikely 
that Baumgarten would simply invent a story. It must be accepted 




























































































which the impact (experience) o f reading Marx and Nietzsche 
could be located in Weber's life.
The reconstruction o f the experiential basis o f Weber's thought is 
more complex than Durkheim's, as the available evidence is even 
scarcer. The starting point was identical, the events o f 1870-71. 
The difference in their age at that time was not significant. Both 
witnessed the events during their childhood, though Durkheim 
was close to adolescence. There was, o f course, an evident 
difference: Weber was on the side o f the victors, while Durkheim 
o f the defeated. But the most important difference was not due to 
the simple fact, rather to the different attitudes they developed 
on its basis. Durkheim remained safely anchored in the dominant 
feeling o f his country: the victory o f Germany must have had a 
secret, and the task is to find out the reasons, to imitate the 
victors. Weber, however, to a large extent under the influence of 
his uncle, Hermann Baumgarten, felt differently. Baumgarten was 
a well-known historian o f the Protestant reformation and the 
ethical model for Max Weber, much more important for his 
development than his father. He had personally fought for the 
unification o f Germany, but the eventual result, especially after 
1871, filled him with dismay. In a manner strikingly similar to 
Nietzsche's views, he was deeply opposed to the predominant 
Prussian mentality, its militarism. He deplored the way Bismarck 
neglected constitutionalism and came to the conviction that this 
victory spelled disaster for his country, leading it to complacency, 
a spiritless, authoritarian system, devoid o f initiative and criticism 
(Scaff 1984b, 85).
Weber not only came to agree, increasingly, with the diagnosis of 
Hermann Baumgarten. He lived it, though for a long time, he was 
not able to express, to catch, to diagnostise what was going on. He 
lived under the weight o f a profoundly uneasy feeling, being 
oppressed by it, being unable to make any commitments, 
decisions, take up responsibilities.
This will be the first in a series o f episodes from Weber's life from 




























































































quite elusive, reluctant to talk about himself. The concrete 
circumstances here only reinforced his predisposition, as this was 
a particularly unhappy and intolerable period o f his life, and at 
that time a basic truth was not yet lost: that there are very few 
worse things than complaining to others about oneself, as such a 
disclosure has an immediate and disastrous effect on the self. 
However, there was a unique occasion in which Weber allowed a 
glimpse to this episode. This was two letters he wrote to Emmy 
Baumgarten, the daughter o f Hermann Baumgarten, a girl to 
whom he felt particularly close, after his engagement to Marianne, 
on 22 April 1893, and just before the wedding, on 2 September 
1893 (Weber 1936, Marianne Weber 1988, pp. 166, 182-4). The 
circumstances made possible, even required, disclosure about his 
state o f mind during the mid to late 1880s.
This is the first piece o f very private information, related directly 
to personal and not professional life, that the paper feels obliged 
to discuss, not without some misgivings and reluctance. However, 
the fundamental links between life and oeuvre for Weber make 
such a discussion unavoidable. The mixing o f personal information 
and ideas has already become almost a standard practice in the 
Weber literature, in a manner that could never have been the case 
with Durkheim or Parsons, though without reflecting fully on the 
fact, and occasionally with an evident purpose o f sensationalism. 
However, reference to this particular incident can be justified by a 
series o f interlocking reasons.
First, the revelation told by Weber that for long years he was 
unable to commit himself to marriage (with Emmy) due to his 
general feeling o f resignation (a word that will gain quite an 
importance for Weber), his unability to make commitments and 
responsibility, is a story identical to the one on which the whole 
philosophy o f Kierkegaard is based. It is therefore not surprising 
that in a crucial letter discovered by Scaff (1984b, p. 103), written 
to Marianne during the summer o f 1894, Kierkegaard is 
mentioned together with Simmel and Nietzsche as being currently 
at the center o f Weber's interest. But Weber eventually came to 




























































































Instead o f building a philosophy on it, he eventually used it to 
distance his own self from the age that weighed upon his being by 
its "epigonism" and "sense o f resignation". Instead o f trying to 
discover the human condition or acting as the critique o f the 
present, he wanted to pin down the specificity o f the modem age. 
However, in order to be able to wedge such a gap, he needed some 
assistance. This was provided to him, after a long "times of 
troubles" when for years, Weber could only survive by "the 
automatic continuation o f [his] obligatory professional work" 
(Marianne Weber 1988, p. 182), in the form o f the fundamental 
reading experiences o f Marx and Nietzsche. At this moment, it is 
again necessary to return to the chronological narrative, starting 
by a few facts about Weber's family background and early years.
First, just as Durkheim and Parsons (and, for that matter, many of 
the most important social thinkers o f the period), Weber also 
came from a family where religion mattered a lot. There was, 
however, a crucial difference. Weber's parents, and the two 
families in general, represented two different denominations and 
two fundamentally divergent views about the importance o f 
religious issues. Therefore, for him, the fundamental question 
could never be the relationship to his previous identity, the 
dilemma o f loyalty, escape and return, as his very background 
religious identity was based on conflict.
Second, in terms o f the economic situation, the family was not 
only considerably better o ff than Durkheim's but included, in 
several different branches, generations o f entrepreneurs (Roth, 
1993). Weber had the chance to participate and observe, indeed to 
grow into, a family that has not only manifested the "protestant 
ethic", but also "the 'spirit' o f capitalism". Third, Weber also had 
one crucial, symbolic childhood experience. At the age o f four, he 
witnessed a railroad accident that has left profound marks on him. 
He described this 35 years later with the following words: "What 
jolted me was not only the event itself, but the sight o f something 
so exalted to a child as a locomotive lying in the ditch like a drunk 
- my first experience o f the transitoriness o f the Great and the 




























































































Fourth, again similarly to Durkheim, Weber was born into and 
raised by books and knowledge. His insatiable intellectual 
curiosity even worried his parents since his childhood. However, 
in the modality, there was a basic difference with respect to the 
attitude o f Durkheim, not unrelated to differences in social 
background. Durkheim was always a top student. For him, the 
search for knowledge was inseparable from  a proper 
advancement in the scholarly curriculum. Weber, however, was 
often bored to death in school. His teachers often reproached him 
about this. However, he was more interested in following his own 
thirst for understanding, and preferred reading the complete 
edition o f Goethe's works under the school desk to being simply 
an eminent student.
In 1882, at the age o f 18, Weber entered university, enrolling at 
the faculty o f law. However, already in his first year, his heart 
went elsewhere. He took up the course o f Knies on economics. 
Though he found the lectures rather boring, the subject fascinated 
him, and did a thorough study o f Knies's book (Hennis 1988, p. 
230, fn.79). Knies was not a towering intellectual figure, but as a 
man o f 1848 he was close to Weber politically and, by introducing 
Weber to Marx (ibid., p. 155), he exerted a lasting intellectual 
impact on him. It was this dual encounter that set the young 
student o f law who followed so far, without full conviction, the 
career o f his father, into an unexpected orbit, opening up to him 
the perspective o f economics, the possibility o f treating living 
everyday reality beyond the dryness o f legal texts. Hennis 
discovered the perfect expression: Knies initiated Weber (1991, p. 
55, fn.15).
The encounter with Knies and then with Marx increased Weber's 
doubts about following the example o f his father that dominated 
his initial university career. According to Marianne, Max Weber 
Sr. was "a typical bourgeois, at peace with himself and with the 
world" (Marianne Weber 1988, 63). Nothing could be further o f 
his eldest son who felt much closer to the attitude o f Hermann 




























































































strong during 1883-84, when Max Weber spent his military 
service in Strasbourg where the Baumgartens lived. The encounter 
enabled him to get rid o f the last remains o f an attitude of 
(bourgeois) complacency, heightened his awareness and 
sensitivity to the dilemmas o f the world he saw around himself, 
but gave no answers and direction. The perspective o f becoming 
an academic in law appealed to him less and less. It looked as the 
worse o f two possible worlds: an occupation where he would not 
be able to address the thoughts that preoccupied him, but that 
would be also distant from practical life. Yet, he was not able to 
commit himself to a practical position, as that would not have 
given him the opportunity o f tackling head on the problems that 
preoccupied him. Due to these dilemmas, it took Weber seven 
years to finish his dissertation - a fact he much felt ashamed 
about (Marianne Weber 1988, pp. 158, 163; Weber 1936, pp. 165, 
270, 273).
Still, he kept working, and finally completed his dissertation in 
1889. This immediately exerted a significant effect. The ability to 
complete a major piece o f work increased his self-confidence and 
also the determination to pursue a work that is at once 
academically acceptable and practically relevant. (23) It led him 
to the first o f a series o f major reorganisations where he suddenly 
and simultaneously engaged in a new track concerning both 
professional and private life. After finishing his dissertation, he 
immediately started his habilitation. This he indeed finished 
within two years, and it was received with especial acclaim. At the 
same time, he also committed himself to public associations, 
balanced academic and public-political activities.
The first was the Verein fur Sozialpolitik (Boese 1939, Demm 
1987), the second was the Evangelic-Social Congress (Aldenhoff 
1987). In both cases, the basic impulse o f Weber, at that time, was 
an interest in the social problem, an agenda shaped by his reading 
o f Marx. For the first, he completed within two years a 900 page 
analysis o f surveys made concerning the rural labourers in the 
East Elba region, at the same time when also completing his 




























































































academic work was involved at the moment, though he would 
repeat a few years later the Verein survey for the Congress. Still, 
membership in this association proved to be decisive for his work, 
as he encountered Nietzsche through it.
In order to locate and understand the impact the reading o f 
Nietzsche had on Weber in between 1892-95, it is necessary' to 
overview Weber's situation at the time. By spring 1892, Max 
Weber became an extremely talented and hard-working young 
scholar who was, however, deeply uneasy about his situation in 
the world. He performed his academic work extremely well, but 
was at cross purposes with his disciplinary vocation. Due to his 
sensitivity, he perceived that the world around him was shaking 
in its foundations, but was not yet able to express and analyse this 
feeling. Since his early childhood, he had an especially strong urge 
for independence, therefore suffered from paternal control, and 
his confidence was seriously impaired by his general sense o f 
resignation. He felt trapped in a vicious circle, as the two things 
that would render him independent were a marriage and a job. 
However, due to his resignation, he could not commit himself to a 
marriage, was thinking rather o f staying forever with his sister 
instead (Marianne Weber 1988, p. 168); and had equal misgiving 
in committing himself to an unwanted legal career.
Suddenly, within a matter o f months, everything changed. Things 
began to move, both pushing Weber towards a definite 
commitment and at the same times enabling him to make the 
step. Concerning his professional life, in the summer o f 1892 he 
substituted Goldschmidt, his dissertation supervisor who had 
become ill. It was just a matter o f time until he would have been 
officially nominated as a replacement. At around the same time, 
he presented the results o f the survey, drawing enthusiastic 
response, this time from economic circles. This opened the 
possibility o f economic-historical work, as opposed to the dreaded 
legal career. The shift o f Weber's interest from law to economics, 
not surprisingly, can be best documented in his letters written to 
Hermann Baumgarten (Scaff, 1984b, p. 87), just like these letters 




























































































1985, p. 66). In the spring, he has also met Marianne for the 
second time, and this soon evoked emotions in him.
Weber had to make up his mind, to make some decisions. This was 
rendered possible by his encounter with Nietzsche. About this 
event, there is again an almost complete lack o f information. The 
reasons for the silence will become apparent in due course. At 
first, it is necessary' to present the story.
In all probability, Weber has first heard o f Nietzsche through the 
Christliche W elt, a journal close to the Evangelic-Social Congress 
and edited by Weber's friend Martin Rade (Hennis 1988, 148; 
Scaff 1989, p. 196). On 28 July 1892, an article entitled "Beyond 
Good and Evil" has appeared on the top page o f the journal, 
presenting the work o f Nietzsche, "a remarkably original thinker" 
whose name is "almost mentioned daily" as "the Copernicus o f the 
moral world" (Mayer 1892). (24) This could not have escaped the 
attention o f Weber who has written articles since early childhood 
about the world historical significance o f Christianity and whose 
earliest pieces show a marked similarity with the questions 
Nietzsche posed in the Genealogy o f Morals , a text that would 
remain central for Weber's work. Thus, i f  at the age o f 28 
Durkheim was interested in Wundt's "genesis" o f morals", at the 
same age Weber encountered a qute different "genealogy" o f 
morals. The other writings o f Nietzsche that have exerted 
particular impact on him in the early stage were the Untimely 
Meditations and Zarathustra . (25) The former diagnostised the 
decadence o f the age, enabling Weber to draw a strategic line 
between his own abilities and powers and the decadence and 
resignation that was due to the impact o f the age in which he 
happened to live and that weighed upon him. It gave him back his 
self-confidence. The latter further clarified this diagnosis, 
especially in the vision o f the last men, taken up in the last pages 
o f the Protestant Ethic while the vision o f the eternal return could 
have given a virtual representation o f the struggle Weber was 
engaged with himself. The concepts o f the overman and the will to 
power both indicated a mode o f analysis to be followed and 




























































































frequently debated in the Congress, and Weber took part in every 
meeting since the first reunion in 1890 until the eighth in 1897 
(Aldenhoff 1987, p. 194).
The reading o f Nietzsche gave Weber eventually both the 
determination and the tools to pursue a long-term project aiming 
at the understanding o f his age. Concerning his life, however, the 
break was immediate. He overcome his deep resignation and was 
ready to make up his mind and marry. In order to decide, he first 
travelled to visit Emmy Baumgarten, to see whether he could - or 
should - make now the steps he was unwilling to do five years 
earlier. This was, o f course, no longer possible. He embraced the 
second option, and became engaged soon to Marianne who also 
showed much more practical energy (Green 1974, p. 126).
This act, however, only solved one of the set o f problems Weber 
was still struggling at that time, trying to overcome fully what he 
diagnostised around him, in which, in all evidence, he was looking 
at Marianne rather as a companion, a source o f support. It is this 
inner struggle that marks his March 1893 address, given in front 
o f the Verein. The address still contains the same words o f 
resignation and epigonism as the November 1892 essay. Things, 
however, change by the fall o f 1893. In both versions o f the 
'Developmental tendencies' essay, the mood is already different, 
much sharper. In between the Spring and Fall o f 1893, Weber's 
whole tone and outlook o f the world have changed. In the words 
o f Hennis (1988, pp. 148-9), Weber has completed a transition 
from a general mood of resignation, the feeling o f living in an age 
o f epigons, or a negative pessimism, to a positive pessimism, the 
acquisition o f a truly tragic perspective.
This points to the summer o f 1893 as a decisive period in Weber's 
encounter with Nietzsche; a period particularly rich in significant 
moments and events. First, this was a period o f transition for 
Weber, after the engagement and before the wedding, a time for 
settling accounts. Weber was definitely engaged in some major 
stocktaking, as his letters to Emmy and his sisters provide ample 




























































































events happened, tightening even further the links between life 
and work. On 19 June, his uncle, Hermann Baumgarten died. For 
Weber, just as for Foucault, the death o f persons they felt 
particularly close to were among the most crucial experiences in 
their lives. Hermann Baumgarten occupied a unique place in 
Weber's life, even more so than his father, if his father played a 
crucial role in the manner Weber grew into the world, Hermann 
Baumgarten majored this influence in getting Weber question 
what he took for granted. Furthermore, as the account o f Scaff 
shows (1984b, pp. 85-7; 1989, pp. 14-5), the influence o f 
Baumgarten has very important parallels with that o f Nietzsche. It 
is, therefore, safe to assume that the death o f Hermann 
Baumgarten may have been a catalyst in the way Nietzsche 
further stamped Weber.
In the same period a major development occurred in Weber's 
academic career. When deciding to marry, Weber had to 
accommodate himself with the prospect o f a legal career. 
However, just in July 1893, as if out o f the blue, the news reached 
Weber that he may be promoted to a position in economics. 
Though the appointment fell through this time, partly due to a not 
fully clear affair involving his father and the Prussian minister of 
education, Althoff, the offer soon returned. In January 1894, 
Weber obtained again the first place on the list, and by 1 April 
1894, he became appointed as a regular professor to Freiburg 
(Tribe 1995).
The new opening, the possibility o f a career in economics as 
opposed to law, just like the decisive second reading o f Nietzsche, 
also came in summer 1893. In itself, this remains a conjecture. But 
the unlikely link Weber could have made between economics and 
Nietzsche can be reinforced by a series o f facts. First, Weber 
became infatuated with economics because o f its practical 
relevance as opposed to law, its closeness to politics and the 
nation; an interpretation confirmed by the Freiburg address. 
Second, for various reasons, neither reading Knies nor Marx was 
enough to turn Weber over to economics. The impulse o f Knies 




























































































could be misunderstood. He needed a distance from Marx and thus 
stayed in law. The reading o f Nietzsche immediately created this 
distance for him that was also demonstrable for others. He no 
longer had to fear the spectre o f Marx. Third, he repeatedly stated 
that economics at that time was a young and flexible science 
(Marianne Weber 1988, p. 200; Scaff 1989, p. 27). Fourth, Weber 
considered economics as a "science of man" (Tribe, 1995; Hennis, 
1988, 1996). Both these arguments were positively Nietzschean. 
Fifth, in talks given in between 1894 and 1897, Weber afforded 
himself a much more explicit, even "brutal" language concerning 
the economy and politics, close to the logic o f class struggles. (26) 
Without Nietzsche and his psychological language, such 
expressions could only have been read as Marxist manifestos. 
Therefore, Weber could not have taken up a position in economics 
without the influence o f Nietzsche; and, conversely, Nietzsche's 
effect reinforced him in his desire to get away from law and into 
economics.
The second reading of Nietzsche during the summer of 1893 was a 
crucial experience for Weber. It has left a profound mark on him, 
stamped his thinking forever, altered the way he perceived the 
world. It enabled him to combine serious reflection and academic 
work with his personal interests, helped him to realise that it is 
possible to do both things at once. However, it left him with a 
crucial dilemma in the short run. Such an experience would have 
required a period o f digestion. Weber later became, very much 
aware o f the need for such a break, but was not in the position 
now to afford such a luxory. Quite the contrary, he had to take up 
a position in economics, in a field where he himself needed to 
learn much. This was a risk taken, with the promise o f turning 
economics into a "Nietzschean" science o f man. This same risk, 
however, also held another promise. If the fact o f marrying 
deprived him from the possibility o f a period o f digestion, it gave 
him the promise o f a companion. Weber intended since the start 
his marriage as a close companionship. On the basis o f his own 
experience o f dependence, he became very sympathetic to the 
women's movement. He realised that a certain kind o f 




























































































wife to be an independent person, orienting her towards academic 
interests, being the first German professor in this regards. Even 
just before wedding, they were working together on the 
publication o f the survey results, much to the dismay o f their 
parents.
However, a full intellectual companionship would have required 
that Marianne also read and appreciate Nietzsche. In the same 
movement and configuration when Weber wanted to transform 
economics into a "Nietzschean" direction, there are a few telling 
signs indicating that Weber also tried to "initiate" Marianne in the 
summer o f 1894. The aim was not to indoctrinate Marianne into a 
dogmatic Nietzscheanism, rather give her access to strength and 
courage to have an independent mind. In a 12 July 1894 letter, 
evidently referring to the Zarathustra and previous discussions, 
he asks Marianne whether she wants more reading material to be 
sent her, ""or is the 'Overman' tormenting you enough for the time 
being?"" (Scaff 1989, p. 128), while a letter sent two weeks later 
repeats the reference to Nietzsche (ibid.). Within less than two 
months, as a present for their first wedding anniversary, he gave 
his wife the full series o f Max Klinger's etchings. Klinger was 
considered as the foremost representative o f Nietzschean art at 
the period.
The 'Overman', however, proved too much to swallow for 
Marianne. Weber started the letter o f 26 July 1894 with the 
following words: "[y jour note still testifies to a significant 
impairment o f the spirit, but that is good and healthy" (quoted in 
Hennis, 149). The hopes that Marianne would eventually digest 
the experience proved to be unfounded. The references to 
Nietzsche disappear from the correspondance, and the wedding 
present was disposed o f in the first possible occasion, the first 
move the Webers were making in Heidelberg in 1906. And if 
reference was made to Nietzsche in letters addressed to other 
persons, Marianne made it sure that it would not get into print. 
Thus, in the Biography , she devoted five full pages to a letter 
Weber wrote in 1907 about the essay of Otto Gross (pp. 375-80). 




























































































rather significant details. First, she failed to indicate that the letter 
was addressed to Else and not Edgar Jaffe; and second, she simply 
cut out the penultimate paragraph in which Weber made a 
distinction between the proper and improper uses o f Nietzsche 
(MWG II/5, pp. 402-3). In her studies, again at the first possible 
occasion, Marianne selected another "master" instead o f Nietzsche: 
Heinrich Rickert.
Just in the period when Weber was trying to "initiate" her wife to 
Nietzsche, he also produced some o f the most awovedly 
Nietzschean pieces o f work, the most important being his famous 
1895 Freiburg inagural address. Weber used the formal occasion 
to reveal himself fully, presenting both his identity and the 
research interest he wanted to pursue. He described himself by 
three identification: he was a political economist (o f the historical 
school), a bourgeois, and a German (Weber 1980, pp. 439-40, 444, 
437). He also defined his Nietzschean research interest, the 
concern with the development o f Menschentum . The fact that 
Weber specified his work and identity in the same act gave 
mutual weight to both. But it carried a serious danger. A public 
revelation o f identity, especially during such a solemn occasion, 
carries a huge weight, especially for someone with the character 
o f Weber. It is difficult to retract them. However, as Weber was 
soon to realise, within a few years all the projects and identities 
he committed himself to around 1893 and reinforced in 1895 
were seriously threatened.
For a time, his statements reflected his confidence that he can be 
an academic political economist, keeping his commitments to his 
class and nation, and yet continue a research project which is 
fundamentally inspired by Marx and Nietzsche. This is reflected in 
his two main lectures given after the inaugural address: a 1896 
talk on the social basis o f the dissolution o f Ancient civilisation 
and a 1897 address on the German industrial state that, by talking 
o f capitalism as a fate, condensed Marx and Nietzsche into a single 
expression. However, in a short time interval, during another 
summer, this time in 1897, the tensions suddenly mounted on all 




























































































Part o f the story, the family feud, has already been hinted at by 
Meinecke in 1926, taken up shortly by Gerth and Mills in 1948, 
and elaborated in 1970 in a rather bombastical manner by 
Mitzman. On 14 June 1897 (Scaff 1989, pp. 73-4), in the outbreak 
o f a protracted period o f hidden conflict, Weber showed his father 
out o f his house. A  few weeks later, on 10 August, Max Weber Sr. 
died, never reconciled with his son. According to Mitzman, this 
was sufficient to explain why Weber was unable to write for five 
and talk for nineteen years. Such an account, however, first o f all 
fails to explain the reasons for Weber's irritability. This, however, 
was not located in a family history, rather in the tensions he had 
about his work and life, concerning both major decisions he took 
on the basis o f his reading o f Nietzsche — his marriage as a 
companionship o f equals and his switch to economics.
Weber turned to economics as a "science o f man" and as a 
practical science that stayed closely in touch with reality. 
However, as he now had to realise, economics was just on the 
threshold o f an epochal change, the marginal revolution. Just as he 
had to realise that Marianne would never be his "Nietzschean" 
companion, he would likewise never make a "Nietzschean" science 
out o f economics. Therefore, just at the moment when, from the 
outside, he seemed to have reached the height o f his career, 
holding the prestigeous chair o f Knies at Heidelberg, he realised 
that his hopes were all lost. The realisation that the shift in 
economics placed his interests at the margins o f the discipline are 
contained in his 1897-98 course outlines that were based on his 
systematic reflections on the state o f economics (Tribe 1995).
Given the available pieces o f evidence, it is not possible to date 
exactly the moment when Weber could have arrived at that 
realisation. However, it is possible to make again some informed 
guesses. Weber accepted the offer to Heidelberg in October 1896. 
Since that moment, he must have been preoccupied about the task 
o f teaching economics as a Heidelberg professor, the heir o f Knies. 
However, he still had to teach in Freiburg during the winter 1896- 




























































































and related distractions. Therefore, though the question must 
have been in Weber's mind, he could not have done serious and 
conclusive reflection before the summer o f 1897, helped by his 
first, transitory Heidelberg semester. The course outline is dated 
April 1898 by Kasler, but according to Tribe, this was already 
given to the students for the winter 1897-98 semester that 
started in October. All this points to the summer o f 1897 as the 
moment o f reckoning when Weber reflected upon the state o f 
economics.
The fact that the breakdown was not simply due to a family 
family feud - this acted only as a catalyst but to problems 
related to Marianne and economics can rely upon another telling 
proof. According to Marianne, the decisive moment o f the crisis 
occured not during the summer or the fall o f 1897, but sometimes 
during the end o f the winter term 1897-98. As often, the exact 
date is not given, but Marianne provides, and probably without 
any conscious intention, something that nobody else could have 
given. The date, in fact, can be defined with considerable 
precision. The winter term in Germany ends in late February — 
early March. However, as late as 16 February 1898, Weber was so 
well that he could take part in a public meeting, the debate o f a 
talk Jellinek gave a week ago about the women's movement, and 
even talked for one quarter o f an hour. From the account 
Marianne gave o f the decisive breakdown, this meeting could not 
have taken place after it.
The accounts o f Weber's speech are contradictory. According to 
the newspaper reports, he supported Jellinek; but according to 
Marianne, this was rather ironic, and Weber really came out in 
favor of the women's movement (p. 229). Whatever is the truth, it 
is evident that Weber had to make some rather delicate 
manouvering around the theme that could not fail to be stressful, 
adding to the tensions he has already accumulated. But there is 
something more. On the very page where Marianne told the story 
o f this meeting, she introduces immediately a new topic. This is 
the first time she mentions the name o f Else von Richthofen who 




























































































ever female graduates in Germany, even though she got to know 
the Weber couple already the summer o f 1894 or 95. (27) There 
was no inherent reason for bringing this episode into the storyline 
here, except for the fact that this was the way Marianne's 
recollection functioned - this time, I would argue, with admirable 
and probably unconscious sensitivity. (28).
At this point, on the basis o f all the evidence listed, it is possible 
to give an account o f Weber's illness and its significance for the 
experiential basis of the oeuvre. The illness was not "caused" by a 
single factor, whether overwork or a family conflict, it was rather 
an event that responded to a complex situation. This was the joint 
problematisation o f the major elements in Weber's identity 
mentioned in his inaugural talk, with the simultaneous failure in 
the risky decisions he undertook in 1892-93. After the Nietzsche 
experience, Weber got married to gain a companion — but his wife 
did not truly understand him and refused to follow his intellectual 
pursuit. He switched to economics in order to transform it, but the 
discipline shifted at the same time to the opposite direction. At 
the same time, Weber encountered a young women who, both 
emotionally and in her professional activities, could have been a 
true companion, making the realisation o f his wrong decision even 
more painful. All this was rendered even more acute by the guilts 
related to the death o f his father, the problematisation o f his 
bourgeois identity. The situation was unbearable, yet there was no 
way out. It does not require much intuition to classify the result 
as a typical example o f psychosomatic illness - a type o f illness 
developed as a compensation and escape; an acceptable, 
"objective" way to deal with conflicts in life that otherwise prove 
to be unsolvable.
The severity o f the situation can be supported with three 
additional considerations. First, partly due to the fact that he could 
not take time out to digest the experience, partly to the need to 
read into economics, Weber did not come up with a proper new 
research topic - though there are allusions that he has already 
started to think about the PE in this period. Second, in 1897 




























































































for the Germans o f the late 19th century. According to tradition, 
Jesus was 33 when he died, and therefore this age represented 
something o f a benchmark, an occasion to reflect upon past 
achievement and to give account o f oneself. It was, for e.g, very 
much present in the concerns of Nietzsche when he was 33. Third, 
adding to this configuration, it was in late 1894 that the first 
major new' posthumous work o f Nietzsche, the Antichrist was 
published. This event could easily have been very disturbing for 
Weber, as he certainly could not share either the style or the 
substance o f this book, and may have been put by this fact even 
more on the defensive side.
Weber collapsed when all the decisions to which he committed 
himself under the spell o f the reading experience o f Nietzsche led 
to disappointment or a dead end. He started to recover the 
moment when a novel reading experience o f Nietzsche gave back 
his strength and focus. This point again requires a careful 
reconstruction o f the exact conditions.
Between 1898 and 1901, Weber was very seriously ill, completely 
rendered idle. On the basis o f a few bits and pieces Weber 
managed to publish in 1899 and 1901, Kasler (1988) claims that 
the crisis was less serious than asserted as, after all, Weber did 
write and publish. This is simply unacceptable, and is due to the 
insertion o f a legal model o f subjectivity into the dynamics o f 
thought. Weber desperately tried to work during this period, but 
couldn't. He started his seminars, and failed again; tried to prepare 
for lectures and was not able to make sense o f his own notes. A 
claim that after all, this was not that serious is simply at the same 
level o f (mis)understanding as Weber's mother was, to whom 
Weber desperately tried to convey the message that his illness is 
real and serious, physical, and not just a weakness o f the will. An 
elementary respect for Weber requires that one should not return 
to this stage and treat the few short introductions Weber wrote to 
the works o f others as insignificant in so far as his work is 
concerned. The writing o f these pieces was o f the same character 




























































































responsible for the act, but it was not part o f his work, as during 
this period work was simply impossible for him.
After the decisive failure to overcome the illness in 1898-99, all 
signs indicate that Weber resigned to the possibility that this may 
have become his permanent condition; that he may never be able 
to work again. Even during the last years o f his life, he considered 
ever bit o f his strength regained as miraculous, always ready to 
expect an. immediately relapse. Given the seriousness o f his 
condition, he needed a shock to regain health and strength, and to 
overcome again the resignation. This new impetus was provided 
by another reading o f Nietzsche, the first edition o f the collection 
o f posthumous notes published in November 1901 under the title 
The Will to Power. (29) Weber was then 37 years old.
When the book was published, Weber was in Italy, almost since a 
whole year. Though the exact details and the sequential order are 
still difficult to establish, in October-November 1901 he was in 
Rome and, after a long period of vacation, he began to feel himself 
better. He started to read again, although only works not closely 
related to his academic interests, and even considered planning 
for his summer semester. It was probably in this period that 
Michelangelo's ceiling o f the Sixtus chapel has captivated him 
(Jaspers 1964, p. 259). However, the single most important event 
during this period, considered by Marianne both as a proof and an 
intrument in the improvement o f Weber's health, was a visit his 
friend Friedrich Naumann paid to them during the Christmas 
period.
No details are available o f the discussions Weber had with 
Naumann. One could assume that at that time, Weber may not 
have been well informed about events in Germany. One thing, 
however, is sure. The publication o f the Will to Power created a 
sensation in Germany. It is very unlikely that after this visit, 
Weber remained uninformed about this publication, and was not 
immediately interested in reading the book. It is even probable 
that Naumann, who was one o f his closest friends and keenly 




























































































"converted" by Weber's avowedly "Nietzschean" Freiburg talk), 
had carried a copy with him.
Weber's subsequent acts fully support the inference that he not 
only regained his lost vitality by this new encounter, but this 
time, he was prepared not to repeat the errors o f the first. First, if 
about a decade ago he changed into economics as a result o f his 
reading of Nietzsche, now he handed in his resignation. This was 
not the first time this happened with Weber. He has done the 
same thing in December 1899. But this time the situaton was quite 
different. In the logic o f the Biography , whenever Weber was 
feeling better, he was trying to take up teaching again; whenever 
he was doing worse, he lost hopel and attempted to resign his 
post. This logic worked so far, even up to the fall o f 1901 when, 
due to the improvement o f his condition, he was thinking again 
about going back to teaching. Therefore, one could expect that the 
resignation handed in in April 1902 was the proof o f a worsening 
o f his condition. However, there are no signs o f such a relapse. 
Quite the contrary, Weber was reading philosophical works again, 
and soon after his return to Heidelberg, he would start to write his 
first work after a gap o f almost five years, the essay on his former 
teacher and predecessor, Knies. The decision, therefore, was not 
motivated by his increased unability to work, but, quite the 
contrary, exactly by the hope that he may have regained his 
ability to work and write. He only realised that this work could 
not be fitted into economics, or, indeed, into any conventional 
academic work at all. He needed all the time he could have to 
digest and recover; to work out his approach in full.
Second, if a decade ago he counted on Marianne as his companion 
at work, he now decided to leave his wife uninformed about the 
whole matter. Subsequently, Nietzsche has hardly ever been 
mentioned in his work. However, Weber would not have been 
himself if he had not have left an allusion, almost a secret code to 
it. The solution is quite simple: whenever you read "Rickert" in 
Weber, beware; it may be a hidden allusion to Nietzsche. This also 





























































































In a number o f well-known passages, Weber has repeatedly 
stated his debt to the works o f Rickert. Such claims were often 
taken at face value, leading a number o f investigators on the trail 
o f discovering the exact nature o f the connection (Burger 1987; 
Merk 1990; Oakes 1988). However, these references have left 
many o f his best interpretators and closest acquaintances 
perplexed, who had problems in tracing this influence. This goes 
back to Troeltsch (Fleischmann 1964, pp. 198-9), and the close 
link between Weber and Rickert has been decisively severed by 
Henrich (1952). The point has been taken up recently by Scaff 
(1989) and Hennis (1988) who argued that instead o f Rickert, 
Weber relied upon Nietzsche. They have made it clear that, for 
e.g., when referring to Rickert's views on values and cultures 
(Weber 1977, pp. 176-7, fn. 16), the actual substance o f his 
argument owed clearly not to Rickert, but to Nietzsche.
This still leaves us with the puzzle concerning the reasons for 
Weber's allusions to Rickert. According to Troeltsch, these were 
merely acts o f politeness and deference toward a close colleague 
and friend, which simply does not provide a sufficient reason. 
Honigsheim (1968, p. 18) does not lead much further, claiming 
that Weber, due to modesty, underestimated his own 
independence from Rickert. The explanation o f Oakes (1987, p. 
444) is even bizarre, as he asserts that Weber simply did not 
understand Rickert. This implies the anachronism that Rickert was 
right: we should forget about Weber, and try to understand what 
Rickert has "really" meant.
The solution, however, lies in a closer reading o f Weber's texts, as 
Weber's acknowledgements are rather ambivalent. Thus, he 
praised Rickert for logical completeness (letter o f April 1902, 
quoted in Marianne Weber 1988, p. 260), and stated that he was 
"one o f our best logicians" (letter o f 16 April 1905, quoted in 
Hennis 1988, p.158). However, in his methodological writings, 
Weber always emphasised that his interest is not in the manner 
professional philosophers (logicians) reflect upon methodological 




























































































and history reflect upon what they are doing. (31) On another 
note, in the same letter, Weber was careful in pointing out that 
nobody has ever characterised Rickert as a great man (Hennis, 
1988, 158). Indeed, he has reserved the highest praise for 
somebody else, Alois Riehl, stating that " " if  Kant were to return 
today, he would find only Riehl’s kind o f philosophizing 
adequate"". (32)
This statement evokes another complex set o f relations between 
Weber, Nietzsche and Rickert. Riehl played an important role in 
the Webers' life, initiating the couple into Freiburg society in a 
time o f evident difficulty, and was also the first professor o f 
philosophy who wrote a monograph on Nietzsche, taking him 
seriously. The book was published in 1897, and therefore 
Nietzsche had to be at the center o f Riehl's interest in 1894. When 
Rickert came to Freiburg in 1894, shortly after —and with the 
active help — o f Max Weber, he replaced Riehl. But Rickert has 
accomplished another, indirect replacement, related to another 
"initiation rite". After the summer and fall o f 1894 when Weber 
was trying to initiate Marianne both to academic work and to 
Nietzsche, Marianne switched to Rickert the first time such an 
occasion presented itself, and "became Rickert's zealous student" 
(Marianne Weber 1988, p. 205).
These facts, together with third o f the maxims Weber taught to his 
students, "know how to keep silent" (Loewenstein 1966), support 
the plausibility o f the strategy Weber followed with respect to the 
subtle game of references to Nietzsche and Rickert. (33)
Weber's possible reasons for his silence can be summarised in the 
following manner. Weber decided, probably immediately in 1901- 
02, to keep silent about the impact Nietzsche had on his potential 
recovery, as he was a person struck by a serious (psychosomatic) 
sickness, fundamentally at odds with the official academic 
establishment o f his time, deeply critical and apprehensive in the 
manner Nietzsche has been generally read and understood, stating 
repeatedly that it is usually the worst in Nietzsche that has been 




























































































transform economics into a Nietzschean "science" o f man, and who 
tried and failed to initiate his wife into Nietzsche. Therefore he 
had all the the reasons, related to the cardinal virtues (Plato, 
Republic , 433b; Nietzsche, Daybreak , No. 556), to keep silent 
about the matter in all three set o f relations one could establish in 
life. In the relations to self, silence was a matter o f prudence (to 
avoid relapse). In the relations to familiar others, it was a matter 
o f courtesy and magnanimity towards his wife. Finally, in the 
relations to others it was a matter o f prudence again, to avoid 
misunderstandings. And i f  somebody would charge here 
concerning the other cardinal virtues, courage and honesty, one 
could respond in two ways: first, by pointing out - in the manner 
Socrates has done in the Apology (31c) when he was charged o f 
not taking part o f political life, stating that he was not lacking 
courage in actual war - that Weber showed enough courage in 
actual conflict, whether in public activities before the war or in his 
"parrhesiastic" lectures after the war; and second, by making a 
distinction between courage and audacity with Aristotle 
(Nicomachean Ethics , 1115a-1116a), the alleged duty to always 
immediately disclose everything would be an incitement to 
audacity, not to courage, as it would have violated in Weber's case 
other cardinal virtues in all three sets o f relations.
The third major point concerning the reorganisation effected 
around 1902 was related not to his decisions made in 1893, but to 
the commitments made about his identity in 1895. If seven years 
ago, he defined himself publicly as a political economics and as a 
bourgeois, now he took up these two identities as the objects o f 
his analysis, since his very first essays. In Roscher and Knies, he 
decided to analyse the extent to which the framework o f historical 
economics still exerted an impact on the minds o f his own 
generation, while the Protestant Ethic became a highly 
autobiographical account o f the emergence o f the modern 
bourgeois as a type.
Fourth, in embarking on his projects, Weber was using the 
example o f Nietzsche in minute details. There are two pieces o f 




























































































of Weber's work, that support such a reading. The first is that the 
type o f essays he wrote immediately upon his recovery perfectly 
mirror the first publications o f Nietzsche. Nietzsche started with a 
major and highly personal work that has immediately created a 
considerable, but quite hostile and incomprehending response 
(Birth o f Tragedy ), continued with critical works related to his 
age and the kind o f audience it represented (the first two 
Untimely Meditations ), then went into giving an account o f his 
masters (the third and fourth Untimely Meditations ), and ended 
up being seriously ill in 1875-76. Weber started from the other 
end, with a recovery from illness. It is therefore no surprise that 
he pursued the same road in the other direction. Thus, he started 
by settling his account with his teachers and their discipline, 
political economy, (34) only to move on to the basic questions of 
the methodology o f his age, and at that time starting also his own 
major personal work, the Protestant Ethic that carries the analogy 
with Nietzsche's first major work even in its title.
As the account so far has already made it clear, Weber was far 
from copying slavishly Nietzsche. Quite the contrary, he only 
wanted to use the experience o f Nietzsche in the best possible 
manner in order to accomplish what Nietzsche has failed to do, 
and provide a disciplined reflection on the problems the oeuvre of 
Nietzsche has helped to bring to surface. It is important to be 
quite precise at this point. Weber's task was not a systematisation 
in the ordinary sense, the alleged discovery or the subjective 
construction o f a closed system out o f Nietzsche's ideas. This 
would have been against the spirit o f Nietzsche, while Weber's 
aim was to complete the work in its spirit. He only wanted to 
combine and use to their full potential the insights Nietzsche 
developed in his fragments but was unable to put together, in 
spite o f all his attempts. This was the task that the editors o f 
the Will to Power evidently wanted to complete, but were not in 
the position accomplishing; and this was the task that Weber 
suddenly found for himself, that gave him the impulse to break 
through the cage o f his illness. It is a commonplace today that 
Nietzsche's sister, to increase attention, has falsified the Will to 




























































































have been misdirected by such claims, but he also noticed that the 
attempt was there. This gave Weber his task. His whole theory of 
action should be interpreted as an attempt to make the most o f 
Nietzsche, as the completion o f his own efforts to take up and 
carry to fruition what Nietzsche has failed to accomplish in his last 
plans and notes. (35)
However, Weber learned not only from his own mistakes, but also 
from the fate o f Nietzsche. He realised the dangers o f closing 
oneself into a personal project, o ff from public and academic 
recognition, where he may well have guessed the roots o f 
Nietzsche's eventual madness. Weber therefore considered it 
crucial to stay in the public view, to exert a public presence. For 
this purposes, the moment he realised that he was able to write 
again, he immediately searched for the proper outlet for his 
works. He found it in the form o f overtaking the Archiv , a journal 
close in orientation to the Verein . For this, he needed academic 
friends whom he could rely upon editing the journal. This was not 
missing. But he also needed something more, to gain control over 
the journal. This was granted to him in the following manner, 
again underlying the intimate links between Weber's research and 
life: Else von Richthofen, who married to Edgar Jaffé in 1902, 
obtained the Archiv for Max Weber from Edgar Jaffé as one o f 
her wedding gifts (Factor 1988, p. 1; Roth 1988, p. xxxi). From this 
moment, publication in the Archiv represented a serious dual 
duty for Weber: an obligation towards the public to present the 
results o f his work, and an obligation toward Edgar (and to Else) to 
keep it running — an obligation that dominates much o f his 
correspondance with the Siebecks who ran the company that 
published the Archiv.
At this point, it is necessary to break o ff the story, as the focus is 
on the founding experiences o f Weber's work. It is only possible to 
add two further remarks about Weber's "Nietzschean" theory o f 
action, and the dynamics o f  his work after 1902. The 
fundamentally "Nietzschean” roots o f Weber's theory o f action are 
visible in the starting sections o f his most important and best 




























































































Weber simply excludes repetitive, mass activity from the field o f 
"his" sociology - although as "we" know it now, sociology as an 
empirical-statistical study does nothing but analyse exactly such 
mass phenomena. Any course on probability theory that underlies 
mathematical statistics starts with the law o f large numbers. 
Second, in emphasising the subjective meaning o f action he is not 
interested in the elusive object o f the "true aim" the actor may 
have in his mind when doing something. His interest is not 
oriented toward the substantive characteristics o f action, rather to 
the specific modality or form o f a certain behavior as action, 
which resides in the actor's aim to make a difference. Such an 
intention is not at all present trivially in everything a human 
being does. Quite the contrary, in all societies where ritual plays a 
major role, one is expected not to behave differently. Acting with 
the intention o f making a difference is restricted there to 
particular actors performing certain sacred deeds in particular 
occasions. In one word, action as action, from the perspective of 
the person who is acting, is always rooted in the extra-ordinary, 
whether it is consciously intended or not. In Weber's writings, 
there is an intricate interplay between his definition of religious 
action and o f action in general, implying that originally, the two 
expression meant the same thing (1978, pp. 399-401; 1981, pp. 
151-3). In this way, on the basis o f Nietzsche's idea o f the eternal 
return, it is possible to go to the bottom o f Weber's diagnosis o f 
modernity. What is most specific, and ultimately self-defeating, in 
modernity is not simply the question of rationality, but the fixed 
idea, the pathological conscious strive o f making a difference with 
every deed, in every move. This is also ultimately self-defeating, 
as a difference can only be made against a background o f 
sameness, o f identity, o f order. If this background disappears, so 
does the possibility o f a difference. Weber's logic helps us to map 
the ultimate sameness o f the world o f rational expectations, allows 
us to understand the most recent economic theories, developed 
more than half a century after he died.
Second, Weber's work after 1902 was not a smooth development. 
He not only had to fight with the lasting marks o f his illness, but 




























































































to work out the exact stakes o f  his work, a project that 
approached the fundamental problems o f the age in a highly 
autobiographical manner. Thus, in the summer o f 1906, due to the 
innocent quiery o f his publisher about a second, book edition o f 
the Protestant Ethic , he almost had a second breakdown, as he 
realised that he did not, and still could not, specify the exact 
problem underlying the work (MWG II/5, p. 119). In his new 
recovery, he was helped by three factors. The first was another 
methodological exercise, this time aiming at the theoretical 
elaboration o f the proper manner in which a "second edition" 
should be completed (Weber 1977, pp. 59-61). The second was 
another Nietzsche reading experience, the publication o f the last 
major posthumous work, Ecce Homo , in 1908. This work added 
two points that were not contained in Nietzsche's works published 
so far and that were o f fundamental importance for Weber. First, 
it has explicitly thematised, through an autobiographical account, 
the idea o f the creative role o f illness. Second, it has described as 
the central personal experience underlying the Zarathustra the 
vision o f the eternal return. This could have helped Weber in 
focusing his theory o f action.
The third and most important sources were the "anticritical 
essays", four polemical pieces written in between 1907 and 1910 
in which Weber defended the Protestant Ethic against its first 
public critics. As Hennis has convincingly shown, these essays 
were much more them products o f idle polemics. In them, Weber 
had the chance o f further clarifying and defining the underlying 
problem o f his book - something he was not able to accomplish in 
the original edition. (36)
However, even Hennis did not provide a full account o f these 
essays. First, more then just defining Weber's problem, they had 
an immediate effect. (37) Second, it is necessary to give an 
account how these essays could have had such an impact. The 
framework o f this paper does provide such an explanation. The 
essays were products o f a special type o f reading experience, the 
effects o f Weber reading Weber, belonging to the genre 




























































































"techniques o f self' or the "writing o f the self' (Foucault 1983, 
1984). This can also be defined as a special kind o f meditative 
exercise helping one to gain focus about the direction of the work. 
This also helps us to explain the third major point, the reason why 
these texts were so neglected in the otherwise enormous Weber 
scholarship.
The reason, on a first look, is simple. Weber always spoke in a 
disparaging manner about these articles, as polemics that were 
imposed on him and only gave trouble (Honigsheim 1968, p. 105). 
The secondary' literature simply took his words for granted here. 
However, there are some good reasons to doubt the 
straightforwardness o f these comments and to argue that these 
essays represented the third major episode in his life over which 
he decided to keep silent. In order to substantiate this claim, it is 
again necessary to treat the facts closely.
In the second anticritical essay, Weber made the claim that the 
reason why he was not continuing with the project sketched at the 
end o f the Protestant Ethic was the publication o f Troeltsch's 
essay 'The social teaching o f Christianity' that appeared in an 
early 1908 issue o f the Archiv . This argument would later be 
taken up in the last footnote o f Protestant Ethic , repeated by 
Marianne Weber (p. 331) and finally taken for granted by almost 
eveiyone. Yet, this claim is plainly incorrect.
First, Troeltsch’s essay appeared three years after the Protestant 
Ethic . During this time, Weber has not even started to work on 
the programme outlined. Second, Weber's argument implies that 
Troeltsch had a negative impact on his work. Yet, as a 20 June, 
1908 letter o f the publisher makes it clear, it should have 
happened the opposite way. In this letter, Siebeck urged Weber to 
work on the book version as the publication by Troeltsch could 
help to sell it. Weber's answer was more than a month late and 
negative: he did not have time for this (MWG II/5, p. 609). Finally, 
in the 1920 edition o f the Protestant Ethic , Weber himself 
provided the decisive argument against his own idea. A simple 




























































































be right concerning the impact o f Troeltsch. In the first footnote, 
he states that most o f the suggestions he received from 
theologians could not be incorporated simply because the 
fundamental thrust o f the book lay elsewhere: "What to a 
theologian is valuable in his religion cannot play a very large part 
in this study." (p. 185). In the next page, he even draws attention 
specifically to Troeltsch's work, claiming that it provided a 
"welcome complement and confirmation" o f his own views, but 
stating that Troeltsch "is principally concerned with the doctrines 
o f religion, while I am interested rather in their practical results". 
If this be so - and here we have no reason for doubt - then the 
claims o f the last footnote cannot be accepted.
This episode had a further consequence. Between Troeltsch and 
the anti-critical essays, the same kind o f transference happened 
as between Rickert and Nietzsche. Troeltsch has also become a 
"hook", a mask, an "alias" behind which Weber could hide his 
change o f strategy due to his work on self. This was also not 
without consequences, visible in the long rivalry between 
Troeltsch and Weber concerning originality, and in Troeltsch's 
behavior after Weber's death.
There is an additional supporting episode. In a 29 November 1910 
letter, written shortly after Weber has completed the 'Anticritical 
last word', he asked a copy o f the first part o f his original 
Protestant Ethic essay from his publisher (MWG II/6, p. 699). He 
explains that he wanted to bind the volume, but as he gave away 
his own copy at the time of publication, he had no copies left. This, 
however, is a very strange claim. By that time, Weber has 
completed four anticritical essays. His main argument was that the 
opponents failed to perceive the problem he was addressing in the 
book and, according to Hennis, also recognised that he was not 
fully clear in stating it himself. Now, it was exactly the first essay 
that was entitled "The Problem". It is all but impossible to believe 
either that throughout this period, he did not even look into his 
own essay, or that he was not working on his own copy. Quite the 
contrary, a good reason for asking an extra offprint may well have 




























































































This leads to the posing o f the following question: why would have 
Weber preferred to remain silent about this episode, even feeling 
ashamed? The answer, however, is again quite trivial. Reading 
one's own work classifies, from the outside, as an excessive 
concern with oneself, an act o f self-love or narcissism; from the 
inside, as a spiritual meditation. Both are fundamental sins for a 
Protestant, committed to activity in the world and the love o f 
others. Weber was led to these exercises by the force o f 
circumstances, but found them exceptionally productive. This 
happened still not without a feeling o f guilt, or at least serious 
reservation. Therefore, he did everything he could in order to hide 
them.
5. The formative experiences o f Durkhelm and Weber compared
At this moment, it is possible to return to the question o f the lack 
o f direct connection between Durkheim and Weber. The two 
thinkers, far from exhibiting fundamentally different universes, 
as it has often been alleged, not only touched orbit, but shared 
strikingly much in their formation. Most o f the names 
encountered by Durkheim, like Schmoller and Wagner (and 
especially their teachers, Roscher and Knies), Ihering, even Wundt, 
figure prominently in the Weberian oeuvre as well. However, the 
types o f experiences they had when encountering these works 
and the dynamics of their paths were fundamentally different.
First, Ihering was not simply one o f the texts Weber has read 
when studying law. He was Weber's professor during the latter's 
studies in Gottingen. The coincidence with Durkheim's 
involvement is again remarkable. Weber was in Gottingen from 
about October 1885 to April 1886. It was exactly the time when 
Ihering worked on the continuation o f his work discussed by 
Durkheim (1975, vol. 1., p.297), and also when Durkheim was in 
Germany, though he evidently did not meet Ihering. Moreover, 
studying under Ihering was not a lost experience for Weber. As 
Turner and Factor have recently shown (1994), much o f the 




























































































action, derived from the fact that he applied, in a fundamentally 
remodeled manner, some o f Ihering's categories. It would still be 
wrong simply to argue that as Ihering was therefore important 
both to Durkheim and Weber, this immediately establishes 
contacts between the two, as their relation to Ihering was 
radically different. For Durkheim, this was an innovative 
experience against his background in Comte and Spencer, 
Renouvier and Espinas. For Weber, it was exactly Ihering that was 
his scholastic background, in contrast to which, but also using it, 
he later developed his own approach.
The situation with Schmoller and Wagner is much the same. 
Weber knew both o f them well, as they worked together in the 
Verein - Wagner was even present in the Evangelic-Social 
Congress. Yet, within a broad agreement for social policy, Weber 
was fundamentally at cross purposes with most o f their basic 
ideas. As this issue is o f considerable importance, it deserves some 
discussion.
It has been often asserted that Schmoller exerted a major 
influence on Weber, though the claim has recently come under 
fire. (38) It is therefore worthwhile to revisit the experiential 
components o f the Weber-Schmoller encounter. First, Max Weber 
was not a student o f Schmoller's. He studied with Knies and 
became his successor at Heidelberg. It was his brother Alfred who 
studied under Schmoller (Demm 1987, p. 89). Second, Max Weber 
has honoured this distinction. The first significant piece he wrote 
after his illness was on the occasion o f the Knies Festschrift 
(though what he wrote did not much suit the occasion), while he 
refused to contribute to the Schmoller Festschrift just a few 
months after he finished the last segment o f the three-part 
Roscher-Knies essay (MWG II/5, p. 192). Third, however, he was 
not without respect for the work and especially the person o f 
Schmoller. He wrote a letter in which he acknowledged the way 
Schmoller kept alive interest in historical thought" [a] t a time of 
the most barren economic rationalism" (Schon, 1987, p.59). Later, 





























































































However, the nature o f their substantive differences is best seen 
in two major, ongoing debates in the Verein. The topics were quite 
important for Weber, and would be o f especial relevance for the 
Weber (mis)reception as well. The first debate was around the 
question o f bureaucracy, and involved first a heated exchange 
between Friedrich Naumann and Schmoller in the 1905 meeting 
(ibid., p. 63), while the second in the 1909 meeting (Boese 1939, 
pp. 133-5; Oberschall 1965, pp. 134-5). In both occasions, Weber 
spoke strongly against Schmoller's idea bureaucratic patronage, 
the latter's belief based on his close ties with state officials that a 
regime o f officials, transcending party and class interests, 
provides for a neutral authority. The second major debate was in 
1914, again in the Verein, on the topic o f value freedom, where 
Weber took up again a position diametrically opposed to 
Schmoller's (Boese 1939, pp. 147-8; Kruger 1987, pp. 82-3; Schon 
1987, pp. 67-8).
The roots o f the intellectual as opposed to political connections 
between Weber and Schmoller were not due to similarity o f 
methods and aim, rather were given by the fact that both 
Schmoller and Weber belonged to the same school. As Deploige 
has rightly pointed out, "Wagner and Schmoller had had 
immediate precursors in the founders o f economic historicism - 
Roscher and Knies" (1938, p. 151). All four were founding 
members o f the Verein (Boese 1939, pp. 242-9). Roscher and 
Knies were exactly the targets o f Weber's first methodological 
article. In these essays, Weber talked as a person who has also 
belonged once to the historical school (Knies was his teacher in 
1882-83 in Heidelberg, and in 1896 he inherited his very chair), 
but who felt the need to overcome this heritage. In the first 
footnote to the first essay, he justified his undertaking, the study 
o f writers who already seem to be obsolete, in the following 
words: "It is a point o f view which has been obsolete for quite 
some time, and no one in our discipline would waste his time 
criticising its substantive aspects today. However, it would be a 
mistake to assume that for this reason the logical weaknesses 




























































































clearer to us today than they were to him ." (p. 211, italics in 
original). The aim o f Weber was to individuate what has been 
taken for granted in the position o f Roscher and Knies, taken over 
by Schmoller and Wagner, in order to be able to think differently. 
(39) The aim o f Durkheim was again the opposite, at the most 
fundamental level o f intention and motivation. Though far from 
copying slavishly the German historical economists, he still 
wanted to reinvigorate French thought by the insertion o f the 
very categories Weber has considered already obsolete. The same 
point can be repeated with respect to the quotation with which 
Durkheim started his account, the reference to the Handbook o f 
Schonberg. Weber spent much o f the last decade o f his life in 
producing a new edition o f Schonberg's Handbook — that 
eventually grew into Economy and Society.
Finally, while Durkheim found Wundt's work so conducive to his 
undertaking, Weber was quite critical o f it on several occasions. 
According to Schluchter, several o f Weber's methodological 
articles were written explicitly against Wundt (1995, pp. 38-9). 
His major methodological article on "Objectivity" was a direct 
attack on the fundamental methodological principle o f Wundt, 
closely followed by Durkheim, according to which the aims and 
methods o f scientific investigations should depend on their object 
(Schon 1987, p. 60). Moreover, Weber also undertook a major 
research project in psychophysics, but analysed the works o f 
Kraepelin, (40) made much less use o f the works o f Wundt, and 
his main conclusions were negative, questioning the relevance of 
such an endeavor for the understanding o f society. In fact, this 
investigation did not originate with Max Weber: it was the idea of 
his brother, Alfred, who — as opposed to him — did show affinities 
with the methods and interests o f Wundt (Schluchter 1995, pp. 
67, 72).
The comparison can be complemented from the other end. All the 
major topics o f Weber's other methodological essays do closely 
correspond to Durkheim's related writings. Weber analysed 
Eduard Meyer's reflections o f the writing o f history in 1906, while 




























































































criticising exactly that aspect that Weber found its most important 
asset, the analysis o f the contribution o f the individual factors in 
history (Durkheim, vol 1., pp. 398-9). The correspondance 
between the essay on "objectivity", trying to specify the exact 
sense in which we can talk about the "objectivity" o f cultural 
analysis contrasts sharply with Durkheim's firm belief in the 
objectivity o f social facts and the need for a science o f society. 
Finally, in the Critique o f Stammler , many o f Weber's most 
important, claims can be read directly against the major tenets o f 
Durkheim (see especially pp. 98-124).
The differences between Weber and Durkheim are located at the 
heart, the experiential bases o f their whole thought. The major 
experience o f Durkheim, his trip in Germany got him acquainted 
as new and revolutionary' exactly with those currents o f thought 
that were the background influences for Weber, but from which 
he tried to liberate his thought, as they were mene, tekel, ufarsim 
, and succeeded with the help o f Nietzsche. The movement o f their 
thought in their decisive experiences was therefore in the 
opposite direction - and if we consider thinking as a dynamic 
process and not as a static systematisation o f ideas conceived as 
representations, then such questions of movement are o f utmost 
significance.
In sum, in the relation between Durkheim and Weber, the issue is 
not simply one o f a fundamental identity o f purpose or a 
difference due to educational background, but there are crucial 
divergences one the basis o f fundamentally similar formative 
influences. It is well known that, in spite o f this fact, Parsons has 
succeeded to found modern social theory on the alleged 
convergence between Durkheim and Weber. It remains to be seen 




























































































6. The major formative experiences o f Parsons
It goes without saying that the denomination of Durkheim and 
Weber as the two great classics o f sociology has been the singular 
achievement o f Talcott Parsons (13 December, 1902 - 8 May, 
1979). Before him, hardly anyone had the idea o f connecting 
Weber and Durkheim. After him, this became a triviality. 
Parsons's work represented an epochal break. The question is the 
exact reason and the consequences o f this fact. This can be 
answered by studying the experiential basis o f Parsons’s 
synthesis.
While in the case o f Durkheim and Weber, it was necessary to rely 
upon rare pieces o f information that until recently were scarcely 
if  at all accessible, there are a number o f available 
autobiographical writings by Parsons. This practice is not only 
different from Durkheim's and Weber's extreme privacy and 
reluctance to discuss themselves, but also from the cases o f some 
of the most important thinkers o f our age who, even though late 
in their life did accept to give autobiographical interviews, were 
not able to write autobiographical statements, due to the same 
resistance Durkheim and Weber had felt earlier (Elias 1991, 
Foucault 1982, Voegelin 1989). Combined with the fact that in 
these and other late reflections, Parsons was rather inclined to 
boast about his achievements, (41) this indicates not only a 
personality trait different from and less sympathic than 
Durkheim's and Weber's, but has different exigencies for the 
understanding o f autobiographical claims, calling for a note o f 
caution. Parsons's disclosures were not sudden revelations o f truth 
in very concrete contexts, where one should balance the truth 
value due to the exceptional insights with possible reasons for 
deep conflict or antagonism, but were conscious constructions that 
were probably nfluenced by the same concerns as his reflections 
on the fate o f his books.
The story, on a first look, cannot be more straightforward, and 
was told in most detail in a 1979 conference (Parsons 1980). 




























































































even heard the name o f Weber until the summer o f 1925, his 
arrival to Heidelberg, and has read, as the first thing o f the 
oeuvre, and not by "mere chance", the Protestant Ethic in the fall. 
Though he does not use the word "revelation" in his account, gets 
quite close: "this reading had an immediate and powerful impact 
on me. It gripped my intense interest immediately and I read it 
straight through ... as if it were a detective story." (p.39). He later 
repeats the primacy o f Weber for his work, stating that he would 
not have been able to complete Structure "without the exposure 
to Weber's work", and that the book "established something of a 
position for me personally" (p. 41).
Again, we do not have the slightest reason, nor right, to doubt the 
basic truth o f the story. And yet, there are some puzzling facts. 
First, given the fundamental reading experience Weber 
represented for Parsons, how could it be that since decades, there 
is a very strong "revisionism" by Weber scholar against the 
Parsonian reading, while there is hardly anything comparable by 
Durkheim scholars? Second, apart from Weber, Parsons gave a 
detailed reason for his choice o f Pareto (the impact o f Henderson), 
while the selection o f Marshall was rather self-evident, given his 
interest in economics (p. 41). However, concerning Durkheim, he is 
satisfied with the vague claim that at that time there was "much 
discussion" about his works — a vagueness all the more strange as 
there is a wide agreement today that Durkheim was even more 
important was the overall framework o f Parsons's work than 
Weber (Alexander 1990, p. 7). This reluctance is quite puzzling. If 
Weber had some reasons to be silent about Nietzsche in the start 
o f the century and Durkheim was reluctant to acknowledge his 
German connection just before W.W.I., there seems to be no 
similar reason for Parsons to pass over the reasons o f his reliance 
upon the work o f Durkheim.
Let us start with a rather trivial point: what have Parsons read 
exactly? As an aside, he mentions that he could not read the book 
through immediately, as he had to respect the library opening 
hours, not owning yet a copy. But there was a more basic problem: 




























































































Protestant Ethic . The essays were published as part o f the first 
volume o f GARS (Collected Essays on the Sociology o f  Religions ), 
and this fact did matter a lot to Weber who he repeatedly refused 
the offer to publish the Protestant Ethic as a separate book. The 
first volume o f the GARS formed a unity for Weber, and this point 
was o f considerable significance. The "rediscovery" o f the 
Protestant Ethic as an independent unit has been the 
achievement o f Parsons. It was not due to a novel problem or a 
new way o f seeing that this book taught him; quite the contrary, it 
was because it led him to reestablish contact with his own 
identity. This immediate restriction o f his reading o f Weber was 
probably due to unreflected autobiographical perspective. This 
imposes the first limit on the way Parsons has read Weber.
The second problem is also hardly perceivable. Parsons stated that 
the reading o f Weber had a major impact on his German 
dissertation (p. 39). This work, however, had no public impact at 
that time. Structure was published exactly ten years later. It is a 
question whether the major book was also published under the 
unbroken impact o f the Weber reading; that the new readings 
represented no major reorientation. Parsons certainly believed so, 
as he stated that Durkheim's work "fitted into my plans 
exceedingly well and gradually the plan to write a general study" 
had taken place (p. 41). It remains to be seen whether the claims 
about such a "graduality" would withstand the test o f a close 
reading o f the actual historical record.
Four facts deserve mentioning about early experiences (Camic 
1991; Martel 1979; Parsons 1969, pp. 59-61; 1970; Wearne 1985). 
First, Parsons was brought up in a Protestant environment. His 
father was an ordained Congregational minister who also belonged 
to the "Social Gospel" movement that was strongly interested in 
economic and social reform. Second, Parsons grew into a not only 
religious but also academic setting. Between 1892 to 1917, his 
father was professor o f English, dean o f the Department o f Arts 
and Sciences and vice president o f Colorado College. Third, the 
only dramatic period in Parsons's early life were the years 1917- 




























































































action against the president o f the college who was charged with 
sexual misconduct. Though his actions had received widespread 
supported at the time and were vindicated later, the powers-that- 
be dismissed him from his post during the summer o f 1917. 
Finally, Parsons has spent a year in his youth in Germany. (Camic 
1991, p. xi)
Parsons's academic career demonstrated his almost boundless 
intellectual curiosity'. He shared an interest in both the natural 
and social sciences, started by studying biology (Parsons 1970, p. 
826), and even completed a non-clinical (psychoanalytical) 
training (Parsons 1981, p.185, fn.4). Within the social sciences, his 
background formation was in institutional economics, to which he 
was initiated by the lectures o f Walton Hamilton and Clarence 
Ayres, but he soon mastered neoclassical economics, before 
turning to sociology. His thinking was also strongly influenced by 
philosophers like Whitehead and Henderson, the chemist James B. 
Conant and later by the social insect biologist Alfred Emerson.
Such a variety o f interests and knowledge is evidently a main 
asset for a social theorist. However, the manner in which Parsons 
went through intellectual trajectory was problematic in two 
senses. The first problem is related to the way Parsons changed 
his disciplinary allegiances, and it can be best seen in comparison 
with the case o f Max Weber. Weber was struggling with the need 
o f understanding his age, and was pushing the disciplines he 
encountered to their utmost limits. Once their utility was 
exhausted, he left them abruptly, as a matter o f conscious 
decision. This enabled him to build later explicitly upon the 
conceptual instruments acquired earlier, while at the same time, 
in his methodological essays, he tried to escape the mental 
framework they imposed on him (Factor and Turner 1994). 
Parsons, on the other hand, rather slipped out first o f biology, 
then from economics, never clarifying the reasons for change for 
himself (1970, p. 834); he even may have broken with his 
religious affiliations in the same way (Wearne 1989, p. 22). In this 




























































































that did not fail to haunt him later, returning in unexpected 
moments as the "answers".
Second, the variety o f interests resulted in a highly eclectic 
approach. A wide range o f curiosity and a synthetic mind is not an 
unmixed blessing. Parsons's account o f the range o f his interests 
gives a peculiar reading. Within the short span o f two full pages 
(1970, pp. 829-31), he lists an enormous variety o f fields that are 
far from being complementary, including biology, Kant's Critique 
o f Pure Reason , Weber's Wissenschaftslehre , with a particular 
emphasis on subjective meaning and Verstehen , Whitehead on 
the nature o f experience, Conant (a chemist) on the nature of 
science, Schumpeter (an economist), Henderson and Pareto on 
"system", and elaborating on further medical and bilogical 
influences. One should recall the point that the section was not on 
his intellectual formation and wanderings, but specifically on 
Structure , entitled "A First Major Synthesis". It simply does not 
add up to a coherent, dogged intellectual pursuit o f a fundamental 
problem, related to (modern) society. Limiting remarks to the 
most evident point, an emphasis on subjective meaning and 
Verstehen is simply incompatible with systematisation o f human 
behavior on the basis o f models borrowed from biology. Both 
undertakings may be legitimate, but they can hardly be pursued 
within the same project. Parsons seems to have picked up 
everything which he encountered and which stimulated his 
exceptional intellect, (41) and at the end was trying fit all o f this 
together in a system, creating an artificial synthesis whose 
foundations were laid down in the subjective, autobiographical 
components o f his interests, buried under the generalising 
language o f the synthesis. It is necessary, therefore, to go beyond 
his account and restore the exact experiential context.
The major formative experience o f Parsons's career was his two- 
year trip in Europe. The first year was spent at the LSE, where he 
met Hobhouse, Laski, Cannon, Tawney, Ginsberg and, most 
importantly, Malinowski. However, the by far more significant 
experience was the year spent in Heidelberg, where he almost 




























































































moment, it is usually assumed that the major formative influence 
for Parsons has been Weber. However, one should immediately 
point out that concerning the circumstances o f this experience, 
Parsons was rather close to Durkheim. Just like the latter, he 
traveled to Germany for a rather short period, and was therefore 
not much able to gain a distance, in his case to separate Weber 
from the background. Moreover, his own formation showed a lot 
o f similarity to the fundamental encounters o f Durkheim. Parsons 
was educated in the tradition o f Institutional Economics, a school 
very strongly rooted in the German historical school, exactly in the 
traditions o f Roscher, Schmoller and Wagner that Durkheim found 
so intriguing in Germany and to which Weber had also belonged 
earlier, but from which he later distanced himself. Also, just like 
Durkheim, he had a strong interest in the "social question", rooted 
in concerns derived from childhood, in a religious setting (Weame 
1989, pp. 11-18), but a concern that they soon displaced toward 
an interest that was both theoretically and practically more 
encompassing (the whole society, the nation, the normative- 
integrative moral system).
Germany left such a strong impression on Parsons that he decided 
not to search a PhD in the States and finish a degree in Heidelberg. 
The topic was a study o f the German authors he encountered - 
Brentano, Sombart, Marx, and especially Weber. He defended his 
thesis in July 1927, returning after an absence o f a year. The first 
works he published upon his return to the States were all 
connected to this German experience. These were the two parts o f 
Chapter Three o f his dissertation, published in 1928-29, and the 
translation o f the Protestant Ethic that he discussed with 
Marianne Weber during his summer 1927 return trip to 
Heidelberg (Camic 1991, p. xxvii).
Parsons's first writing on Weber provides remarkable insights into 
the manner in which Parsons has received Weber. The general 
presentation shows similarities to Durkheim's early texts. Just like 
Durkheim, Parsons concentrated on the historical school on the 




























































































main aim was not critical examination, only the introduction of 
unknown ideas to the American public. (42)
The first part o f the article, the one that was published in 1928, 
was restricted to the discussion o f Sombart and Marx. Weber was 
the topic o f the second, 1929 installment. The discussion could not 
have had a more promising starting point. Far from reducing 
Weber to the Protestant Ethic , Parsons introduced the full scope 
o f Weber's investigations into the sociology o f world religions in 
the very first paragraph. In the immediately following sentence, 
he makes the point, referring to the memorial speech of Jaspers, 
that even in these studies, Weber never forgot from sight the 
fundamental issues o f his present. The article goes on the discuss 
the basic categories o f Weber's thought, following closely Weber's 
two most important mature introductions, the 'Author's 
Introduction' and the 'Basic Categories', and even makes 
references to Weber's study on the Agrarian Sociology o f 
Antiquity. However, soon, on the bottom o f page 24 and the top of 
page 25, just after correctly individuating Weber's interest as 
being concerned with the source o f the "common characteristics of 
all the principal features o f modern society ... their peculiar type 
o f rationality”, which is almost a verbatim quote from the crucial 
section o f the 'Author's Introduction' (p. 26), a new concept is 
introduced: bureaucracy.
Given the matter o f fact consensus concerning the importance this 
concept possesses for Weber's work, one would be inclined to say 
that finally, after all these references to ancient history, Weber 
(and Parsons) are back on target. However, I would claim that it is 
exactly here that Parsons goes astray. The attack against the 
conventional reading o f Weber must start at its center, the alleged 
centrality o f "bureaucracy" and "bureaucratisation” for Weber's 
work. No matter how strange it may sound, the word does not 
appear in the 'Author's Introduction', though this text was central 
for Weber, as he took an extreme care in finishing it. The 
understanding o f the significance o f this text has been hindered, 
and the proposition o f the bureacratisation thesis at the same 




























































































that together, and with their consequences, had a rather major 
reifying effect.
First, Parsons has decided to publish the 'Author's Introduction', a 
text written in 1919-1920 as the Preface to all three volumes of 
the GARS, together with only the Protestant Ethic . The problem 
here is not simply that in this way, the authorial intentions were 
disregarded in a particularly blatant manner; not even that it gave 
rise to the frequently committed error that the 1920 Preface was 
assumed to have been written in 1905 (Nelson 1974), or that it 
separated this text from Weber's other two important late 
introductory essays that were eventually published by Gerth and 
Mills. The error was even more fundamental in a sense that has 
become visible only with the help o f the recently published 
letters. On this basis, it is evident that for about fifteen years, in 
spite o f the repeated insistence and urging o f his publisher, Weber 
has refused to republish the Protestant Ethic in a book form. He 
came to the realisation that the book cannot stand by itself, being 
too open to misinterpretation, due partly to the fact that in the 
book Weber was not able to define his problem in an unambigous 
manner. Therefore, he needed a clearer definition o f his problem, 
and the inclusion o f a larger body of supporting material. He 
worked fifteen years to fill these exigencies, writing first a series 
o f anticritical essays in which, as Wilhelm Hennis has shown, his 
major purpose was the specification o f his underlying problem; 
then worked for four years on a series o f essays on the WEWR; 
then wrote two major, synthetic pieces trying to summarise the 
main purpose o f  these essays (the Einlei tung  and the 
Zwischenbetrachtung ); then worked a further four years on the 
preparation o f his substantive essays for publication in the Archiv 
; and finally, when deciding that now time was ripe for their joint 
publication together in a book form - this was the real publication 
o f the second edition o f the Protestant Ethic -, he wrote another 
summary essay, the Vorbemerkung , a "second order reflection" 
(Tenbruck 1980, p. 348, fn 29) in which he provided the "master 
key" (Nelson 1974) about how the whole thing belonged together. 
By publishing only this final summary analysis with the 




























































































more "manageable" size, but simply did exactly what Weber has 
absolutely refused to do - to publish a separate edition o f the 
Protestant Ethic only; and he even worsened this by adding to it 
the misleading late Preface. The fact that he has committed this 
serious error with the explicit consensus o f Marianne Weber only 
adds to the puzzle.
Second, this error has been worsened by another problem, the 
Parsonian invention about the "iron cage". This mistranslation has 
given place to a small discussion in social theory (Kent, 1983, 
Tiryakian, 1981). The problem is more than a minor philological 
matter, as it fits into a general pattern: the manner in which the 
special autobiographical angle from which Parsons has read 
Weber, through his selections, translations and interpretations, 
became the established tradition in sociology.
However, the perplexity does not end here. One element is still 
missing, and it may be the decisive source. Autobiographical 
perspectives may distort the manner in which a book is read, but 
they do not put in it something that is not there. The Protestant 
Ethic does not contain a bureaucratisation thesis, so Parsons could 
not have given it excessive weight. The issue raises the further 
problem concerning the exact source o f the thesis. For this, one 
may first turn to Weber's other main work, Economy and Society.
Surprisingly, one finds that though the concept o f bureaucracy 
does appear in the book, references to it are unemphatic. It does 
not enter the conceptual introduction. Even more importantly, it 
fails to appear in the central sections about power, domination, 
and legitimacy. In the whole Part One, the section Weber has 
prepared for publication with so much care in 1918-20, 
'bureaucracy' receives only a passing treatment, mostly reduced 
to a small section entitled 'Legal authority with a bureaucratic 
administrative staff (pp. 217-26). The concept was discussed in 
more detail in Part Two, the earlier, more descriptive-historical 
manuscript, completed in 1911-13. However, when in 1918-20 
Weber has reworked his material, with the explicit aim o f 




























































































'bureaucracy'. How can the singular emphasis given to this concept 
in "Weberian sociology" be explained?
The reason is simple. It is given by two names: Robert Michels and 
Alfred Weber. First, Weber had a very specific source in his 
discussion o f bureacracy in the writings o f Michels. Michels, a 
former member and prospective young ideologist o f the German 
Social Democratic Party has become disillusioned with the party 
around 1907, largely under the influence o f Max Weber. He 
realised that his party, instead o f working on the salvation o f the 
working class, was developing into a huge bureaucratic machine. 
On the basis o f this experience, he wrote his famous work (Michels 
1911) that is still a classic in political science; and later he 
changed his political allegiances so radically that he ended up 
endorsing Italian fascism. Michels was closely in touch with 
Weber before and after the disillusionment and during the writing 
o f the book. The letters Weber wrote to Michels are among the 
most important ones he has ever written. Michels has amply 
acknowledged Weber's contribution, as the dedication o f the first 
edition attests. Weber acknowledged the merits o f the book and 
used some o f the results, even something o f its the general 
outlook, for his own work. In the early manuscript, written just 
after the publication o f Michels's book, he used the concept o f 
bureaucracy extensively. However, Weber was also quite critical 
o f Michels. (Scaff 1981) He considered the position o f Michels as 
one-sided, and thought that he was on the wrong track in pressing 
for the problem o f democracy. Therefore, in his more mature 
version, he reduced the problem o f bureaucracy to one o f the - no 
doubt important and Interesting - characteristics o f modernity, 
and o f political organisation in general. (43)
Were this the case, somebody had to put, by force, the concept o f 
bureaucracy at the center o f Weber's interests. This feat was 
accomplished by Alfred Weber. First, there are some indications 
that the theory o f bureucratisation and value freedom was central 
for the way Alfred Weber represented his brother's thought in the 
1920s and 1930s. Second, there is a particularly good experiential 




























































































the main point o f contact between the two Weber brothers, which 
pitted Gustav Schmoller, Alfred's teacher, and Max Weber, his 
older brother, against each other (Demm 1987). Such an encounter 
could not failed to have impressed Alfred Weber. However, third, 
these were exactly the issues where Alfred Weber, though 
originally supporting his brother, soon dissented from him. He 
increasingly lost belief in the possibility and desirability o f a 
value free social science. At the same instance, he came to 
represent his brother ever more as a simplistic positivist. 
Similarly, he also preferred to identify Max Weber with the 
sweeping generalisation o f the bureaucratisation thesis, avoiding 
in his work any reference to the word bureaucracy even when it 
would have been self-evident to use (A. Weber 1971), though the 
idea that bureaicratisation is a phenomenon where there is no 
distinction between capitalism and socialism was credited by Max 
Weber to Alfred. In this manner, by a single stroke, Alfred Weber 
reduced his brother's highly complex and nuanced theory o f the 
genesis o f modernity into a simple theory o f bureaucratisation, 
substituting the complex experiential basis o f Weber's thought 
with the much more simplistic disappointment o f Michels in 
socialism. (44)
This misrepresentation was not without personal interests. Alfred 
Weber had very good reasons to downgrade his older brother's 
heritage, beyond the standard fraternal rivalry. These were Max 
Weber's evidently larger talent and recognition, his not only 
scholarly but also political influence, and, not least, their common 
attraction to Else von Richthofen, where Alfred evidently was only 
a substitute (Green 1974, pp. 55, 129-30). The hidden animosity 
broke to the surface at least once, in 1950, still with considerable 
strength even 30 years after Max Weber's death. When learning 
that a former émigré, Arnold Brecht, wanted to teach Weber's 
Wissenschaftslehre to his students, Alfred hit the table with his 
fist, exclaiming "What! You tell this old nonsense to the 
Americans! The first thing I tell my students is what the highest 
values are." (Roth 1985, p. liii). The major aim o f Alfred Weber 
was to make Max look as simplistic and obsolete as possible. His 




























































































positivist, the second was to reduce his theory o f modernity to the 
ideas o f Michels. His success was almost limitless - though with a 
ironic twist: it was exactly due to this distortion that Max Weber 
has managed to become the undisputed classic and founding 
father o f sociology. (45)
The success o f this distortion had two reasons, The first was 
located in the general mood o f times; the second in the particular 
conditions o f the Weber reception. Concerning the first, the two 
misrepresentation perfectly fitted the mood o f the time, 
characterised by two major tendencies: the consolidation o f a new 
positivism in the social sciences, and the struggle against 
socialism. Weber's arguments for the separation o f the interests of 
scholarly work from the direct inferences o f everyday politics and 
ideology became a credo for the complete separation o f research 
from any concern with meaning, relevance, and experienced 
reality; while his account o f the emergence o f modernity and 
capitalism became reduced to a simplistic thesis proving that 
socialism would only lead to the establishment o f a bureaucratic 
rule. Weber became a trump in an ideological struggle in 
opposition to which he developed his whole work.
Before explaining the second reason of this success, it is necessary 
to present the broader movement o f which Alfred Weber was 
only one part. In the introduction to his ground-breaking book, 
Wilhelm Hennis starts by listing four major withdrawals from 
Weber. His examples are Lukacs, Marcuse, Leo Strauss and 
Voegelin (1988, p. 21). However, he failed to mention the "other 
gang o f four", the much more influential figures o f withdrawal, 
persons from Weber's closest circle. Alfred Weber did not act 
alone. He had "complices" in Rickert and Troeltsch, and even 
Marianne Weber herself.
The manifestations o f these withdrawals happened literally the 
moment after Weber's death. Troeltsch was one o f Weber's closest 
colleagues. They shared the same house for long years, though this 
ended in a bitter quarrel, o f which they reconciled only shortly 




























































































deliver the funeral speech. Troeltsch refused (Graf 1987, p. 219), 
as he was tired and tied up in other engagements. But it does not 
require depth psychology to realise that this was only an excuse. 
A memorial speech, however, was delivered a few weeks later in 
the Heidelberg faculty by Karl Jaspers. Though the substitution 
was not direct, it certainly had a symbolic value. Troeltsch did not 
behave much differently in print. This starts with the published 
text o f his obituary in which he made the oft-quoted statement 
according to which Weber, with the singular exception o f Paul 
Gohre, had no personal friends (1920, p. 44), only people with 
whom he had a shared interest - a claim which, apart from being 
questionable (one could mention Friedrich Naumann), tried, and 
with much success, to reduce the tragic dimension of loneliness to 
the choice or predisposition o f being solely motivated by interests. 
Another well-known characterisation o f Weber contained in the 
obituary, according to which he was "truly" a politician (pp.45-7), 
is also way o ff the mark and was similarly not without bad faith 
and personal interest. By downgrading Weber into a (failed) 
politician, Troeltsch could implicitly support his claims about his 
originality. To summarise this episode in the clearest possible 
terms, when Troeltsch was asked to deliver the funeral speech of 
his close colleague and friend Max Weber, generally considered 
the greatest German social scientist o f his time, he politely 
declined the offer, but pointed out in writing that Weber was not 
really his friend, and was a failed politician rather than a scholar - 
a response that must have few parallels in history. Shortly later, 
in a collection o f writings published in 1922, he in commenting 
the difference between their outlooks on evolution (Troetsch was 
an evolutionist, Weber was not), he gave an account that, 
according to Fleischman, was "full with sourness and indignation" 
(1964, p. 203).
The withdrawal o f Rickert was just as prompt and violent. Five 
days after Weber passed away, Heinrich Rickert, his cousin and 
colleague ventured a remark to Karl Jaspers about "the tragic 
wrecking" o f Weber's work" and "the slight chance o f any 
influence o f his insights". Jaspers was quick to respond: "If you 




























































































future, you may perhaps be right, but only because your name is 
mentioned in a footnotes in one o f Weber's works as the man to 
whom Max Weber expresses his gratitude for certain logical 
insights". (Jaspers 1957, pp.32-3). Troeltsch and Rickert both had 
their special reasons. Apart from the obvious matters o f scholarly 
jealousy and the issue o f primacy, both must have noticed that 
they also served as "hooks" for the second and third major issues 
where Weber has decided to remain silent: the influence o f 
Nietzsche, and the "non-Protestant", "mystical" or "narcissistic" 
work on self he accomplished during the anticritical essays.
Concerning the detraction o f Marianne Weber, there is no place 
here for presenting a detailed argument. Dirk Kaesler (1989) has 
already announced a whole book related to the theme and is 
currently working on it. Only a few, mostly well-known facts will 
be collected together. The list is probably unique in the history o f 
Western thought: Marianne Weber has destroyed all the letters 
sent to his husband: gave away his whole library, retaining only 
about a hundred volumes; managed to dispense with practically 
all the manuscripts, o f which only a few were recovered; 
destroyed his experimental, "clinical autobiography" that Max 
Weber handed to Jaspers; and has evidently deeply interfered 
with the editing o f Economy and Society (Orihara 1994). The 
Biography is indeed an indispensable tool for anyone studying 
Weber, and its value lies in information (pieces o f recognition) 
nobody else could have provided. But it contains several grave 
defects, well beyond questions o f mistaken dates and facts. In 
1967 Michel Foucault started the general introduction to a new 
French edition o f Nietzsche's work that he prepared with Gilles 
Deleuze by referring to a class o f "cursed thinkers" whose life- 
work has been haunted by a suddenly interrupted oeuvre, 
abusive relatives weighing on posthumous material, and the 
existence o f a "book" whose secrets one does not stop guessing. It 
is well-known that Nietzsche has belonged to this group, and the 
machinations o f his sister have long been uncovered. But it is just 
amazing how every single statement also applies to Weber (and in 
a certain sense also to Foucault). Of course, Elisabeth Nietzsche- 




























































































dispense with cartoon characterisations, it is necessary to realise 
the rather striking commonalities in the manner they handled the 
heritage o f some o f the greatest thinkers o f the age that have 
fallen upon them. There is also at least some indirect evidence 
suggesting that Weber has been aware o f the perils o f such a 
possibility. In a very important 19 February, 1909 letter to 
Michels, he was pondering upon his own future, and specifically 
expressed worries about the fate o f his work in the hands o f his 
wife: "Da sie mich - das ist doch nun einmal ihr Schicksal - sicher 
fur lange iiberleben wird miissen und ich gar nicht sehe, wie sie 
das konnen soli, ohne zu verkiimmern, so denke ich z. Z. nicht 
gern an ihre Zukunft." (MWGI1/6, p. 60). The conditions o f this 
disclosure are again o f vital importance. In this period, he was 
working on the third article on the Psychophysics o f industrial 
labor - a particularly taxing undertaking, as by that time he has 
lost but all hopes in the value o f the work, and felt like wasting 
away himself. (46) On the same day, he wrote another important 
letter to Tonnies, also on a similar, reflexive, meditative tone. This 
is the famous letter where he defined himself as being religiously 
unmusical, and added that he felt crippled because o f it (p. 65). 
The final letter shedding light on the issue was written on 15 
December 1910. Addressed to Gundolf, a main disciple o f Stefan 
Georg, Weber stated there that in the past years, he was very 
often on the verge o f suicide (pp. 741-2). It does not require much 
imagination to guess that the days just preceding 19 February 
1909 must have belonged to this category. Finally, one should 
recall the observation o f Elias, according to which Marianne Weber 
exercised a decisive influence on Alfred Weber (1991, p. 121).
The reason why the detractors achieved such an almost complete 
success, up till the revisionism o f the 1970s and 1980s led by 
Tenbruck, Hennis and Scaff had a complex set o f reasons even 
apart from the external, historical circumstances. The most 
important was the joint, mutually reinforcing influence o f two 
factors. On the one hand, the detractors were extremely close to 
Weber. The authority o f their words relied not only upon personal 
acquaintance but family membership. On the other hand, as 




























































































not have students who would have defended the "purity" o f his 
views. Such "faithful" students are often ridiculed and accused o f 
dogmatic sectarianism. However, they do serve a purpose, as they 
do prevent a completely everything-is-free attitude with the 
heritage o f major scholars, help to keep close to the mark. Weber 
hardly have any such defenders.
Fortunately, however, he had one. The name has already been 
mentioned several times, as he came in close contact with all the 
detractors o f Weber, practically the moment such a detraction has 
happened. He was Karl Jaspers. Jaspers never considered Weber 
as a positivistic sociologist, nor a student o f bureaucratisation. He 
understood that due to his in depth empirical and historical 
studies, Weber was in fact the true philosopher o f his time - not in 
the sense o f academic philosophy, but in the classical sense o f the 
philosophical life, staying always close to reality and experience. 
(47) The series o f texts Jaspers has written about Weber, right 
from his memorial address (1921) that was based upon the way 
Jaspers has experienced the passing away o f Weber, are unique 
documents and are unavoidable starting points for a genuine 
understanding and reconstruction o f Weber's work.
Jaspers did not take up open conflict with the official guardians o f 
the Weber heritage. He may not have had any willingness for 
fight, and the odds would have been against him anyway. Jaspers 
was in a Department o f Philosophy, with a training in psychology, 
while Alfred Weber took up the "official" chair in sociology. 
Therefore, Jaspers did not have much influence over the dominant 
Heidelberg assessment o f Weber in the 1920s and 30s. However, 
he had more success with students who only came to Heidelberg 
for a short visit and were non-sociology majors. Two o f them are 
especially worth mentioning. They are Norbert Elias and Eric 
Voegelin.
Elias came to Heidelberg in 1922, Voegelin in 1929, both in the 
framework o f a semester-long exchange programme. Both o f them 
mention Jaspers as the most important encounter o f their visit, 




























































































1991, pp. 49, 105; Voegelin 1989). They preserved the traces of 
this encounter throughout their life. This is visible in their long- 
run historical projects that focused upon the reconstruction o f the 
interrelationship between political, social and psychological 
processes, resulting in the emergence o f a specific personality or 
subjectivity type. Both o f them used extensively some of the most 
important Weberian concepts. Though usually classified as critics 
o f Weber, and being indeed relentless critics o f mainstream 
Weberian sociology, a detailed study would be able to show that 
their main target was the normalised-positivistic Weber, and not 
the spirit o f Weber's research, o f which they have remained, 
maybe against themselves, the real guardians and followers until 
the end. (48)
Finally, the importance o f Jaspers is not even restricted to his 
indirect influence. In a book written originally in 1949 (Jaspers 
1954), directly under the impact o f WW1I, he developed the 
concept o f the "axial age" and was thus able to pin down the 
underlying horizon o f the works o f Weber on Antiquity - a 
horizon that unites not only Weber and Jaspers, but also Voegelin, 
Elias, and even Foucault. (49) It is not accidental that in his late 
work, Voegelin has explicitly taken up and developed further the 
concept o f the axial age (1974). It is also a very significant 
development that one o f the most important students o f Parsons, 
Shmuel Eisenstadt, under the influence o f Karl Jaspers — and also 
Martin Buber, himself a disciple o f Dilthey, the father o f 
Verstehen , who was a regular household guest in the home o f 
Max Weber Sr, and was discovered in his last period by Victor 
Turner (1982) —, returned to the path o f the study o f the axial 
age.
The crucial role o f Jaspers as a "fertiliser" or "catalyst" o f modern 
thought is a theme where there is still much to be researched. 
Here only one additional hint will be given concerning the 
possibility o f such a role. Jaspers was not simply the only genuine 
follower o f Weber in his generation, but was also a serious scholar 
o f Nietzsche, about whom he has written one o f the most 




























































































Allgemeine Psychopathologie that Max Weber mentioned always 
together with Rickert and Simmel as having influenced his ideas 
most (1978, p. 3; 1981, p. 179) has been profoundly marked by 
Nietzsche. His whole work was therefore based on the dual 
background o f Nietzsche and Weber.
Parsons, just like Voegelin and Elias, became attracted to Jaspers. 
His left a testimony about this in one o f the last writings he has 
published (Parsons 1979). (50) Alfred Weber and Jaspers were 
both members o f his thesis committee. However, as the structure 
o f Parsons's first writing on Weber demonstrates, the reading of 
Alfred Weber eventually gained the upper hand. The history o f 
sociology would have been different i f  this would not have 
happened. However, given the background o f Parsons and the 
closeness o f the modality o f his experience to Durkheim, it was 
perhaps unavoidable that this be so. Parsons was bound to 
construct sociology, motivated by his short stay in Germany, on 
the basis o f the book Durkheim wrote under the impact o f a 
similarly short stay in Germany and the diminuished reading of 
Weber provided by his brother Alfred. But we are running ahead 
of the story.
The ascendancy o f Alfred over Jaspers (and Max) is clearly visible 
already in the 1929 text. After the promising starting point and 
the ensuing mis-presenting Weber as a theorist o f bureaucratic 
rationalisation, in the last pages Parsons criticises Weber for 
giving such an exaggerated, one-sided view o f modernity (p.36). 
However, even more importantly, it is exactly at the moment 
when he is criticising his own picture that he decides to include a 
rare autobiographical allusion, switching to first person plural, 
disclosing the exact way in which Weber attracted him: "However 
exaggerated Weber's view o f the dominating importance o f 
"bureaucracy" may be, it certainly calls attention in a most 
striking way to an aspect o f our modern society which we have all 
felt to be there, but which has received far less attention from the 
economists than it deserves." (pp.36-7) Parsons could have 
followed Alfred in mis-reading Max not only due to the quality o f 




























































































institutional arrangements into which he had to fit, but because 
the manner in which he experienced his world was closer to the 
relatively simplistic experiences o f Alfred Weber, Rickert and 
Michels, and not to the much more complex and subtle world­
views o f Max Weber or Jaspers. The irony o f the fact is that due to 
the power o f the biological fact o f longer life and the sociological 
fact o f institutional arrangements, the views o f Weber came to be 
represented in a manner that placed them under the "wisdom" of 
an Alfred Weber or a Rickert.
After finishing this work, being a member o f an economics 
department, Parsons turned back to economists, as his 
professional affiliations were still in between economics and 
sociology. During 1930-32, he wrote extensively on Alfred 
Marshall and Pareto. It was this professional situation that he 
turned into a project, aiming to write a book on the links between 
economics and sociology. The Structure eventually grew out o f 
this question. It is therefore o f much importance to map exactly 
its conditions of emergence.
First, in the way he posed his question, Parsons was much 
influenced by two ongoing debates o f the American academic 
scene. As the theme has been covered in depth (Camic 1989, 41- 
6), the discussion can be brief. First, there was a general struggle 
o f the social sciences against certain behavioristic claims aiming to 
deny any specificity to human action and purposiveness. People 
like John Watson claimed that human beings are merely reactive 
animals, and that questions o f soul and consciousness, meaning 
and purpose are irrelevant. Under normal circumstances, such a 
position would have been a fine subject for an investigation in 
social pathology concerning its very possibility. However, the 
1920s and the 1930s were anything but "normal" times, and the 
danger was real enough. The problem was especially serious for 
sociology which at that time was far from being a well-established 
discipline, and which had to fight for its right to exist even with 




























































































Second, as it is a common knowledge, the emergence o f American 
behavioralism coincided with the spread o f fascism and 
communism in Europe, and especially Nazism in Germany and 
Bolshevism in Russia elevated some tenets very close to or 
identical o f behavioralism into state philosophies. (51) Third, such 
difficult times for the human and social sciences, especially 
sociology, coincided with difficult times for the academic career o f 
Parsons himself (Camic 1991). Soon after his return from 
Germany, in 1927, Parsons became an instructor in the Economics 
department in Harvard, the center o f mainstream economics 
theory. Though he accommodated himself, his background was in 
institutional economics, and therefore he was drawn to sociology. 
He felt himself tom between allegiances, lived both the attacks on 
the social sciences and the struggle between economics and 
sociology in a very personal way, both as a matter o f intellectual 
and existential dilemma. Parsons got married and had three 
children in the period in which not only his job, but also his very 
disciplinary allegiance was far from beig settled. The dilemma was 
only rendered more acute by the fact that he had to work under 
hostile chairmen in both ecoomics and sociology. The situation has 
become especially tense from late 1932, when his official position 
changed from "nonfaculty" to "faculty" instructor, and he moved to 
the new sociology Department (p. xlii). It was generally felt that 
this was a probation period. This was when, after 1917-18, 
Parsons has entered the second "time o f troubles" in his life. For 
evidence concerning the crisis, it is necessary to turn to his 
publication record.
Upon his return from Germany, Parsons, just like Durkheim, 
started to publish on German topics. However, soon after his 
return, as he belonged to an economics department, Parsons wrote 
about Marshall and Pareto, though from a sociological angle. The 
completion o f the manuscript on Pareto in late September 1932 
marked a break.
This event coincided with his appointment to sociology for a 
testing period. His urge to publish was therefore very high. At the 




























































































All these concerns found an outlet in a crucial letter written to 
Frank Knight, the translator o f Economic History , on 13 October
1932. (52) Parsons explained there his aims as establishing links 
between thinkers who were so far only thought o f as different, 
thus already pointing toward Structure (liii, fn. 144); he referred 
to the pressure he was under for getting things published (xlii, fn 
116); and, probably due to this contrast, was inexplicably 
depricatory about the past o f American sociology (xxxix, fn.103). 
His attempt to publish the manuscript, however, was frustrated. 
As there were several books published on Pareto just that time, 
he failed to find a publisher. This pushed him into the attempt to 
finalise his plans about a general, theoretical volume, leading to an 
impossible plan, formulated in another important letter written to 
Knight on 23 January 1933 (Camic 1991, liv-v).
Parsons defined there the problem of his book as the link between 
economics and sociology. Doing so, he set up for himself a trap. It 
is not possible to discuss "the" links between economics and 
sociology as an abstract theoretical theme on its own right. Such 
an impass can be contrasted with the initial problems Durkheim 
and Weber faced in the analogous period o f their life. Parsons was 
now exactly in the same position as Durkheim was before his trip 
to Germany, when he was pondering upon the links between the 
individual and society, and radically different from the sense of 
resignation Weber has felt in the late 1880s. Parsons defined for 
himself a scholastic - theoretical project that was simply not 
manageable. He was aiming high, wanted to write a global theory, 
doing away with all the predecessors (Camic 1991. pp. xxxix, 
fn.103; liii, fn.144), but did not know how to proceed.
As a result, as o f late 1932, Parsons has stopped both writing and 
publishing altogether. There is some evidence that just like many 
others in an intellectual crisis, he was reading rather than writing; 
and not according to the inner logic o f a project, but just picking 
up the books that got published. He has certainly read the 1933 
book o f Brinton, in which he realised that Spencer is now being 
forgotten and needs to be replaced, and which he would use in the 




























































































interested in the debate around it that inspired him for a rejoiner. 
But there is no evidence that he found a way to start writing his 
book, though he had the project formulated already in early 1933, 
completed a thorough reading of Marshall and Pareto, and was 
much in need o f getting things published. According to all 
indications, apart from maybe an Encyclopedia article, Parsons has 
not written anything from late 1932 up to late 1933 - exactly the 
period when he really needed to write and publish.
A private crisis undergone in that period had a peculiar symbolic 
value. It was already pointed out that the first times of troubles 
for Parsons coincided with the last year o f WWI, though the 
events in the world did not enter into his horizon at that times. 
This was repeated exactly during 1932-33, the period o f Hitler's 
rise to power in Germany. In spite o f Parsons's evident interest in 
Germany, the events failed to make an impact on his thought that 
was focused on the purely academic-scholastic question of the link 
between two disciplines, economics and sociology.
It is necessary to be very precise and cautious here. First, the two 
events have important symbolic value, requiring reflection but 
not simplistic, moralising criticism. Second, Parsons has often been 
accused o f living in the ivory tower o f academic life, being 
allegedly "morally wrong" in neglecting the broader social 
implications (Bottomore 1969, p. 34). As opposed to this, he has 
been defended either in general terms, by claims about the 
legitimacy o f the autonomy o f academic work or, more concretely, 
by his involvement in anti-Nazi efforts after 1938 (Camic 1989, p. 
38; Gerhardt 1993). In this debate, there is no question that Camic 
and Gerhardt are right against Marxist critiques. First, to state the 
obvious, Parsons was an academic, and the value o f the autonomy 
o f academic work is a touchstone o f our civilisation. The events o f 
the 20th century, the rise o f fascism and communism, far from 
undermining such concerns, rather point to their irreplaceability. 
In support o f Parsons, or rather the position attributed to Parsons 
by the Marxist critiques, one could evoke the attitude o f the 
German philosopher Nicolai von Hartman who has completed his 




























































































war, and decide to actively ignore the events going on around him. 
Second, the question o f a moral and civic duty can only be 
formulated once the threat o f an enemy has materialised. Parsons 
cannot be attacked even in this count, as his actions after 9 
November 1938 bear full witness. It was on this date that, using 
the occasion o f the assassination o f a German diplomat by a Polish 
Jew', the Nazi persecution against the Jews got escalated, and that 
Parsons finally recognised the danger (Gerhardt 1993, p. 3). (53)
This, how'ever, is not the last word. There is a genuine problem 
here, pointed out by the symbolic events. This, however, is not a 
matter o f moral duties and rights, but lies at the level o f 
sensibilities and recognition. One of the most important tasks of 
sociology concerns the early recognition o f significant social 
trends, a premonition o f changes. This is something completely 
different from a mechanical technique o f prediction like 
econometric modeling. In this regard, sociology is situated in 
between art and science - as art only senses and expresses 
something that is in the air, intuites the novelty, while science 
only analyses phenomena on the basis o f objectively given 
knowledge. The truly remarkable social thinkers, a Max Weber, a 
Norbert Elias or a Michel Foucault were able both to pick up 
something in the air, to recognise the symptoms o f major social 
changes, and at the same time to map and analyse, in historical 
studies, the directions o f the tendencies.
Probably due to gaps in his formative experiences, Parsons simply 
lacked this sensitivity and ability, and nobody can charge him 
with anything on this count. Beyond good and evil, beyond crime 
and punishment, he was simply part o f the "great dumbness" (die 
grosse Stumpfsinn ), described by Thomas Mann in the Magic 
Mountain ; a situation that has been characterised by William 
Butler Yeats with the following lines: "The best lack all conviction, 
while the worst/ Are full o f passionate intensity" — both 
descriptions dating from the years around the end of WWI. The 
"failure" o f Parsons was not moral, It is o f a purely intellectual 




























































































Politics or the world outside did not enter Parsons's thinking in
1933. It was a different, and purely "academic" event that closed 
the crisis for him and after a relatively short time. In late 1933, 
after a gap and search o f about a year, he read a book that 
suddenly focalised his concerns and changed his hesitations into a 
definite plan. The book was the English translation o f the Division 
o f Labor that has just appeared in very late 1933. (55)
The sudden effects o f this reading experience are visible in every 
segment o f Parsons's activities. The most striking example is the 
essay "Sociological Elements in Economic Thought" that was 
abandoned almost two years ago, finished in 1934 with a section 
focusing on Durkheim, especially the Division o f Labor , and 
published in 1935. Around the same time, a long review essay 
about the book o f Robbins was also finished and published in May
1934. (56) Shortly after completing this review essay, in the fall 
o f 1934, Parsons started a major work on his own, 'The Place o f 
Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory", the only early essay to 
have received attention (Camic, lxiii). He also finished several 
essays to the Encyclopedia, referring to Durkheim if possible 
(Parsons 1991, pp. 50, 119-21) Finally, and most importantly o f 
all, it was in 1934 that he started to work on his magnum opus 
starting, not surprisingly, with Durkheim's early work (Camic 
1991, p. lxv), and by the end o f 1935 had completed a large 
section (p. xliv). (57)
Given the evident impact the reading o f Durkheim exerted on him, 
it is somehow puzzling why Parsons never hinted in his 
recollections to this event. After all, if Weber had something to 
hide about Nietzsche, and if Durkheim had a reason to be reluctant 
about his German sources, Parsons had nothing to be afraid o f the 
association with Durkheim. However, a closer look reveals a series 
o f reasons why he could feel reluctant, even ashamed about this 
truth. Parsons has read Durkheim seriously only very late, missing 





























































































The Weber experience was a sudden discovery for Parsons. He has 
never even heard the name before arriving at Heidelberg. This 
was not true for Durkheim. Intriguingly, Durkheim's name is 
mentioned already in one o f the very first pieces he has ever 
written, a term paper for the seminar of Clarence Ayres submitted 
on 17 March, 1923 (Wearne 1989, p.26). At that time, he 
evidently only knew about the Elementary Forms . The next time 
he encountered the name in the LSE, in 1924-5, when meeting 
Ginsburg and Malinowski. Evidently, they also mostly referred to 
Durkheim last work, and were quite negative about it. Finally, he 
stumbled upon the name o f Durkheim during his third main 
formative influence, in Heidelberg, where Jaspers was talking to 
him about Durkheim, and even in a more useful manner (Camic 
1991, p. xxxix). However, he balked at all three times, and only 
realised the importance o f Durkheim for his own project when he 
happened to read the English translation of Division o f Labor. One 
could easily imagine the feeling Parsons may have had at that 
time, realisiing that he has "wasted" ten years by not picking up 
this book earlier.
There are two additional facts that lend some support to the 
hypothesis about the uneasiness, even "shame" Parsons may have 
felt about the matter. First, he was always quite touchy about 
suggestions that he has first read Durkheim in English. Second, in 
a letter written to Frank Knight on 25 November 1934 he 
indicated that the whole first draft o f the essay 'Sociological 
Elements in Economic Thought', including its second part, was 
written in the Spring o f 1933, before the review of Robbins and 
therefore before the publication o f the English edition (Camic 
1991, lix, fn.154). This, however, simply does not make any sense, 
would not fit into the serial order. The second section is fully 
under the impact o f the Division o f Labor , a book not even 
mentioned before. It would be difficult to explain how and why 
could have Parsons read suddenly this book in Spring 1933, and 
not start work on the other essays and the book immediately. The 
reasoning given on the basis o f the late 1933 reading o f Division 
o f Labor is, however, perfectly congruent with the evidence. 




























































































the embarrassment Parsons had about this also correspond to the 
argument made above concerning the lack o f prior touch with the 
major socio-political events o f the times, and the subsequent 
effort to compensate.
In the previous sections the paper has shown that Durkheim and 
Weber, far from inhabiting different universes o f thought, had 
many common elements in their formative experiences. However, 
instead o f giving complementary formulations o f the same basic 
thesis, their relation to this system o f thought was opposite: 
Weber moved out o f it, while Durkheim moved in. The point gains 
additional significance if we add Parsons assertion in his main 
thesis that Durkheim and Weber, together with Pareto and 
Marshall, shared a common m ovem ent in the structure o f 
theoretical thinking (1968, p. viii). Even if  the exact meaning of 
the word may have been slightly different in the two cases, the 
sense o f the underlying metaphor requires that individuals 
actually moving in the opposite direction not be considered as 
part o f the same "movement". Therefore, their simple synthesis 
was based on a fundamental error, and this meant the reduction 
o f Weber into the exact framework o f thought he worked so hard 
to overcome. (58) We have seen the manner in which Parsons 
nevertheless integrated Durkheim and Weber. Now, it is necessary 
to give an explanation for the huge effect he succeeded to make.
In a certain sense, concerning the external circumstances, such an 
explanation is almost superfluous. The situation was very ripe for 
such a synthetic work. Sociology was fighting for its right to exist 
in the U.S. and was looking for the proper tradition to which it 
could attach itself ever since the beginning. Albion Small, the first 
chairperson o f the first American sociology department attempted 
to lay down the foundations already in 1909 (Small 1909). The 
attempt was in a way even remarkably close to Durkheim and 
Parsons. Small was a student o f Schmoller and Adolf Wagner, and 
made the claim that the true ancestor o f sociology was — the 
Polizeiwissenschaft... . Still, Small, like others after him, failed to 




























































































it was exactly the book o f Parsons that accomplished the feat. It is 
necessary to look at its intrinsic qualities.
One may argue that this was solely due to the book's merits, its 
"truth". Concerning merits, the power of Parsons's theoretical mind 
is beyond doubt. But it is also a commonplace to complain about 
the tediousness o f the book that makes its reading a particularly 
difficult exercise. There is no question that the book is much less 
used effectively than the classic work o f the "founding fathers". 
Furthermore, the connection between Durkheim and Weber 
established there was certainly ingenous - the only problem being 
that it was not only not "true", but was based on a mistaken 
identification. The question therefore remains: why has the book 
become so famous and successful? How can its powerful effect be 
explained?
There are two names whose presence largely contributed to the 
book's success, making the "necessary and useful error" it 
committed for sociology by forcing Durkheim and Weber together 
into a reality. These are Jaspers and — Nietzsche. The first name, 
given the previous account, is less surprising. The work o f Parsons 
still contained the spark, the stamp o f Jaspers, even though it was 
well covered by the influence o f Alfred Weber. Parsons spoke 
highly o f the lectures o f Jaspers (1970, p. 876, fn.10; 1979), while 
according to Elias, Alfred Weber was not a brilliant speaker (1991, 
p. 145). The presence o f Jaspers in the work of Parsons has also 
been recognised by Wearne (1989, pp. 42-3). This gave it a value 
that has been all but lost in the writings o f the Parsonian school, 
until the much later rediscovery o f Jaspers by Eisenstadt.
The second name is more surprising. Parsons, o f course, not only 
has never referred to Nietzsche, but has not used his ideas in his 
works at all. And still, Nietzsche was present in a certain manner 
in the Structure , and even in a very prominent place. Previous 
commentators, whether laudatory or critical, overlooked a crucial 
element, the dramatic, stage-like self-presentation o f the start o f 
the book. They failed to pin down its extra performative force. 




























































































peculiar and powerful starting point. In spite o f all its length and 
tediousness, it starts as a detective story, by introducing a murder 
- and a highly peculiar one at that.
The first sentences are a direct quotation from a 1933 book by 
Crane Brinton, the Harvard historian (1898-1968). It starts with 
the by now famous question, ""Who now reads Spencer?"" (p. 3), 
and goes on to state that Spencer was a believer o f the God of 
Evolution who now has betrayed him. Parsons immediately 
paraphrases these statements, using startling expressions, into the 
"verdict" o f a "coroner", ""Dead by suicide or at the hands of 
person or persons unknown"", and defines the problem o f the 
book in the following way: "Spencer is dead. But who killed him 
and how?"
The second paragraph maintains the suspense at the level o f a 
detective story. It contains words like "dead", "stir", ""crime"", 
"done to death", "died". But it also gives a further indication. The 
case o f Spencer, his death was only the "typical representative" o f 
a more general phenomenon. This suggests a mass murder, as 
opposed to a simple crime. But the way Parsons is proceeding in 
the third paragraph is even more startling. He first identifies the 
murderer as a jealous god. Evolution. This god was Spencer's "own 
god", already identified as such by Brinton and repeated by 
Parsons in the fourth paragraph. However, it is exactly this god of 
Evolution, "also called Progress", the belief in a long linear 
unbroken process that has "become dubious" now. Spencer, 
therefore, was killed by his own god - but in the same act, as it 
was already alluded to by Parsons, in the first paragraph, this god 
himself has also died. Parsons may have written an undecently 
long book, but at least has indeed started it in a powerful, 
startling manner - by a Nietzschean thesis about the death o f God.
Anybody perplexed by such a claim should only re-read carefully 
the first few pages o f the introduction. But there is additional 
evidence o f support. Parsons started the book by quoting Brinton. 
He also acknowledges elsewhere that during the years when he 




























































































faculty group that met regularly (1970, p. 833). But Crinton 
published in 1940 and 1941 two books on Nietzsche. His work has 
been received well even by Eric Voegelin, in his otherwise 
scathing criticism of the contemporary American perceptions on 
Nietzsche (Voegelin, 1944, p. 201, fn.53, and p. 202, fn.55). It does 
not require much imagination to argue that Nietzsche and the 
"death o f god" must have been discussed during some o f these 
faculty meetings. Parsons has in all probability never referred to 
Nietzsche in print, and may not have been using him on purpose. 
The connection, through the "medium" o f Brinton, was probably 
unintended - but may have largely contributed to the powerful 
effect the book ended up having.
There are a further series o f facts that support this possibility. 
Nietzsche's thesis is remarkably close to the core o f the argument 
o f Robertson Smith about the sacrificial origins o f religion in the 
killing and consuming o f their god in the form o f a sacred animal. 
It has already been pointed out how elementary an effect this 
image had on Durkheim. We may add the similar influence on 
Freud - the third major figure in the career o f Parsons. And he 
was not alone in this feeling - the "death o f god" was the most 
intriguing, challenging, harrowing thesis o f the age, expressing the 
mood o f the times in a particularly poignant manner. Whether one 
was for or against it, hardly anyone could subtract oneself from its 
emotional power. If his Protestant upbringing strong pushed 
Parsons to the explicit, conscious appropriation of Weber's thesis 
about the Protestant Ethic , the same must have predisposed him 
to reject Nietzsche - though the latter took his revenge by 
providing the starting point o f the book.
Furthermore, there is a direct link between Nietzsche and 
Robertson Smith. Nietzsche, as it is well-known, was a student o f 
Ritschl, studying under him first in Bonn, then in Leipzig, between 
1864 and 69. Now, during 1868-69, Robertson made several trips 
on the continent, visiting among others Ritschl. Though little 
known today, Ritschl was a highly influential thinker o f the 19th 
century. He was a student o f F. C. Baur, who produced the first 




























































































ideas o f Eric Voegelin. His school o f liberal theology had an impact, 
through Troeltsch and especially Harnack, on the thinking of 
Weber. This influence was even exerted in institutional channels, 
as the followers o f Ritschl were a major force within the 
Evangelical-Social Congress, one o f the important groups to which 
Weber belonged, serving, together with the economist Adolf 
Wagner, as channel with the Verein. Given that Nietzsche was for 
years Ritschl's top student, the interest the Congress had in his 
works in the 1890s is all the more understandable. The presence 
o f Ritschl extended even to France. In his book entitled Science 
and Religion , Emile Boutroux (1908), one o f Durkheim's most 
important teachers, discusses five authors in separate chapters, of 
whom three are well-known classics like Comte, Spencer and 
William James, the other two being Haeckel and — Ritschl. Finally, 
in the United States, his ideas became the principal source behind 
the "Social Gospel Movement" to which the father o f Parsons 
belonged (Spieler 1965, p. 2068).
The previous two points give an explanation in terms o f the 
hidden, almost sub-conscious reasons for the impact o f the book — 
a phenomenon that could be in some relation with the strong 
interest that Parsons would soon develop towards Freud. But 
there is still something to be added, concerning the theoretical 
viability o f the Parsonian synthesis. Beyond the elements o f 
personal recognition that explains the motivation o f Parsons and 
the reasons that explain the "seductive" power o f the book, 
referring to Nietzsche and Jaspers looming in the background, 
there had to be something in its theoretical apparatus, related not 
simply to the Parsonian conceptual innovations, but in the manner 
he handled the - incompatible - ideas o f Durkheim and Weber 
that made the Parsonian synthesis practicable. It is necessary to 
explain the exact manner in which Parsons combined the work of 
Durkheim and Weber.
The resounding success o f Parsons in this sense was due to a 
particular tension spanned between his use o f Durkheim and 
Weber. As we have seen, the great experience for Parsons was the 




























































































obsolete work. This provided the basic framework for his whole 
thought. The synthesis has been rendered viable by the fact that 
into this framework was fitted the conceptual apparatus o f the 
most advanced work o f Weber, Economy and Society. The whole 
theory o f social change, and sociology in general, has been plagued 
for almost six decades by the fact that the enormous intellectual 
mileage provided by Weber's conceptual apparatus has been 
assigned for "exclusive", "official" use to a 19th century positivist- 
evolutionist framework.
7, Conclusion: the founding experiences o f sociology
This paper, one could argue, fits into a tradition o f "criticism" or 
"deconstruction", its main aim being to question the manner in 
which the theoretical paradigm o f the discipline has been formed. 
Such a characterisation, however, would be misleading, even false 
for a series o f reasons. First, the paper did not question the truth 
content or the meaning o f certain sociological theories. It was 
rather concerned with the taken for granted mental framework of 
classical sociological theory. Second, it was not just deconstructing 
or destroying this framework, rather reconstructing it, tracing it 
back to the experiential sources and contexts that stamped it. 
Third, the paper was based on a methodology quite different from 
(Marxist) critique or (postmodern) deconstruction, the possession 
o f the truth about social reality or the refusal o f the very 
existence o f reality. It was motivated by the idea that thought 
indeed could and should be traced back to reality, but this reality 
is not identical to an objective world to be represented. It is 
rather given by the real experiences o f concrete human beings 
with whom certain events happen on which they reflect using 
their power o f reasoning and thus transform themselves, change 
their subjectivity, develop an own way o f looking on the world, 
and formulating on these basis first a set o f questions and then 
giving a series o f answers. No matter how the further elaboration, 
systematisation and formalisation o f these idea-answer can be 
disconnected from the original experiential basis, it can never 




























































































taken for granted (Schütz) or the frame (Bateson, Goffman), that 
was given by the original problém atisation  (Foucault) or 
Fragestellung (Weber), in turn based on the engendering 
experience (Voegelin). For this, new experiences must happen.
Beyond "criticism" and "deconstructionism", there still remains a 
question about the significance o f the findings. This will be the 
focus o f the three concluding points. First, though Weber and 
Durkheim shared many common elements in their formation, their 
attitude to these was opposite. Weber left those authors in whom 
Durkheim found his approach. The similarities between the 
experiential basis o f Durkheim and Parsons, however, are 
remarkable. Both grew up in a strongly religious environment, 
and dropped religion from their life, without a major crisis, and 
without ever exteriorising the possible influence o f this factor in 
their life. Therefore, in both cases, this has come to "haunt" them 
later. Instead o f religion, their work was explicitly driven by two 
other motives, also strongly present in their early background, the 
social problem and an unreserved faith in science, in itself and as 
the solution to the social problem. After an education in which 
they have come close to certain collectivistic ideas, including a 
slight socialist influence, they have both traveled to Germany in 
order to study, at a particularly sensitive age. This trip proved to 
be the major experience in their life. Durkheim found there most 
o f the formative influences o f Max Weber's thought, while Parsons 
encountered Max Weber mostly in its version expouded by Alfred 
Weber. However, the visit o f both was relatively short (one year 
for Parsons, about six months for Durkheim). Such a time period is 
enough to gain some acquaintance, to pick up new ideas, but too 
short to gain in depth familarity, or to go beyond the first 
impressions. At most, one can maintain a "critical distance", based 
on prior convictions. After their return, both o f them tried to 
spread and popularise the ideas they have found and were also 
engaged in major issues o f career-building which prevented them 
to further elaborate, reflexively, their experiences. The major 
effect o f his visit for Durkheim was the Division o f Labor ; while 
for Parsons, this was eventually the Structure. This, however, was 




























































































Labor . The decisive encounter, for Parsons, was therefore not 
Weber, but the recognition o f the similarity between the 
experience Durkheim had in Germany and his own.
The encounter with this work was not merely a cognition, but a 
recognition. The word has a dual relevance. It designates the 
encounter as an event, a break, and at the same time as a return, 
a revisitation and repetition, not merely something new added to 
what has been previously known. It also has a fundamental 
relationship to the heart o f identity. (59)
In making the - false - contact between Durkheim and Weber, 
however, the mere recognition o f an identity with Durkheim is not 
enough. It was also necessary to bring Weber into the picture in 
the same moment - he needed a catalyst for the spark, a "false 
initiator". This was given in the person o f Alfred Weber, who not 
only misrepresented the work o f his brother in a direction close to 
Durkheim's view, but also, in opposition to Max Weber, did share 
on many issues views that were strikingly similar to Durkheim's.
Second, though it is not possible to elaborate here all the 
consequences o f this finding concerning the level o f the taken for 
granted in sociological thought, it is possible to point out one that 
is certainly among the most important. This concerns the attitude 
o f sociology towards the phenomenon known as the 
"individualism" o f modernity, and the relation in this context 
between sociology and economics. As we have seen, this question 
was at the center o f Parsons's interest when working on his book. 
Given the fact that Weber was an economist-turned-sociologist, 
his work could have provided a particularly appropriate starting 
point. However, Parsons relied upon Durkheim instead, and this 
was to have fateful consequences. Instead o f placing sociology at a 
level different from economics, not questioning its statements but 
reflecting upon the origins, consequences and meaning of modem 
individualism, sociology after Durkheim became a discipline trying 
to compete with economics, denying the relevance o f 
individualism on the basis o f an emphasis on the universal 




























































































heart o f the discipline, in spite o f all claims o f scientific positivism, 
normative and empirical elements. (60) This led to the 
unnecessary and counterproductive dualism between the "social 
man" and the homo oeconomicus. The hostility to the phenomenon 
o f individualism and the mixing o f normative elements into the 
theory led to two developments: on the one hand, it contributed to 
the fundamentally a-theoretical attitude o f empirical sociology; on 
the other, this lies behind the recent upsurge o f rational choice 
theory. This theory is a mere backlash o f the earlier emphasis on 
social norms. It does not provide a way out for understanding as, 
instead o f trying to analyse and understand the specific type o f 
individualism characteristic o f modern society, it simply takes it 
for granted.
Third, the way out o f the situation in terms o f method is given by 
a return to the original Weberian project, incorporating those 
advances that have been made on similar lines, although often 
quite far from the orthodox mainstream Weberianism. In terms o f 
content, the way out lies in a new type o f synthesis between the 
approaches o f Weber and Durkheim, focusing on their late works.
One o f the further peculiarities o f the Parsonian foundation is that 
it has put the emphasis on the early substantive works o f Weber 
and Durkheim, even though their late works developed 
specifically in reflection to the earlier ones. The deficiency and 
one-sidedness o f this approach has been lately realised even in 
mainstream circles, including Parsons himself. Thus, the massive 
project o f Schluchter focused on Weber's late religious sociology, 
while Tenbruck (1980) has also proposed to put these writings 
into the center o f attention. In some o f his last writings, Parsons 
explicitly acknowledged his mistake and re-valued Durkheim's 
last work (Parsons, 1978). Furthermore, he also stated that in the 
1940s and 1950s, two new developments had an impact on his 
thought (1949, p. xvii; 1968, p. xi). One was psychoanalysis, 
characterised by the works o f Freud, the other anthropology, 
where Parsons mentioned the name o f Boas, though indicated that 
there are no figures comparable to Freud's standing. Such a 




























































































about the major intellectual developments o f the period. In The 
Order o f Things , Michel Foucault claimed that there were two 
directions o f research trying to break out o f the "anthropological 
sleep" o f thought, psychoanalysis and ethnology, and alluded to 
Lacan and Lévi-Strauss as the two central players in the game. If 
we take into account that Foucault’s late work can be called a 
"historicisation” o f Freud, a genealogy o f the "subject o f desire", 
the connection between these two trends and the late works of 
Weber and Durkheim becomes even more evident.
In spite o f this, very little has been accomplished in the 
integration o f these two pursuits. There has been, however, 
important and pathbreaking works, starting from both directions. 
Starting from the Weberian camp, the late works o f Elias touch 
both some issues in Ancient history and anthropology. Voegelin, in 
a different but related development, has become interested in his 
last years in paleology. From the other side, in their later works, 
anthropologists like Victor Turner and René Girard, starting from 
a Durkheimian background and rediscovering some o f Durkheim's 
major critics that were neglected for long decades, turned again in 
their last works to study the origins o f Christianity.
If these developments are put together and connected, they 
reveal the contours o f a redirection o f social thought with almost 
geometrical perfection. At the starting point, we have the 
dynamics o f the works o f Durkheim and Weber, with the new, 
revolutionary direction gained in the late substantive stage. These 
work span a tension between ancient history and anthropology, 
providing the task to pursue these tasks separately, with explicit 
respect to the understanding o f the present, and eventually 
connect them. This task has been all but lost in subsequent 
developments — except for the fact that they have been taken up 
by their most important disciples, their true intellectual heirs, 
Marcel Mauss and Karl Jaspers. The identities and differences 
between Mauss and Jaspers again fit into a pattern. Mauss was a 
close relative and designated heir who, however, refused to play 
the official role prepared for him o f maintaining the orthodoxy, 




























































































the least recognised and most important features o f Durkheim's 
work; while Jaspers was neither a close relative nor a designated 
heir, but maintained the spirit o f the work as opposed to the 
distortions o f the official curators, and eventually developed the 
thesis o f the axial age that was not used by Weber but that 
provided a focus to the whole late work.
So far, in this section, Weber and Durkheim were often treated in 
a parallel manner. This, however, is not fully tenable. In spite o f 
all the advances, Durkheim's late work still remained anchored in 
the early work, therefore in theoretical perspectives that were 
obsolete and which Weber (and Simmel and others) overcame or 
attempted to overcome. Therefore, the Durkheim "side", to be 
intellectually feasible and powerful, needed reinforcement. This 
was provided, again in an almost perfectly geometric manner, by 
his main opponents, Tarde and van Gennep.
Though the intellectual heritage o f Tarde and van Gennep has 
destroyed by the revenge Durkheim and his disciples took on 
their intellectual opponents and their work became forgotten for 
long decades, in the 1960s and 1970s it has been taken up by two 
thinkers who developed the most important late insights o f 
Durkheim into their conclusion. These were Victor Turner and 
René Girard. Both started their career in literary criticism, but 
both shifted to anthropology (Turner relatively early, Girard much 
later). Turner picked up and developed the ideas o f van Gennep 
concerning liminality and the ries o f passage, while Girard those of 
Tarde about imitation and desire.
All these developments so far stayed rather separate, picked up 
here and there if they became fashionable (Weber with positivist 
sociology, Foucault with structuralism and post-modernism, 
Turner with the counterculture, etc.), but more often rather 
forgotten. They represent, however, a whole agenda for social 
thought; a tradition that is there and that has its own history and 
even "systematicity", in the sense o f constituting a precise 
configuration. The links are in the process o f forming, in front o f 




























































































history, something completely missing from the works o f 
Durkheim and Weber, even o f Mauss and Jaspers, has been made 
by Turner and Girard, while in his recent writings, Eisenstadt — 
who has been instrumental in calling the attention o f sociologists 
to the works o f Voegelin — has connected axial age and liminality 
(1995).
The approach combining anthropology and Ancient history 
constitutes a first step in giving a new direction to the self­
understanding o f modern society. Such a direction would all the 
more be welcome as this would represent a double challenge to a 
major complacency o f our age: the conviction that we are so 
different from all other societies that neither the evidence o f 
other cultures, nor our own past is relevant any longer for our 
problems. The contrast with the evidence o f both Ancient history 
and anthropology, on the other hand, as both Weber and 
Durkheim tried to indicate separately, does provide a way to map 
and situate ourselves in a context - understanding the specificity 
and the limits o f modern civilisation, beyond the mere 
proclaiming of its uniqueness.
Such a currently ongoing reorientation o f sociology, based on the 
synthesis o f a number o f independent lines o f investigation 
conducted in the century is, on the one hand, a genuine synthesis 
o f the works o f Durkheim and Weber, spanned by the tension 
existing between them, as Weber did had have much interest in 
anthropology and Durkheim never studied the history o f 
Antiquity; on the other hand, it would not simply contest the 
mainstream approaches or provide an alternative to them, but can 
truly aspire to move beyond them, to a different level, just as the 
late substantive works o f Durkheim and Weber added a 
dimension to their work that they were previously lacking.
If the events o f 1989 taught a lesson to social theory, currently 
being discussed under the the question "why did the social 
sciences fail to predict the collapse o f Communism?", this is that 




























































































condition. Such an understanding cannot be provided merely by 
formal modeling or the collection o f empirical data. It requires an 
explicit effort to understand the long-term concrete historical 
trends that have shaped us, that made us what we are, in contrast 
with the history and empirical reality o f the other cultures and 
civilisations o f our world. For such a purpose, it was necessary to 
gain an enormous amount o f concrete empirical knowledge that 
has not been possible to accumulate without a high degree o f 
specialisation. However, the specialised disciplines do not simply 
exist for their own sake - this is the "frog-perspective" o f 
academic departmentalism -, but for the sake o f the self­
understanding o f our modern world; a type o f knowledge that is 
especially needed today. Time and again, there is a necessity o f 
reflecting upon the results obtained, overcoming the partly 
necessary, but partly artificial disciplinary lines, and engage upon 
long-term personal projects that shed a particularly sharp and 
intense light on our condition. A way must be found to preserve 
the value and the message o f such works; something like a 
"second order" or "meta-sociology", in the sense o f Geertz (1973), 
that could, and should, take as its point o f departure exactly the 
"second" Weber and "Durkheim", and to which the work 
(especially the mature, late work) o f most o f the thinkers listed in 
the second group would belong — a discourse that would resist 
systematisation, as it would not be possible to integrate such 
insights into a system, but would preserve the specificity o f the 
thought o f each o f the thinkers, while using as the "inspiration" for 
concrete works the tension spanned between their writings, and 
that would not aim at a replacement o f the existing disciplines but 
would be lateral to them, existing not in opposition to them but, in 
a state o f symbiosis and not parasitism, would use them in order 
to get beyond, to move deeper, to help to understand what is 
going on with us at the moment.
In spite o f the difficulties — both intellectual institutional — that 
such an undertaking must face, it is a challenge one cannot afford 
not to take up if one wants to understand the world o f today and 





























































































(1) One can refer here to the Dialogues of Plato and his most 
important and autobiographical Seventh Epistle, the letters o f Paul 
and the Acts o f the Apostles, the Confessions o f Augustine, the 
Table Conversations of Luther, the Discourses and the Prince of 
Machiavelli, the Meditations o f Descartes and the autobiographical 
character o f his Discourse on Method.
(2) This does not mean that transcendence, universality, or 
method cannot be legitimate concerns. This depends on whether 
these are used in connection with experiences or against them; 
whether they subscribe to a fundamental "reality principle" in this 
sense. This implies that the most important, founding experiences 
are not "constructed" in the contemporary sense of social 
constructionism. They simple happen; are in this sense 
"primordial". It is, however, a reflection and elaboration on these 
experiences that creates those forms o f thought and action 
through which the re-living o f these experiences becomes 
accessible to others.
(3) In his excellent and much neglected account on the origins of 
Western individualism, Franz Borkenau discusses the first, old 
Norse occurence o f using the personal pronoun "I" in front o f the 
name of the person who is designated by the pronoun. This was 
the first declaration o f personal identity. The source, strangely, is 
contemporaneous with Augustine (Borkenau 1981, p. 133).
(4) Toynbee gained the decisive idea for his magnum opus 
when, during a train journey across Bulgaria on 17 September, 
1921, he recognised the identity o f the fox-skin cap worn by 
Bulgarian peasants and the one used in the expedition of Xerxes 
(1954, pp. vi-viii). Spengler's work was based on his perception of 
the "halcyon days" before W.W.I. (1932). Huizinga gained the idea 
for his book during a walk in a given Sunday afternoon around 
1907, described in minute detail in his posthumously published 
autobiography (Huizinga 1967, p. 564). Pirenne derived his idea 
during W.W.I. when he was in a German POW camp (1939, p. 9).
(5) In his first archeology, as Foucault explicitly acknowledged, 
the question o f change has been left suspended (1973, p. xii)
(6) This is discussed by Voegelin (1978). For the similar concept 
o f the 'front experience" in Wittgenstein and Patocka, see Monk 
(1991) and Patocka (1976/77).




























































































1. "Roscher's position ... is a point o f view which has been 
obsolete for quite some time, and no one in our discipline would 
waste his time criticising its substantive aspects today. However, 
it would be a mistake to assume that for this reason the logical 
weaknesses which lie concealed within Roscher's position are in 
general clearer to us today than they were to him ." (Weber 1975 
[1903], p. 211, italics in original).
2. "The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping 
from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of 
us have been, into every comer o f our minds" (Keynes 1964 
[1936], p. viii)
3. "Thought exists, well beyond and well within systems and 
edifices o f discourse. It is something which often hides itself, but 
it always animates everyday behavior. There is always a little bit 
o f thought even in the silliest institutions, always some thought 
even in mute habits. Criticism consists in driving this thought out 
o f hiding and trying to change it: showing that things are not as 
obvious as we might believe, doing it in such a way that what we 
accept as going without saying no longer goes without saying. To 
criticize is to render the too-easy gestures difficult" (Foucault, 
1982).
Weber, Keynes and Foucault managed to escape these limits. 
Their opponents did not want to. Most of the Weberians, 
Keynesians and Foucaldians did neither. That is why the original 
classic works have remained just as fresh as they were at the time 
o f their writing.
(8) Weber covered the political and the social part o f the same 
process under the name o f "charisma".
(9) These methodological remarks can be traced back to 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy o f Morals, Preface, no. 6. Furthermore, 
Nietzsche probably developed here some o f the ideas o f Ritschl 
and these, through Troeltsch and Hamack, may have influenced 
Weber's thought in another channel as well.
(10) These articles provide important insights into the possibility 
o f connecting personal and civilisational identity, an issue 
paricularly relevant for especially the later work o f Weber and 
Durkheim, and will be revisited in the conclusion. Two additional 
facts help to make this point especially pertinent. First, the 
manner in which the connections between Robertson Smith and 
Durkheim were connected to the question o f Jewish identity has 
an exact parallel in the way Yerushalmi (1991) has recently 
explained Freud's Moses , as this work, just as Totem and Taboo, 




























































































Smith. Second, Franz Borkenau, one of the most fascinating and 
unjustly forgotten scholars o f the century, a here noir o f the 
Frankfurt school, a former Communist official who has been 
among the very firsts who broke with communism and who 
became the first analyst and critique o f totalitarianism, a person 
who, given his half-Jewish origins and the strongly catholic, Jesuit 
upbringing he has received was especially sensitive to the 
question of identity, has located in his posthumous magnum opus 
the decisive origins o f Christianity and Western civilisation in the 
innovation of the dogma of the Eucharist, even comparing it to 
totemism (1981, pp. 407-10).
A concern with Jewish identity and the recognition of 
modernity have further links. If, following the characterisation of 
Baudelaire, Walter Benjamin and others, modernity can be 
considered as a "permanent state o f transition”, a special emphasis 
on the fleeting and the transitory, then the source o f this state can 
be located in three archetypical figures, the monk, the pilgrim and 
the crusader that form a tight series. The pilgrim is a monk on the 
move (Dupront 1987, p. 370), while the crusades are "paroxystic 
pilgrimages" (Dupront 1987, p. 256), the crusaders armed pilgrims 
(Flori 1992, p. 454) or "monks at war" (Seward 1995). The 
relevance o f these three archetypal figures for modernity has 
been discovered and put at the center o f analysis by Weber, 
Dupront and Victor Turner. In each o f these figures, there is a 
clear break with the past, a running away from home and the 
accommodation to a permanently transitory, homeless way o f life. 
However, this state has another model in the form o f the exile, a 
figure also o f considerable importance for the thought o f the 
twentieth century, and that has been also central for the stoics of 
the Antiquity (van Geytenbeck 1963, pp. 141-51). Now, in a 
fundamental sense, the state o f permanent homelessness and exile 
has been at the heart o f Jewish identity, ever since the symbolic 
figures o f Abraham and Moses. Therefore, a reflection on Jewish 
identity provides a privileged access to the heart o f understanding 
the modem condition.
(11) For the detailed plan o f the reforms suggested in higher 
education, see Renan (1871, pp. 95ff). For a good collection of 
passages revealing his interests, see Deploige (1938, p. 122), also 
quoted in Lukes (1973, p. 86).
(13) In Durkheim (1975, vol.l, p. 409). The reference is missing 
in the otherwise reliable name index of the book.
(14) Mauss (1928, p. 506). This claim is somewhat problematic, as 




























































































as something different from the social sciences, to which he 
assigns sociology.
(15) The possible significance o f such a travel experience can be 
indirectly supported by accounts o f other scholars who had 
similarly decisive experiences during their travels abroad, and 
who told their story. Lukes is using the example o f Camille Jullian 
who traveled in Germany during 1882-83 with a similar purpose 
(1973, p.86, fn.2). But one could also refer to other, more 
significant examples. In their autobiographical interviews, Eric 
Voegelin (1989) and Jan Patocka (1981, p. 170) both underline 
the impact a visit in France and especially in the United States 
(from Austria) and in France and especially in Germany (from 
Czechoslovakia) had on them during the 1920s and 1930s. The 
case o f Talcott Parsons will be discussed in detail later. Finally, 
one could also mention the names of Tocqueville and Weber, both 
o f whom had major travel experiences in the United States. In his 
recent article reconstructing Weber's visit, Rollman (1993) makes 
the suggestion that a comparison of the visits of Weber and 
Tocqueville would make a fascinating topic. This suggestion could 
be taken up and extended. It would be worthwhile studying, in a 
comparative framework, the impact o f travel experiences on the 
birth o f modern thought - either by comparing the different 
scholars (the names listed above would already justify such an 
undertaking), or with an eye on the scholastic exchange in the 
Middle Ages or the early modern period. In such an analysis, one 
o f the crucial variables must be actual biological age at the time of 
the encounter. Thus, all those thinkers who were stamped in a 
very definite manner were in their 20s at the time o f the impact 
(Parsons was 23-24, Voegelin 23-25, Patocka 24-26, Tocqueville 
26-27, Durkheim 27-8), while Weber was already past 40 when 
he went to St Louis.
(16) As opposed to this, in one of the rare articles covering 
Durkheim's early reviews, Giddens attributes to him the idea that 
only a sociologist can study properly the diversity o f moral facts, 
and also that his major aim was the scientific study o f moral facts 
(1970, pp. 140-2). In 1886-7, however, Durkheim was not a 
sociologist studying moral facts, but had the intention of 
establishing a science o f morals in the pursuit o f solving practical, 
social and national, exigencies.
(17) One may wonder about the reasons for Deploige's insistence 
concerning Durkheim's German connection, suspecting sinister 
motives. However, there was nothing o f the sort. The book was 




























































































English edition in 1938, just one year before WWII. Yet, there was 
not a single allusion to this matter in it. Deploige was a Catholic 
theologian, not a French nationalist. His main argument, based on 
a detailed reconstruction of French and German intellectual 
history, is that behind the German sources o f Durkheim, there is 
noone else than Rousseau. According to Deploige, therefore, 
Durkheim has not picked up in Germany an "indigenous" tradition, 
but exactly a stream produced by the reception of the ideas of 
Rousseau spread by the French revolution.
(18) The original source is Baumgarten (1964, pp. 554-5), and is 
available in English in Hennis (1988, p. 146). Hennis also starts his 
fourth chapter entitled 'The traces o f Nietzsche in the work of 
Weber' with the quote. His work has been a major inspiration for 
this section.
(19) The first allusion on the possible influence of Nietzsche on 
Weber were made by Heuss in 1958, Mommsen in 1959, and 
finally with more determination and impact by Aron and 
Fleischmann in 1964 (Albrow 1990, pp. 55-7). However, both 
Aron and Mommsen took up only one aspect o f Weber's reading of 
Nietzsche, the same that has already been picked up by Friedrich 
Naumann in 1895, and - in the case o f Aron who mentions 
Nietzsche together with Darwin - with considerable distortions.
(20) Thus, first, right after the second anticritical essay, Weber 
started to work on the new edition o f his Agrarian Sociology o f 
Antiquity, suddenly honouring a request o f his editor that he was 
not able to meet since years due to his poor health. Second, almost 
the moment he completed the 'Anticritical last word', the second 
essay in the second series o f exchanges, he became embarked in a 
long-run project on the economic ethic o f world religions, never 
even considered before, while suddenly developing an interest in 
mysticism and the Stefan George circle. Third, just when he 
started to revise his essays on Ancient Judaism for publication, in 
the fall o f 1916, he suddenly became able to keep public lectures 
after a break o f almost two decades, as he found his "identity", 
recognising a high degree o f similarity between his role and the 
Hebrew prophets, especially Jeremiah - a role that could be called 
a "recogniser", an "antiprophetical prophet" (Scaff 1989) ora  
parrhesiast (Foucault 1983, 1984, 1995), while at the same time 
having intense recollections o f his childhood.
(21) Repetitiveness, as the previous examples show, has a special 
importance for effective meditative exercises or, to use the 




























































































(22) To give only one example, the chronology brings together for 
each year the events without any monthly order.
(23) In the absence o f any evidence, one could only conjecture 
that this could have been motivated not only by the experience of 
writing, but also by the reading experience o f Marx. Even if Knies 
could have initiated Weber into Marx in the early 1880s, it was 
probably only when working on his thesis that Weber has made 
effective use o f Marx. At any rate, the impact o f some o f the key 
concepts o f Marx are visible both in Weber's dissertation and 
habilitation theses, though this view has been challenged (Roth 
1971). Two comments must be added here. First, a proper 
assessment o f the impact Marx and Nietzsche may have had on 
Nietzsche is often prevented by the presumption that such an 
assertion alleges that Weber thus has become a "converted" 
Marxist or Nietzschean, in the sense in which others define the 
meaning o f being Marxist and Nietzschean. (In order to avoid this 
confusion, the paper will use the adjective "Nietzschean" in 
parentheses when applying to Weber, indicating that he read 
Nietzsche in his manner, and not according to the standard 
reception). Second, given the situation of the late 1880s and the 
association Marx's name aroused in "bourgeois academic" circles, 
Max Weber had very good reasons to keep it for himself that he 
has effectively used some o f the works and ideas o f Marx.
(24) I owe this reference to Scaff (1984a) Strangely enough, the 
article is missing from Krummel (1974) that aims for 
completeness in the early Nietzsche reception.
(25) Concerning the reading of the Untimely Meditations, "a work 
that was dedicated entirely to a struggle with the epigonistic spirit 
o f the time" (Hennis 1988, p. 151), see also Roth (1990, pp. 22-3), 
and Scaff (1984b, p. 90); with special attention being paid to the 
second meditation that "was certainly one o f the greatest 
formative experiences" o f Weber (Hennis 1988, p. 248, fn. 68). 
Concerning the reading Zarathustra , see especially the July 1894 
letters written to Marianne (Scaffl989, p. 128).
(26) Discussed in Kasler (1988, p. 66), and Frank (1987, p. 9).
(27) This reference is also missing from the quite sloppy index of 
the Biography.
(28) Marianne Weber was a person o f very delicate sensitivity 




























































































Except for the themes that she was not informed or considered as 
taboo, her perceptions and recognitions not only can and must be 
trusted, but are indispensable.
(29) Though this fact is well-known, even those who have 
emphasised the impact Nietzsche exerted on Weber failed to 
consider the potential relevance o f posthumous publications. The 
only allusion in the literature to the correlation between the 
dynamics o f Weber's work and the posthumous Nietzsche 
publications is in Fleischman (1964, p. 229), though the point was 
not elaborated in detail.
(30) Concerning the plausibility o f the existence o f a code, one 
could evoke Guenther Roth who stated about Economy and Society 
, the most "systematic" and "objective" work o f Weber, that "the 
work is full o f irony, sarcasm and the love o f paradox: a dead-pan 
expression may imply a swipe at the Kaiser, status-conscious 
professors or pretentious littérateurs." (1978, p. xxxiv). 
Concerning the feasibility o f Weber engaging in such a game of not 
referring directly to Nietzsche, several reasons could explain his 
attitude. First, he certainly wanted to keep himself away from the 
Nietzsche reception. After the initial discussion in the early 1890s 
when the official and counter-official dogmatism has not yet 
settled itself, Nietzsche was appropriated on the basis o f what was 
the worse in him (this much Weber has explicitly stated), and was 
assimilated into the extremist fringes of the contemporary gender 
and sexual politics, and social and political prophecy. Second, there 
was a personal element involved. Max did not simply refrain from 
"hurting the feelings" o f Marianne, but probably did not want an 
open (public) conflict to break out between the two o f them in the 
actual context o f the Nietzsche reception, and given the huge 
disappointment the non-encounter o f his wife caused him related 
to some o f his most important hopes in his life.
(31) For two clear and important examples o f distancing his very 
undertaking from the work o f Rickert, placed at the start o f two of 
his methodological essays, see the first footnote to the Prefatory 
Note to the essay on Roscher and Knies (1975, p. 209) and the first 
two pages o f his essay on Meyer (1949, pp. 113-4). The 
circumstances are again particularly relevant, as Weber was 
gestating the idea o f writing these two pieces exactly at the time 
when he wrote the two letters praising Rickert as a logician.
(32) Honigsheim 1968, p.19. Strangely enough, the name o f Riehl 




























































































(33) It is not accidental that the only direct references to 
Nietzsche were contained in explicitly educative messages 
delivered to (his) students, like the letter written to Else in 1907 
or the lecture "Science as a Vocation"; while in the Protestant Ethic 
, he used the Nietzschean expression "last men" without reference, 
while using quotation marks for a long "Nietzschean" sentence that 
was evidently not quoted from anywhere.
(34) A good indication for the analogy in terms o f the use o f 
Nietzsche's spirit as opposed to a mechanical imitation is that the 
essay on Roscher and Knies is closest to Nietzsche's fifth Untimely 
Meditation , "We Classicists", that was written in 1874-75, but was 
only published as an Untimely Meditation in 1910.
(35) The exact manner in which Weber could have developed this 
task in detail can be partially studied by differences in the 
subsequent editions o f the Will to Power. Thus, fragment No. 462 
selected as the epigraph by Antonio (1995) in his recent article 
analysing Nietzsche's "Antisociology" ("... In place o f "sociology", a 
theory o f the forms o f domination. In place o f "society", the 
cultural complex, as my chief interest."), also used by Fleischman 
(1964, p. 235), was published only in 1906, not in 1901. Even if 
Weber's approach was certainly not an "antisociology", it was an 
"antisociological sociology" — just as he was an "antiprophetlcal 
prophet".
(36) This happened in spite o f the fact that Weber devoted a 
huge amount o f space in the Protestant Ethic to this question. A 
short comparison between the ways in which Weber, Durkheim 
and Parsons have defined their problem can be done by 
comparing the amount o f space each devoted to this issue. This 
can be easily done, as each of them start by giving "The Problem" 
as the title to the very first segment o f their book. For Weber, this 
is the whole first part o f the Protestant Ethic , published first as a 
separate essay, and extending to 60 pages in a text o f 150 
(without notes). For Durkheim, in the Division o f Labor, it is the 
Introduction, covering 33 pages o f over 400 in the first edition, 
but reduced to a mere eight pages in the second edition where the 
discussion o f other thinkers has been cut out. For Parsons, in the 
Structure , it is the first section o f the first chapter, not more than 
three pages in a text o f over 800.
(37) About this, see fn. 20 above.
(38) For the first position, see Riesebrodt (1986); for the second, 




























































































so far as to claim that Weber and Schmoller "were so remote from 
each other that... they could be classified as intellectual 
antipodes." (1987, p. 59).
(39) Combining the works of Hennis on Knies and Factor and
Turner on Ihering, one could say that the originality o f Weber lay 
in using the insights and spirit o f Nietzsche as the substance in the 
framework derived from the works o f Ihering and Knies that was 
appropriated through his university studies.
(40) It was exactly references to the work of Kraepelin that 
Sorokin (1976, p. 12) found missing in the contemporary 
discussions. Concerning such omissions, Parsons later claimed that 
noone has introduced him into Weber's empirical works in 
Germany (Lazarsfeld and Oberschall 1965, p. 194). On the one 
hand, this is a telling proof about the care with which his heritage 
was handled; on the other hand, however, given that Weber's role 
in the Archiv was common knowledge, one could have expected 
Parsons to devote more attention at least to Weber's earlier 
publications in this journal.
(40B) Thus, in the Preface to the 1968 paperback edition of 
Structure , he proudly and in detail enumerates the number of 
copies the book sold — an attitude that can be contrasted with 
Weber's refusal to reproduce the Protestant Ethic without an 
overall reorganisation, despite the repeated, almost desperate 
insistance of the publisher about its certain success. Later Parsons 
states again with evident pride that his analytical introduction to 
the translation o f the first part o f Economy and Society went up 
to 83 pages, and that he gave the lead-off statement in a 1977 
conference (1980, pp. 42-3).
(41) One is reminded here o f the epigraph Eric Voegelin chose 
from Augustinus for his 5-volume study o f Order and History, 
spanning three millenia o f world history and almost four decades 
o f his life: "In the study o f creature one should not exercise a vain 
and perishing curiosity, but ascend toward what is immortal and 
everlasting."
(42) The significance o f this fact cannot be exaggerated. The 
secure establishment o f sociology as a separate academic 
discipline, first with Durkheim and then with Parsons, was rooted 
not in a long, in-depth appropriation and digestion of different 
intellectual traditions, but in the popularisation o f a so far little 



























































































- I l l  -
legitimate to wonder about the extent to which sociology has 
managed to go beyond this limited vision.
(43) In this case, however, it seems better to avoid the 
controversial point of the "originality" o f the idea altogether.
There are two reasons for that. First, during 1905-1910, there was 
a very strong interaction between Weber and Michels, and much 
o f the eventual views on bureaucratisation o f both thinkers owed 
a lot to this interaction. Second, however, the fundamental 
experience, in this case, was Michels's. This was at the center o f 
his whole life and work, while for Weber, it was only an episode.
(44) A further proof that Weber's views on bureaucracy were 
rooted the "dark years" o f 1905-1910, related to the debates with 
Schmoller and the association with Michels and Alfred Weber is 
that his writings on the psychophysics o f industrial labor show 
marked affinities to the theme. Thus, in the concluding pages of 
his methodological introduction, elaborating suggestions made by 
his brother Alfred concerning the independence o f the 
bureaucratic machine from the question o f "capitalist" or 
"socialist" organisation, Weber describes the factory as a "modem 
workshop with its official hierarchy, its discipline, its chaining of 
worker to the machine, its agglomeration and yet at the same time 
... its isolation of workers, its huge calculating machinery, 
stretching right down to the simplest manipulation o f the worker" 
(Eldridge 1970, p. 155). This is almost identical with the 
descriptions provided by Foucault in Discipline and Punish , 
demonstrating that Weber was very much aware o f the points 
which O'Neill (1985, p. 57) missed in him. The real connection 
between Weber and Foucault lies elsewhere. Shortly after 
finishing these works, they both realised that these were only 
intermediate products that they had to overcome, and within a 
few years, they both switched the center o f their work to the 
Antiquity, embarking on the genealogy of the ascetic ideal and of 
modem subjectivity.
(45) Economy and Society itself can serve as further illustration 
o f the hidden antagonism. Schonberg, the compiler o f the original 
Handbook, was the other professor o f Alfred (Demm 1987, p. 89). 
When Max Weber refused for a long time to become the editor of 
the new version, he repeatedly suggested his younger brother to 
the publisher — with no avail.
(46) See especially the letters o f January 8, 1909 (MWG 11/6, 
p.19), January 12 (p. 26) February 1 (pp. 46ff) March 28 (p. 84) 




























































































(47) This concept has recently been taken up by Pierre Hadot, 
emeritus professor o f the Collège de France. Hadot (1995) is very 
explicit that the idea o f a philosophical life is directly opposed to 
the contemporary interpretation o f the task o f academic 
philosophy. In this way, we can give a perfectly coherent 
interpretation o f the debate between Rickert and Jaspers. Rickert, 
like all scholastics, i.e. individuals who derive their power from 
the institutional arrangement o f the academic system, was correct 
in his own way that Jaspers was not really a philosopher 
according to the strict institutional requirements. On the other 
hand, Jaspers in fact has been a philosopher in the classical sense 
o f the philosophical life, as resurrected by Hadot. Needless to say, 
this point is not "against" institutions. Institutions, like all rules 
and forms, provide the frameworks for life and thought. However, 
the application o f institutional rules always requires human 
judgment; and it is one o f the fundamental tasks of social thought 
to identify those individual thinkers who, not being confident 
enough in the power of their own work and thought, have used 
the insitutional sources o f power to get rid o f their intellectual 
opponents whose power of thought and originality they feared.
(48) Two examples can shed light on this point. Elias and Voegelin 
have both used in crucial parts o f their work two o f those 
concepts o f Weber that have been central for his work but have 
been disregarded in Weberian sociology. First, the Weberian 
inspiration o f the work o f Elias can be shown by his frequent use 
o f the concept "stamping". For e.g. he used it four times in the last 
two paragraphs o f the original introduction to his 1933 
dissertation, the Court Society (1969, pp. 66-7), three o f which 
were preserved in the English edition (1983, pp. 39-40). Elias 
chose Karl Mannheim over Alfred Weber and followed him to 
Frankfurt. Weber is often referred to in the book, is taken as the 
point o f reference with respect to the further advances are to be 
made - an attitude that certainly would have pleased him. Elias 
only developed his anti-Weberian polemics in England, for 
obvious reasons. Voegelin, in one o f his most important 
expressions, das Verbot der Fragestellung (the prohibition o f 
questioning), takes up another key Weberian term, Fragestellung . 
This concept has been developed by Weber during the reflection 
on the underlying problem of his works and the writing o f the 
anticritical essays; see the letters o f 13 October 1908 (MWG II/5, 
p. 675), and 12 October 1910 (MWG II/6, p. 644). It is contained 
in the provisional title o f his methodological essay in the original 
plan for what became Economy and Society ('Objekt und logische 




























































































o f the Vorbemerkung. Interestingly, Ch. Turner (1992, p.176, 
fn.19) conjectures that the fact that Hennis uses the word 
Fragestellung in the title o f the German original o f his book shows 
that he was influenced by Voegelin. In any case, Voegelin and 
Hennis, those two scholars who in the 1950s and 1960s were the 
most outspoken opponents o f "Weberian" sociology (ibid, p. 8), 
took up and used a central conceptual innovation o f Weber of 
which it was even forgotten that it has been developed by him.
(49) There is a particularly revealing passage in which Foucault 
has recognised the affinity between his work and Weber's, due to 
the common stamping impact of Netzsche. In an unpublished 
section o f an interview, Foucault stated in 1983 that "if Nietzsche 
interests me, this is only to the extent that Nietzsche for Weber 
was absolutely determining, even if in general it is not said" 
(1983b, p.14). One has to be careful in reading this section: it does 
not mean that Foucault has read Nietzsche through Weber — 
Foucault has only developed a serious interest in Weber after 
1979 —, but a late recognition o f the fundamental commonality of 
their undertaking.
(50) During the 1940s, Parsons and Voegelin were engaged in a 
correspondance (Gerhardt 1993).
(51) One could refer to the trivial example o f the rough 
contemporaneity o f Skinner and Pavlov.
(52) Camic (1991) quotes extensively from the letter in several 
places, though he is not combining the points and therefore its 
significance is lost.
(53) The claim o f Gerhardt, however, that the book had an 
implicit political message (1993, p . l l ) ,  cannot be accepted, or only 
to the extent that any book in the social sciences at that time that 
was not explicitly fascist in orientation probably had the same 
"message". This seems to be a superfluous defense o f Parsons 
against attacks that are not legitimate.
(54) Parsons noticed the real Nazi threat exactly at the moment 
when the general public. Thus, writing about Hitler's intentions 
concerning the Holocaust, Gordon A. Craig states that "[t]he 
striking thing about the elaboration o f this program is that it 
elicited no sigiflcant protests from the German universities or 
churches, from the civil service or the courts, or from the general 
public. Even critics o f other aspects o f Nazi policy were strangely 




























































































1938" (1996, p. 6). As opposed to this, Max Weber, and before him 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Hermann Baumgarten, already foresaw 
after (or even in) 1870-71 that something was fundamentally 
going wrong with German society. Of course, they did not predict 
the Holocaust, but there is a rather direct link between what they 
noticed and what eventually happened. This issue is similar to the 
debate that has recently started about the failure o f the social 
sciences to predict the fall o f the Berlin wall.
(55) The Preface o f the translator, George Simpson is dated 
November 1933 (p. xi). Parsons himself acknowledges that the 
"clue" to Durkheim's work was Division o f Labor (1970, p. 829), 
though fails to add that he himself recognised this exactly the 
moment the English edition was published.
(56) As Durkheim's name is only mentioned in two of the 
footnotes (note 33, p. 170 and note 38, page 171), but not in the 
text, it is highly probable that the review was first written before 
the reading of Division o f Labor, and the references to Durkheim 
were only inserted in last minute.
(57) In spite o f this, Wearne (1989, p. 43) still locates the use o f 
Durkheim's theory by Parsons as late as 1935.
(58) Giddens has also recognised this fact (1990, p.141, fn.18).
(59) Two further points could make this arguments about such 
hidden influences and recognitions more acceptable. The first is 
theoretical, and is concerned with the weight given to recognition 
in the recent work of Alessandro Pizzorno (1987, 1994). The 
second is that the assumed Durkheim - Parsons connection, in 
terms o f recognition, extends, with an almost perfect analogy, to 
the Robertson Smith - Durkheim link. Smith first travelled to 
Germany in 1868, at the age o f 22 (Beidelman 1974). His first 
paper, written and delivered orally just before his trip, was 
entitled "Prophecy and Personality". His first publications came 
out after his return. They bear witness to the German experience 
as, apart one or two papers belonging to mathematics, he wrote a 
few short pieces related to Hegel, while his first major article, 
published after his second return from Germany, is entitled 
"Prophecy in the Critical Schools o f the Continent", and his first 
major book o f research that, according to Beidelman, is "perhaps 





























































































(60) This is quite reminescent o f the old meaning o f positivism, 
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